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INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court has decided that certain types of law, when
challenged, are presumptively unconstitutional, while others are
presumptively permissible. Laws containing racial classifications, for
example, have been deemed to be presumptively unconstitutional,
and to violate the Equal Protection Clause unless the government
shows those classifications to be "necessary" to achieve a "compelling''
state interest.1 The Court has applied a presumption of
unconstitutionality, and a similar formulation of "strict scrutiny," not
only to laws containing racial classifications, but also to laws that
classify according to the content of speech;2 laws that burden the free
exercise of religion;a laws that burden the right to choose abortion;4
laws that burden the right to travel;5 indeed, laws that burden the
full range of rights deemed to be "fundamental."6
1. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) (Racial "classifications are
constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental
interests."); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984) (Racial "classifications are
subject to the most exacting scrutiny; to pass constitutional muster, they must be
justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be 'necessary . . . to the
accomplishment' of their legitimate purpose." (citations omitted)).
2. See Simon & Schuster v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991) (To validate a law targeting speech based on content, "the
State must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest
and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.").
3. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1963) (requiring burdens on
religious exercise to be justified by a "compelling" governmental interest); Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603 ("The state may justify a limitation on
religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding
governmental interest.").
4. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) ("Where certain 'fundamental rights'
are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified
only by a 'compelling state interest,' and that legislative enactments must be narrowly
drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake.") (citations omitted).
5. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (A classification penalizing
the right to travel is unconstitutional "unless shown to be necessary to promote a
compelling governmental interest.").
6. Why does the government bear this burden under these disparate
circumstances? Does "strict scrutiny" mean the same thing for enforcing the Equal
Protection Clause, the speech clause, the free exercise clause, and the Due Process
Clause? Should it mean the same thing? How can variations on one vague verbal
formula serve to vindicate the range of disparate values that must underlie
constitutional protections against racial discrimination, censorship of speech, and
restrictions on the right to choose, to travel, or to worship? What, if anything, does
"strict scrutiny" have to do with the particular constitutional values underlying the
proscriptions in these disparate areas? Do particular constitutional values matter in
those doctrinal contexts in which the Court has established "strict scrutiny'' as the test
of constitutionality? Should they? What, precisely, does the government have to prove
under "strict scrutiny'' when defending a racial classification, a content-based
regulation of speech, an intrusion on the exercise of religion, an intrusion on a right of
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In contrast, the Court presumes that facially neutral laws
challenged as inflicting unconstitutional racial discrimination do not
violate the Equal Protection Clause.7 Such a law will be upheld
unless the challenger proves that "a racially discriminatory purpose
has been a motivating factor" in the law's enactment.s In another
constitutional context, the Court at one time treated as
presumptively unconstitutional federal statutes enacted under the
Commerce Clause that regulated subjects other than interstate
commerce.9 Today, the Court treats such statutes as presumptively
permissible-at least if Congress has regulated economic activityIOand treats as presumptively impermissible Commerce Clause
legislation that regulates non-economic activity.11
How has the Court determined which types of law should be
presumed permissible, and which types presumed impermissible?
How should the Court make these determinations? Beyond
presumptions, in particular constitutional challenges under
particular constitutional provisions, has the Court clearly identified
what the challenger must prove to overcome a presumption of
permissibility, or what the government must show to overcome a
presumption of impermissibility? How should the Court determine,
and articulate, what must be shown to overcome these presumptions?
The foregoing questions reflect two functionally discrete issues
that courts must confront in deciding particular constitutional
controversies. First, what is the substantive definition of
governmental action that violates particular provisions of the
Constitution? In other words, what substantive constitutional
principles define restrictions on governmental discretion? Second,
what party should bear the burden of persuasion with respect to a
privacy, or an intrusion on the right to travel? In determining whether a state interest
is "compelling," does a court decide an issue of law, fact, or mixed law and fact? See
infra note 30.
7. See Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-266
(1977).
8. Id. At times, the Court characterizes the task of establishing
unconstitutionality as a matter of making a "showing;" at other times, as a matter of
establishing "proof." Compare Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in Arlington
Heights, 429 U.S. at 265 ("Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required
to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause."), with Justice Powell's opinion in
California Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305 (1978) ("[I]n order to justify
the use of a suspect classification, a State must show that its purpose or interest is
both constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use of the classification
is 'necessary . . . to the accomplishment' of its purpose or the safeguarding of its
interest.") (citations omitted).
9. See generally Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
10. See generally United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
11. See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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court's determination of whether that substantive definition of
unconstitutionality has been violated; and how should that burden be
discharged? In other words, through what adjudicative rules should
courts determine whether a particular governmental act violates a
substantive definition of unconstitutionality?
This Article will suggest that each of these two issues ought to be
addressed explicitly in formulating doctrine for the adjudication of
constitutional controversies. In doing so, my argument rests on a
fundamental distinction that parallels that raised in Mitchell
Berman's work on "constitutional decision rules."12 Berman argues
that scholars and judges should "concentrate on developing a
functional taxonomy" of constitutional doctrine,13 suggesting a
distinction between "doctrines that represent the judiciary's
understanding of the proper meaning of a constitutional power, right,
duty, or other sort of provision" (which he terms "constitutional
operative provisions") and "doctrines that direct courts how to decide
whether a constitutional operative provision is satisfied" (which he
terms "constitution decision rules").14
In my view, Berman's work is on a track that could-and
should-lead to a new paradigm for thinking about constitutional
law. I have been working a similar track in my teaching for over
twenty years, and for the past five years have been formalizing my
analyses in writing this Article. Toward developing this conceptual
distinction between rules that define constitutional meaning
(substantive constitutional principles) and rules for determining
whether a particular challenged governmental act violates a
substantive constitutional principle (adjudicative rules), my route is
different from Berman's.15 Berman develops the distinction as
12. See Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004)
[hereinafter Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules]; see also Mitchell N. Berman,
Guillen and Gullibility: Piercing the Surface of Commerce Clause Doctrine, 89 IOWA L.
REV. 1487, 1519-23 (2004) [hereinafter Berman, Guillen and Gullibility]; Mitchell N.
Berman, Managing Gerrymandering, 83 TEXAS L. REV. 781 (2005) [hereinafter
Berman, Managing Gerrymandering].
13. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, supra note 12, at 8.
14. Id. at 9.
15. Imagine my mix of reactions when I happened upon Professor Berman's article
in late June of 2005, (as I was clumsily searching in Westlaw for the cite to Robert
Nagel's Formulaic Constitution), just as this piece was nearing completion, after so
many years of classroom percolation and four years of deliberate-speed paced writing.
The proposition that constitutional doctrine should be explicitly structured in terms of
substantive and adjudicative rules seemed so foundational to me, and almost obvious,
but since no one had sharply made the point in the two centuries during which the
Court has been crafting constitutional doctrine, I did not expect that anyone else soon
would. I was wrong. But this makes all the more interesting the independent-and
different-routes that we take to reach a similar conclusion. The notion first occurred
to me the first time I taught McCulloch v. Maryland, in the fall of 1983. For a
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"taxonomy," a framework for categorizing doctrinal rules. He teases
the distinction through providing his own refining responses to
positions taken by two Justices dissenting in recent cases,16 and to
positions asserted by contemporary scholars engaged in their own
meta-critiques of constitutional doctrine.11 I derive the distinction as
intrinsic to the nature of adjudication-whether tort, contract,
criminal, or constitutional adjudication-and, beyond this, as
essential to achieving the special functions that constitutionalism
and judicial review exist to serve.is
Viewing the distinction between substantive constitutional
principles and adjudicative rules as intrinsic and foundational,19 I go
prescriptive steps beyond Berman in suggesting what ought to be
done with it. Berman urges that "judges, scholars, and litigators
should make greater efforts to distinguish whether a constitutional
rule is an announcement of constitutional meaning (i.e., a
constitutional operative proposition) or, instead, is a constitutional
decision rule, and should pay attention, in the making of
constitutional decision rules, to the particular considerations that

discussion of McCulloch, see infra text accompanying notes 327-49. The insight's
significance seemed enhanced the first time I taught Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke,
the following spring. For a discussion of Powell's opinion in Bakke, see infra Parts
111.C, 111.D.l.a-b. It took all these years for me to fully develop the proposition that
constitutional doctrine ought to be framed explicitly in terms of substantive
constitutional principles and adjudicative rules (which I called "judicial proof rules" in
those early years).
16. In particular, Berman focuses on Justice Scalia's dissent in United States v.
Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), and Justice Breyer's dissent in Board of Trustees of the
University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). See Berman, Constitutional
Decision Rules, supra note 12, at 24-29, 54-60.
17. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term-Foreword: The
Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26 (2000-2001); Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 54 (1997-1998); Henry P. Monahan, The Supreme Court, 1974 TermForeword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975); Lawrence Gene
Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1977-1978); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules,
55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 TermForeword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996-1997).
18. See infra Part II (discussing adjudicative and political functions of judicial
review).
19. Berman also posits an intrinsic necessity for categorizing his operative
propositions and decision rules. "A decision rule of some sort is unavoidable because
application of the operative propositions confronts epistemic uncertainty." Berman,
Constitutional Decision Rules, supra note 12, at 93. Thus, some of the differences in
our rationales for suggesting that constitutional doctrine is (Berman), or ought to be
(Chang), comprised at least implicitly (Berman), or preferably explicitly (Chang), of
operative propositions (or substantive constitutional principles) and decision rules (or
adjudicative rules), are differences of emphasis.
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might justify its construction."20 Although he discusses benefits that
could result from categorizing extant doctrinal rules as "operative
propositions" or "decision rules,"21 Berman suggests that "[s]ome
benefits of treating the distinction seriously (as well, admittedly, as
some costs) are likely to be hard to envision before a judicial and
scholarly practice of doing so emerges."22 He eschews recommending
that "when announcing doctrine, a court should always make clear
which aspects of that doctrine are operative propositions and which,
if any, are decision rules,"23 urging, instead, that "courts, scholars,
and litigators ... should think and speak in terms of [this 'doctrinal
taxonomy'] when doing so would be productive."24
I do recommend that Justices always should derive and define
constitutional doctrine explicitly in terms of substantive
constitutional principles and adjudicative rules-or should explain
why they choose to leave the matter ambiguous. Toward reaching
that conclusion, I closely examine judicial opinions in a range of
contexts-from Justice Marshall's early nineteenth century
federalism in McCulloch u. Maryland,25 to Justice Powell's late
twentieth century equal protection in California Board of Regents u.
Bakke,26 and beyond. I identify the substantive constitutional
principles and adjudicative rules implicit in those opinions, discuss
the significant benefits that could have been achieved had the
implicit been made explicit (and significant costs from failing to have
done so), and sketch how the Justices could have framed their
opinions explicitly in such terms. Furthermore, while Berman
emphasizes the taxonomy of existing doctrine, I emphasize the
reformulation of existing doctrine and the creation of new doctrine.
Berman largely eschews "staking ourselves to any claims about the
sorts of considerations upon which courts might rely in the derivation
and formulation of either" kind of rule;21 I explore the discrete

20. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, supra note 12, at 13. In endorsing
Berman's suggestion that constitutional doctrine ought to be categorized in terms of
operative propositions and decision rules, Professor Kermit Roosevelt has suggested
particular considerations relevant for framing decision rules. See Kermit Roosevelt III,
Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L.
REV. 1649 (2005). For my views on considerations relevant for framing adjudicative
rules, see infra text at notes 142-57, 478-81. For discussion of Roosevelt's views on
decision rules, see infra note 142.
21. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, supra note 12, at 83-107.
22. Id. at 83.
23. Id. at 108.
24. Id.
25. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
26. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
27. See Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, supra note 12, at 60.
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considerations that are essential to the derivation, definition, and
legitimacy of each kind of rule.2s
Because positing the fundamental distinction between
substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules can
reorient the way that people think about constitutional law, the
concept bears generative efforts that pursue alternative routes-not
redundant, but mutually reinforcing-toward its explicit recognition
and development. Thus, I construct a track parallel to that laid by
Berman, the destination of which is the explicit distinction between
substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules. I
suggest a payoff from traveling this track that goes beyond taxonomy
of extant constitutional doctrines.29 The payoff includes, first, a
prescription as to how Justices ought to structure constitutional
28. Berman suggests that "the more difficult it is to reach agreement on the proper
characterization of extant doctrines, the greater is the worry that the basic conceptual
distinction between operative and decision rules would thereby be rendered, if not
illusory, then of precious little value." Id. at 79. In my view, difficulty in classifying
existing doctrine is to be expected, because courts have failed to derive and define
existing constitutional doctrine explicitly in terms of the substantive rule function and
the adjudicative rule function. It is important to identify those separate functions and
to identify the factors relevant to the derivation and definition of each kind of rule.
Berman recognizes this to an extent, in noting that:
Whether a given piece of doctrine is an operative proposition depends on ...
one's theory of constitutional interpretation. Because there exist different
plausible theories of proper constitutional interpretation, there exist
different plausible conceptions of constitutional meaning. What one views as
an operative proposition thus depends upon how one proposes to derive
constitutional meaning, a matter that cannot be resolved (though it can be
informed) by taxonomic explorations.
Id. at 80. This point, it seems to me, conflates two questions: First, what are the
essential functions of operative propositions (or substantive constitutional principles)
on the one hand, versus decision rules (or adjudicative rules) on the other? Second,
what considerations are relevant for the derivation and definition of each kind of rule?
Functionally, substantive constitutional principles (or decision rules) exist to identify
issues of legally relevant fact, and adjudicative rules (or decision rules) exist to resolve
issues of relevant fact. Methods for deriving and defining substantive constitutional
principles (or operative propositions) might include originalism, conventional morality,
Dworkinian principle, and so on. Considerations relevant for deriving and defining
adjudicative (or decision) rules might include reducing the costs of erroneous decisions.
Against these benchmarks, extant doctrine might be categorized-and more
significantly, might be critiqued and reformulated-toward better serving each
respective rule-function, and thereby better serving the essential functions of judicial
review.
29. Indeed, struggling too much to identify what the substantive constitutional
principle (or operative proposition) is, and what the adjudicative (or decision) rule is,
seems a bit awkward, when the Court has not thought and written in those terms in a
given doctrinal context, and has not sought explicitly to derive and define such a
doctrinal structure. See infra note 308 (discussing Berman's analysis of the operative
proposition and decision rule established by the "strict scrutiny" of racial
classifications in contemporary cases).
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doctrine; second, an analysis of the considerations relevant for the
explicit derivation and definition of substantive constitutional
principles and adjudicative rules (both in the reformulation of
existing doctrine and the creation of new doctrine); and third, at least
potentially, a resulting body of doctrine consistently better able to
serve the essential functions of constitutionalism and judicial review.
My point of departure for this parallel track suggests that the
ultimate issue in constitutional adjudication is structurally like the
ultimate issues in other adjudicative contexts. In a criminal
prosecution, that ultimate question concerns whether a particular
defendant has violated some criminal statute. In a negligence action,
an ultimate question concerns whether a particular defendant
violated a duty of reasonable care. In constitutional adjudication, the
ultimate question concerns whether a particular challenged
governmental action violates some constitutional prov1s10n.3o
Answering these ultimate questions requires a doctrinal structure
comprised of substantive rules for defining the crime, or the tort, or
the constitutional infraction at issue; and adjudicative rules for
resolving issues of relevant fact and for applying such substantive
rules to the facts found.31
30. A step removed from these bottom-line adjudicative questions that apply law to
facts are more "purely legal" questions: What were the legally relevant facts of some
precedent which, under stare decisis, might govern a finding of negligence in a present
controversy? What is the meaning of "dwelling'' in a statute defining burglary in the
second degree? Constitutional adjudication, or more precisely, adjudication in which
constitutional issues are raised, presents legal issues concerning the permissibility of
government action. Is constitutional adjudication more like civil litigation, or a
criminal prosecution, in presenting a "bottom-line" question applying law to facts, or is
it more like the task of statutory interpretation, presenting "pure(r)" questions of law?
If it is more like the former, then, one would think, there should be a clear distinction
between substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules. If it is more like
the latter, then the absence of a clear distinction between substantive rules and
adjudicative rules might be no less appropriate, but would at least be consistent with
prevailing approaches to statutory interpretation and other legal decisions allocated to
judges without jury (or factfinder) participation.
It would seem that constitutional adjudication is like other kinds of litigation in
presenting questions of pure law, questions of pure fact, and mixed questions of law
and fact. Pure questions of law are presented in deriving and defining the meaning of
constitutional text. Resolving these questions of pure law generates rules-substantive
constitutional principles-that identify those facts which have legal significance.
Where parties contest relevant facts, they generate issues of pure fact that must be
resolved. Finally, in resolving the bottom line question of constitutionality, the court
must address a mixed question of law and fact, in applying the legal rule to the facts
found.
31. Determining whether a criminal defendant is guilty of a crime, for example,
requires substantive rules defining the crime in question, and adjudicative rules for
resolving issues of fact relevant under those substantive rules, and for applying those
substantive rules to the facts of the defendant's case. Determining whether a
defendant has committed a tort requires substantive rules defining the tort in
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Continuing the journey on this parallel track, beyond further
exploring the structural similarities between the ultimate issue in
constitutional adjudication and those in other adjudicative contexts,
Part II explores the special functions that constitutionalism and
judicial review exist to serve. As conceived by politicians, scholars,
and judges through the generations, these special functions include:
first, adjudicating constitutional cases (an adjudicative function); and
second, shaping political debate toward inhibiting the enactment of
unconstitutional laws (a political function).32 Part II considers
whether these special functions also imply the importance of
explicitly differentiating substantive constitutional principles and
adjudicative rules. Part III carefully explores a range of particular
contexts in which the Court has failed explicitly to differentiate the
derivation and definition of substantive constitutional principles and
adjudicative rules. It seeks to demonstrate how and why these
failures seriously undermined both the adjudicative and political
functions of judicial review. Finally, Part IV sketches a template that
courts might consider toward explicitly deriving and defining
substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules.
This Article's focus transcends critiques of particular cases as
having been decided "correctly" or "incorrectly," and transcends
debates about the merits of originalism versus other interpretive
methodologies. It is concerned with the structure of constitutional
doctrine in a generic sense. It is concerned with revealing two
functionally discrete kinds of legal rule that ought to be recognized in
the constitutional context, and the considerations relevant for the
derivation and definition of each. The Article suggests that by
explicitly differentiating the derivation and definition of substantive
constitutional principles and adjudicative rules, the Court could
create a far more productive body of constitutional law. The Court
could create a constitutional law with a normative clarity that
enhances the Justices' accountability for the values they would
enforce, or refrain from enforcing; a constitutional law that could
provide judges with a clearer. basis for adjudicating particular
constitutional cases effectively; a constitutional law that could
provide the public and its representatives with a clearer sense of the

question, and adjudicative rules for resolving issues of fact relevant under those
substantive rules, and for applying those substantive rules to the facts of the case.
Similarly, as this Article will argue, determining whether a governmental act is
unconstitutional requires a substantive rule defining the constitutional infraction at
issue, and adjudicative rules for resolving issues of relevant fact, and for applying that
definition to the facts of the case. For a definition of "rule," see infra text
accompanying note 34.
32. Of course, the political function applies to inhibiting unconstitutional executive
action, and to inhibiting other forms of state action as well.
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constitutional boundaries of political discretion; and, perhaps most
importantly, a constitutional law that could enable political actors
better to refrain from violating, while acting freely within, the
Constitution's mandates.33

II. THE ADJUDICATIVE AND POLITICAL FUNCTIONS OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR STRUCTURING
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE

A.

Substantive Constitutional Principles and Adjudicative
Rules Defined

The ultimate issue in a criminal prosecution (or tort action)
concerns whether a defendant has committed a crime (or a tort).
Adjudicating this ultimate question in these and other
nonconstitutional contexts requires two kinds of rule, serving
fundamentally different functions. Substantive rules-whether in
tort law, criminal. law, or labor law-identify legally relevant facts
and determine the range of factual issues that the parties will
contest. Adjudicative rules-such as rules of evidence or those
allocating the burden of persuasion-are designed to resolve issues of
legally relevant fact.
The ultimate issue in constitutional adjudication concerns
whether the government has committed a constitutional violation.
This issue is structurally analogous to the ultimate issue in other
adjudicative contexts, and must be resolved by the application of two
functionally discrete kinds of constitutional rule. Thus, determining
whether a law is unconstitutional requires substantive principles for
identifying issues of relevant fact, and adjudicative rules for
resolving those issues of fact, and for applying the substantive
principles to those facts. To determine whether the government has
abridged the freedom of speech, for example, requires a substantive
definition of unconstitutional abridgement (provided by the First
Amendment's speech clause and substantive judicial interpretations
of that clause) for identifying issues of material fact, and adjudicative
rules for resolving those factual issues and determining whether the
facts found satisfy the substantive definition of such abridgement.
Developing this proposition further requires some definitions. By
rule, I mean a conditional proposition, the elements of which must be
satisfied as a prerequisite for triggering identified legal

33. Professor Berman touched upon this benefit as well, suggesting that "we might
find our political culture enriched by being able to contemplate constitutional
operative propositions alone, divorced from the constitutional decision rules which are
designed solely to govern litigation. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, supra note
12, at 16; see also Berman, Guillen and Gullibility, supra note 12, at 1531-32.
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consequences-i.e., if certain conditions are satisfied, then certain
legal consequences follow.34 By principle, I mean a rule that is
developed with particular attention to normative roots and
implications, and that is evocative of those underlying norms. By
substantive constitutional principle, I mean a principle that defines
restrictions on governmental discretion derived from and evoking
values deemed to underlie constitutional text. By adjudicative rule, I
mean a rule employed by a court in the context of constitutional
adjudication
toward
determining
whether
a
substantive
constitutional principle has been violated in relation to the facts and
circumstances as developed at trial.
In nonconstitutional contexts, substantive principles and
adjudicative rules serve different functions and have been framed to
serve different sets of values. Substantive principles are (or should
34. The suggestion that constitutional doctrine ought to be framed explicitly
through the separate derivation and definition of substantive constitutional principles
and adjudicative rules does not depend on favoring "rules" over "standards" for
substantive constitutional principles, or vice versa. For discussion of "rules" versus
"standards," see generally, for example, Kathleen M. Sullivan, Forward: The Justices
of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992). For my purposes, a standard
such as, "if a regulation places an undue burden on a woman's interest in terminating
her pregnancy, then that regulation violates the Due Process Clause," is just as much
a rule as is the more "rule"-like, "if a regulation requires a woman to wait more than
twenty-four hours to terminate her pregnancy, then that regulation violates the Due
Process Clause."
Indeed, in critiquing Justice Powell's justification of "strict scrutiny" for affirmative
action racial classifications in Bakke, I suggest that he ought to have separately and
explicitly derived and defined three substantive constitutional principles that were
implicit in his analysis: first, that a racial classification may not be adopted because of
purposes rooted in racist values or stereotypes; second, that a racial classification may
not excessively promote racial prejudice; and third, that a racial classification may not
have excessively unfair effects on "innocents." See infra text accompanying notes 23441. The first putative substantive constitutional principle is more at the "rule" end of
the continuum between "rules" and "standards;" the second and third putative
substantive constitutional principles are more at the "standard" end. But all three, I
suggest, are better framed as explicit, rather than implicit, substantive constitutional
principles, rather than as parts of an undifferentiated hodgepodge of reasons for the
"strict scrutiny" of racial classifications. See infra text accompanying notes 242-326.
Similarly, adjudicative rules might be framed either as standards or as rules. To
require proof of constitutionally significant facts by a preponderance of the evidence,
beyond a reasonable dc:mbt, or to a moral certainty, frames the foundational
adjudicative rule-the burden of persuasion-in terms of "standards" rather than
"rules." To require a legislature to make findings of fact identifying the past racial
discrimination, the effects of which it seeks to redress as part of its burden to rebut the
presumption that its racial classification was adopted because of purposes rooted in
racism, see infra text accompanying notes 258-62, or to require Congress to make
findings of fact identifying the effect on interstate commerce from regulated noneconomic activity, as part of rebutting a presumption that such regulation was not
adopted for purposes of promoting interstate commerce, see infra text accompanying
notes 439-54, frames adjudicative rules as "rules" rather than "standards."
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be) derived from and express public values concerning the proper
public response to choices, conduct, and circumstances relevant to
the area of law in question. In the criminal context, for example,
legislatures create statutes reflecting norms that distinguish socially
acceptable conduct from that which is unacceptable, and strategic
considerations as to why particular unacceptable conduct should be
criminalized-e.g., for retribution, deterrence, or incapacitation.
When interpreting a criminal statute, courts resolve ambiguity by
referring to and reasoning from these substantive concerns. Indeed,
in many criminal codes, legislatures direct the courts to resolve
statutory ambiguity by referring to the substantive concerns
underlying the definition of the particular criminal act, and the
strategic reasons for criminalizing that bad act.35
Adjudicative rules in nonconstitutional contexts are derived from
values relevant to the imperfect judicial capacity to resolve issues of
legally significant fact and to apply governing substantive rules to
the facts and circumstances of particular cases. Because courts must
make findings of fact in particular cases founded on incomplete
evidence, or evidence tainted by the interest litigants have to hide
and mislead, they must anticipate making an erroneous decision. In
the criminal context, such errors include convicting the innocent, or
acquitting the guilty. In tort, a court might wrongly find a defendant
responsible, or wrongly fail to do so. Adjudicative rules must be
designed to promote accuracy and minimize the social harm resulting
from error in deciding the facts and determining the winner m a
particular dispute between particular parties.
In the constitutional context, substantive principles and
adjudicative rules also must be derived from differently rooted sets of
values. It cannot be controversial that the First Amendment's
freedom of speech, no less than any criminal statute, was adopted to
achieve a particular range of substantive objectives reflecting a
particular range of substantive values-though people might well
have different interpretations as to what those values are. The
definition of Congress' powers as limited to those enumerated also
was rooted· in particular substantive objectives and values, as was
the Due Process Clause, the unreasonable search and seizure clause,
and, indeed, every provision in the Constitution.

35. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 5.00 (McKinney 2004) ("The general rule that a
penal statute is to be strictly construed does not apply to this chapter, but the
provisions herein must be construed according to the fair import of their terms to
promote justice and effect the objects of the law."); MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(3)
(1985) ("The provisions of the Code shall be construed according to the fair import of
their terms but when the language is susceptible of differing constructions it shall be
interpreted to further the general purposes stated in this Section and the special
purposes of the particular provision involved.").
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In adjudicating whether a substantive constitutional principle
has been violated under the facts and circumstances of a particular
case, a court is no more omniscient, and no less error-prone, than are
courts adjudicating other kinds of claim. Courts must anticipate the
possible errors of either striking down a governmental act that "in
fact" is not unconstitutional or upholding a governmental act that "in
fact" is unconstitutional. Thus, adjudicative rules in the
constitutional context, as for other kinds of law, must be framed to
serve the values of accuracy in resolving issues of material fact, and
of minimizing the systemic 'costs of adjudicative errors.36
This analysis has been rooted in the structural similarities
between the ultimate issues presented in adjudicating constitutional
cases and those presented in other areas of adjudication. Yet,
constitutional provisions are unique-at least in their supremacy and
their immunity from change by ordinary political processes. Judicial
interpretation and enforcement of constitutional provisions also are
unique-themselves to be treated as the supreme law of the land.37
Do these special attributes of constitutional la~ undermine or
reinforce the proposition that l have thus far sought to establish: i.e.,
that like doctrine applicable in other adjudicative contexts,
constitutional doctrine must be structured in a way that includes
explicitly differentiated substantive principles (rooted in identified
substantive values and objectives) and adjudicative rules (designed
to promote adjudicative accuracy and to minimize the social harm
resulting from factfinding error)?
The following will examine several classic perspectives about
special attributes of constitutional law and judicial review that
distinguish the constitutional context from other adjudicative
contexts. I will suggest that each perspective contemplates the
special adjudicative and political functions of judicial review, and
thereby reinforces the proposition that the structure of constitutional
doctrine must explicitly differentiate the derivation and definition of
substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules.38
36. Berman suggests there might be adjudicative values such as reducing the costs
of litigation, but acknowledges that error-cost minimization is the most clearly
legitimate rationale for creating adjudicative or decisionmaking rules. See Berman,
Constitutional Decision Rules, supra note 12, at 93 ("A decision rule of some sort is
unavoidable because application of the operative propositions confronts epistemic
uncertainty. The most obvious factor that a decision-rule-maker should consider, then,
is how best to minimize adjudicatory errors-i.e., the sum of false positives and false
negatives.").
37. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. l, 18 (1958); infra text accompanying notes 99115; see generally David Chang, A Critique of Judicial Supremacy, 36 VILL. L. REV.
281 (1991) [hereinafter Chang, Critique].
38. Of course, adjudicative error also can result from erroneously declared
substantive constitutional principles-as adjudicative error in a criminal case can
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James Madison and Alexander Hamilton: The Origins of
Constitutionalism and Judicial Review

In The Federalist No. 10 and The Federalist No. 78, James
Madison and Alexander Hamilton (respectively) develop a rationale
for a self-governing people to create a Constitution and to create
judicial review as a means for enforcing that Constitution's
mandates. In creating a Constitution, the People declare its
provisions to be the supreme law of the land. They choose the policies
underlying these
supreme constitutional proVIs1ons
with
extraordinary deliberation and with special concern for "the
permanent and aggregate interests of the community."a9 By making
the Constitution's provisions far more difficult to change than is
ordinary legislation, the People protect that supreme law from their
own anticipated fallibility-factional
short-sightedness and
selfishness-in the context of ordinary, everyday political disputes.
"Until the people have, by some solemn and authoritative act,
annulled or changed the established form, it is binding upon
themselves collectively, as well as individually."40
This is a notion of political self-constraint.41 It is a notion that
constitutional text (and the foundational yet politically vulnerable
national policy that this text signifies) should be much more difficult
to create and to change than is the text of congressionally-enacted
legislation (and the national policy that this text signifies). It
suggests that the essential device of our constitutionalism is the
distinction between the Article I political processes for creating or
amending national legislation, and the Article V political processes
for creating or amending the nation's supreme constitutional text.
Through the principle of constitutional supremacy and the
distinction between Article I for making ordinary national policy and
Article V for making supreme national policy, the People's own
result not only from factfinding errors, but also from errors in instructing jurors on the
law they should apply to their findings of fact. The point here is that different
considerations are relevant for avoiding adjudicative error from each of these two
sources, and for framing explicitly differentiated substantive constitutional principles
and adjudicative rules-the two kinds of rule with respect to which the two sources of
adjudicative error might be committed.
39. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 83 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
40. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). Hamilton further suggested that the People who created their supreme law in
the Constitution, and who provided for federal courts to interpret and enforce that
supreme law, anticipated their own political failings resulting from "the effects of
those ill humors which the arts of designing men or the influence of particular
conjunctures sometimes disseminate among the people themselves ...." Id. at 469.
41. See Chang, Critique, supra note 37, at 293-95; David Chang, Conflict,
Coherence, and Constitutional Intent, 72 IOWA L. REV. 753, 767-82 (1987) [hereinafter
Chang, Constitutional Intent].
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choices concerning foundational yet politically vulnerable values can
be protected from their own anticipated short-sighted fallibility.
Along with insulating their supreme legal text from amendment
by ordinary political processes in which this fallibility might more
readily be manifested, the People chose to entrust judges with the
tasks of interpreting and enforcing the meaning of that supreme
law-judges appointed "during good behavior,'' rather than politically
accountable to voters.
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard
the Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of
those ill humors which the arts of designing men, or the
influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate
among the people themselves ... 42
Because federal judges are not accountable to the political pressures
that influence the behavior of the President and members of
Congress, the federal courts can remain free to exercise "judgment,''
and thereby enforce the People's own foundational constitutional
choices.43
Most significant for present purposes, Hamilton suggests that in
exercising the power of judicial review, courts might address two
kinds of harm. First, courts might redress the rights of individual
litigants when such rights have been infringed by unconstitutional
laws. Second, through judicial review, courts also might inhibit
legislatures from enacting unconstitutional laws. 44
But it is not with a view to infractions of the Constitution only
that the independence of the judges may be an essential
safeguard against the effects of occasional ill humors in the
society. These sometimes extend no farther than to the injury of
the private rights of particular classes of citizens, by unjust and
partial laws. Here also the firmness of the judicial magistracy is
of vast importance in mitigating the severity and confining the
operation of such laws. It not only serves to moderate the
immediate mischiefs of those which may have been passed but
it operates as a check upon the legislative body in passing them;
who, perceiving that obstacles to the success of an iniquitous
intention are to be expected from the scruples of the courts, are in

42. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469.
43. Of course, Hamilton's justification for vesting the power to interpret and
enforce the Constitution's mandates with judges appointed "during good behavior"
fails to explain the mechanism by which such judges will be held accountable to the
task they ought to be doing. If the lack of political accountability frees judges to
exercise "judgment," does it not also free them to exercise politically unaccountable
will?
44. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 470.
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a manner compelled, by the very motives of the injustice they
mediate, to qualify their attempts.45

By striking down unconstitutional laws when adjudicating particular
cases, the Court "moderate[s] the immediate mischiefs" otherwise
inflicted on those subject to the reach of such laws. Beyond this, the
prospect of such invalidation "operates as a check upon the legislative
body," inducing legislators to "qualify" their laws according to the
"obstacles . . . [that] are to be expected from the scruples of the
courts."
Thus, Hamilton recognizes that judicial review should serve two
functions-one is adjudicative and the second is political. The
adjudicative function decides particular cases and protects the rights
of individual litigants from intrusion by unconstitutional laws. The
political function influences legislative decisionmaking and can
inhibit legislatures from enacting unconstitutional laws-thereby
averting the occasion for adjudication to enforce constitutional
norms.46 Elaborating on this political function, Hamilton posits that
legislators would so qualify their laws because of iniquitous
intentions; but this is not inconsistent with a more optimistic
expectation that when "enlightened statesmen" are, in fact, at the
helm-which, as Madison suggested, was neither inevitable nor
impossible47-they might, because of a sense of public duty, seek to
keep whatever policies they pursue within the boundaries of
anticipated judicial acquiescence.48
How politicians, and the electorate, understand the "obstacles"
erected against legislative discretion by courts in the name of the
45. Id. (emphasis added).
46. Differentiating substantive constitutional principles from adjudicative rules in
service of the adjudicative and political functions is unrelated to H.L.A. Hart's
distinction between primary rules and secondary rules. See generally H.L.A. HART,
THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). Hart's primary rules are directed against government
officials; secondary rules are directed against private actors. Substantive
constitutional principles and adjudicative rules are both primary rules, from Hart's
perspective. See id. at 77 -96.
47. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 80.
48. In Marbury v. Madison, Justice Marshall suggested a political function for a
written constitution. "The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that
those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written." 5 U.S. 137,
176 (1803). Recognizing that a written constitution can itself influence legislative
debates and decisions contradicts one of his main bases for concluding that the people
who created the Constitution must have intended to establish the power of judicial
review. It is not true, as Marshall suggested, that a written constitution would be
"reduce[d] to nothing'' unless its provisions were judicially enforced. See id. at 178. Yet,
just as a written constitution itself can affect legislative debate and decision in a way
that unwritten fundamental law could not, so it would seem that judicial
interpretations of the Constitution could affect legislative debate and decision, and do
so differently depending on the manner in which those judicial opinions are written.
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Constitution can shape political decisions.49 Political debate and
decision might vary according to how the Court articulates the
principles with respect to which the constitutionality of legislation is
to be measured. If constitutional doctrine fails to articulate clearly
the substantive principles derived from and evoking values deemed
to underlie constitutional text-if, instead, doctrine is a confused
amalgam of substantive and adjudicative considerations-the
normative content of constitutional law must be obscured.5o Thus,
creating doctrine that clearly distinguishes between substantive
constitutional principles and adjudicative rules is essential if judicial
review is effectively to serve not only the adjudicative function, but
also the political function envisioned by Madison and Hamilton at
the origins of constitutionalism and judicial review.51

C.

James Bradley Thayer and Legislative Responsibility

In The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, James Bradley Thayer suggests that judicial
interpretations of constitutional text "were supplemented by a very
significant rule of administration ... 'that an Act of [Congress] is not
to be declared void unless the violation of the [C]onstitution is so
manifest as to leave no room for reasonable doubt."' 52
If [a court's] duty were in truth merely and nakedly to ascertain
the meaning of the text of the constitution and of the impeached
Act of the legislature, and to determine, as an academic
question, whether in the court's judgment the two were in
conflict, it would, to be sure, be an elevated and important
office, one dealing with great matters, involving large public
considerations, but yet a function far simpler than it really is.
Having ascertained all this, yet there remains a question-the
49. Congressional consideration of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides a vivid
example. See infra text accompanying notes 454-65.
50. See infra text accompanying notes 159-91, 310-12, 323-26, 348-49, 382-83, 45465, 475-76. Professor Roosevelt makes similar point. "When the Court treats its
decision rules as operative propositions, it announces as constitutional truths rules
that should neither be followed by non-judicial actors nor internalized by the general
public." See Roosevelt, supra note 20, at 1713.
51. One might imagine the consequences of an analogous (hypothetical) conflation
of substantive and adjudicative rules in criminal law. Consider the following
(hypothetical) definition of murder:
A person has not committed murder unless the state can present admissible
evidence that proves beyond a reasonable doubt that he engaged in conduct
that was not necessary to achieve a compelling objective, and that caused the
death of another human being.
52. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 139-40 (1893) (quoting Commonwealth ex rel.
O'Hara v. Smith, 4 Bin. 117, 123 (Pa. 1811)) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Thayer,
Origin and Scope].
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really momentous question-whether, after all, the court can
disregard the Act. It cannot do this as a mere matter of coursemerely because it is concluded that upon a just and true
construction that the law is unconstitutional. That is precisely
the significance of the rule of administration .... 53
In Alexander Bickel's view, Thayer's deferential "rule of
administration" required upholding any act of Congress that was
permissible under any plausible or rational interpretation of the
Constitution.54 Bickel characterized Thayer's position as follows:
[T]he Constitution is ... a complex charter of government....
Most frequently, reasonable men will differ about its proper
construction. The Constitution leaves open "a range of choice
and judgment," so that "whatever choice is rational is
constitutional." The Court, exercising the power of judicial
review, is to be "the ultimate arbiter of what is rational and
permissible," but is to have no further concern with policy
choices.55
Thus, according to Bickel, Thayer had a single substantive definition
of boundaries on Congress' discretion: Congress must act rationally
in pursuit of its purposes.56
In my view, Bickel misconceived Thayer's position. Thayer was
not proposing deference to Congress in defining the Constitution's
meaning-i.e., in deriving and defining the substantive principles
with respect to which the Constitution should be deemed to
circumscribe national legislative discretion. Rather, Thayer was
proposing judicial deference in determining whether a particular act
of Congress violates a particular judicial interpretation of the
Constitution's substantive meaning.57
53. Id. at 143· 44 (emphasis added).
54. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 37 (1986)
(suggesting Thayer's view "that the Court might nullify a statute only if it could not
rationally be said to proceed from a plausible construction of the Constitution")
[hereinafter BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH].
55. Id. at 35-36.
56. See id. This rationality requirement is the essential concern of "rationality
review," which is comprised of a substantive requirement (all things that are similarly
situated with respect to a statute's purpose must be similarly treated by that statute)
and an adjudicative rule (legislatures are accorded extreme deference in determining
whether the rationality requirement has been violated). For a discussion of the
substantive constitutional principle, see, for example, Joseph Tussman & Jacobus
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341 (1949); Hans Linde,
The Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976).
57. Professor Berman reads Thayer as did Bickel, saying that Thayer "resisted the
effort to tease the states of interpretation and application apart, seeming to suggest
instead that courts could and should just announce whether the challenged legislation
could stand without specifying what they took to be the constitutional premise
supporting such a conclusion." See Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, supra note
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Indeed,
Thayer
distinguished
between a
substantive
interpretation of the Constitution's text and an adjudicative
determination as to whether a particular act of Congress should be
deemed to violate that substantive interpretation. On the former
point, Thayer referred to the task of "ascertain[ing] the meaning" of
constitutional text.5s In interpreting Congress' discretion under its
enumerated powers, for example, Thayer articulated substantive
constitutional principles much as did Justice Marshall in McCulloch:
Congress could pursue any means of regulation so long as it did so for
purposes-"ends" or "objects"-authorized by the Constitution.59
Thayer urged his deferential "rule of administration" for
determining whether Congress enacted a particular challenged
statute for constitutionally authorized ends, or did so pretextually.
The question of rationality was not whether Congress' challenged
legislation comports with any rational or plausible substantive
interpretation of the Constitution but, rather, whether Congress
might rationally have believed that its legislation would serve the
constitutionally authorized purposes to which it is limited under
judicially derived and defined substantive interpretations of its
enumerated powers.
Consider Thayer's application of these concepts. Thayer
analyzed, for example, whether Congress acted unconstitutionally in
issuing paper bills. 60 He suggested that the power to issue paper
currency and to make such legal tender might be ancillary (under the
Necessary and Proper Clause) to the power to regulate commerce, the
power to coin and regulate the value of money, or the power to
borrow money.61 In particular, he said:
[I]f Congress give to its currency the quality of legal tender,
wholly or mainly because it will thus be a better instrument for
borrowing purposes, it will not be in the power of a court to
declare the legislation for that reason unconstitutional.62

12, at 103. Berman urges, nevertheless, that "Thayerians ... [should] shift their focus
from arguing for judicial deference to Congress' constitutional interpretations-i.e., to
Congress' judgments about the constitutional operative propositions-to arguing for
more deferential decision rules." Id. at 104. As argued in what follows, I interpret
Thayer differently-as having himself made the distinction between deference to
Congress' substantive interpretations (which he did not advocate) and deference to
Congress on the question of whether its enactments violate judicially-declared
substantive constitutional mandates (which he did advocate).
58. Thayer, Origin and Scope, supra note 52, at 144.
59. See generally McCulloch, 17 U.S. 316. For an extended discussion of
McCulloch, see infra notes 327-49 and accompanying text.
60. See James B. Thayer, Legal Tender, 1 HARV. L. REV. 73, 89 (1887-1888).
61. Id. at 92-95.
62. Id. at 95 (emphasis added).

2006]

STRUCTURING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE

797

For Thayer, as for Marshall in McCulloch, whether a particular
legislative end is constitutionally authorized is a judicial question.
Whether an act of Congress is fit to achieve its constitutionally
permissible ends is a political question. Whether Congress has in fact
acted for a constitutionally authorized end or purpose is a judicial
question, but one which should be answered with due deference to
Congress. "[T]he fitness of the legal tender acts to accomplish their
ends [is] a purely legislative question, in the absence of an obvious
fraud on the Constitution."63
In justifying such a deferential "rule of administration," Thayer
contemplates both the adjudicative and political functions of judicial
review, and strongly suggests a need to distinguish between
substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules toward
serving each function effectively. First, Thayer suggests that in
performing the adjudicative function, the court's task is not simply to
determine whether and how the challenged statute is "in conflict"
with the Constitution's judicially-declared meaning. To do so would
risk invalidating a permissible statute-an error which, in Thayer's
view, is more to be avoided than is upholding an unconstitutional
law.64 Thayer views invalidating permissible statutes as undesirable
because such errors deprive the legislature of its "proper range of
discretion." In his view, therefore, the rule of administration should
provide "an allowance . . . for the vast and not definable range of
legislative power and choice."65
Thus, in relation to the adjudicative function, Thayer's rationale
for a deferential "rule of administration" is normative-erroneously
invalidating an act of Congress is worse than erroneously upholding
such an act, because the former error deprives the legislature of its
"proper range of discretion."66 I will argue below that this normative
notion is vulnerable-as would be the converse normative
proposition-and will suggest an alternative analysis for establishing
presumptions in constitutional adjudication.67 For present purposes,
however, it is enough simply to recognize that Thayer's treatment of
the adjudicative function of judicial review does recognize a
distinction between substantive principles expressing the meaning of

63. Id. at 89 (emphasis added).
64. Thayer views the erroneous invalidation as more to be avoided, despite
recognizing that "it is as probable that the judiciary will declare laws unconstitutional
that are not so, as it is that the legislature will exceed their constitutional authority."
Thayer, Origin and Scope, supra note 52, at 134 (quoting Swift's "System of the Laws
of Connecticut").
65. Id. at 135.
66. Id.
67. See infra text accompanying notes 142-51 (normative approach); 152-57
(probabilistic approach).
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constitutional prov1s10ns, and adjudicative rules-"rules of
administration"-for determining whether challenged· legislation
violates those substantive interpretations.
.
Thayer's further justifications for the deferential "rule of
administration" also imply a political function for judicial review, and
the need to distinguish between substantive constitutional principles
and adjudicative rules to serve this function effectively. The relevant
reasoning begins with the proposition that under the Constitution,
Congress has initial responsibility and authority to determine
whether its contemplated enactments are constitutionally
permissible. Indeed, Thayer suggests that the legislature often has
final authority to answer such questions, because judicial review can
be exercised only in the context of a case or controversy: "It was,
then, all along true ... that much which is harmful and
unconstitutional may take effect without any capacity in the courts
to prevent it, since their whole power is a judicial one. Their
interference was but one of many safeguards, and its scope was
narrow."6s Thus, because the Constitution contemplated that
Congress should make initial determinations of constitutionality, and
because such determinations would prevail but for the exceptional
occasions of constitutional adjudication, "the actual determinations"
by the legislature that its enactments are constitutionally
permissible "are entitled to a corresponding respect."69
Significantly, toward implying the political function of judicial
review, Thayer predicates the legislature's entitlement to respect and
a deferential "rule of administration" on the interesting proposition
that legislators have made an "actual determination" as to the
constitutionality of their enactment, and that they have done so with
"virtue, sense, and competent knowledge."10
The judicial function is merely that of fixing the outside border
of reasonable legislative action. . . . It must be studiously
remembered, in judicially applying such a test as this of what a
legislature may reasonably think, that virtue, sense, and
competent knowledge are always to be attributed to that
body.... And so in a court's revision of legislative acts, as in its
revision of a jury's acts, it will always assume a duly instructed
body .. .. If, for example, what is presented to the court be a
question as to the constitutionality of an Act alleged to be ex
post facto, there can be no assumption of ignorance, however
probable, as to anything involved in a learned or competent
discussion of that subject. And so of the provisions of double
jeopardy, or giving evidence against one's self, or attainder, or
68.
69.
70.

Thayer, Origin and Scope, supra note 52, at 137.
Id. at 136 (emphasis added).
Id. at 149 (emphasis added).
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jury trial. The reasonable doubt, then, about which our judges
speak is that reasonable doubt which lingers in the mind of a
competent and duly instructed person who has carefully applied
his faculties to the question. n

In presupposing legislators who are "duly instructed" about the
Constitution's principles and prohibitions so that they can make
competent (and, perhaps, public-spirited) decisions to remain within
constitutional boundaries, Thayer's analysis implies a political
function for judicial review.72 Just as a jury cannot be "duly
instructed" on the law it should apply to its factfinding unless the
judge provides instructions, so Congress would not be "duly
instructed" on the constitutional boundaries of its discretion unless
informed by the reasoning of the courts' decided cases. One cannot
expect that a jury will correctly determine the legal significance of
the facts of a case unless it has been soundly instructed on the law
that it should apply. By analogy and by reason, one might suggest
that the more soundly a legislature is instructed on the meaning of
the constitutional provisions against which its enactments are to be
evaluated, the better able will legislators themselves be to make
choices that remain within constitutional bounds. Judicial review
thus can serve this political function of instructing legislators as to
the constitutional principles within which they should view
themselves constrained-the saµie political function suggested by
Hamilton in The Federalist No. 78. 73

71. Id. at 148-49 (emphasis added).
72. As Thayer said, "in a court's revision of legislative acts, as in its revision of a
jury's acts, it will always assume a duly instructed body" of persons who are
"competent, well-instructed, sagacious, attentive, intent only on public ends, [and] fit
to represent a self-governing people." Id. at 149. To understand the implications of this
"assumption," one must consider its genesis. If the assumption is merely considered to
be a fictional rationalization of judicial deference in exercising the adjudicative
function, then it must be justified entirely with reference to the normative notion that
it would be worse to invalidate a law that is not unconstitutional, than to uphold a law
that is unconstitutional. This normative judgment is at least contestable and, surely,
is not self-evident. See infra text accompanying notes 73, 142-51. If the assumption of
a competent, well-instructed, and public-spirited legislature is predicated on a
proposition of fact, however, another rationale for a deferential "rule of
administration" emerges-a rationale predicated on the probabilities of
unconstitutional government action. See infra text accompanying notes 152-57.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 44-51. Thayer suggests that legislative acts
should be presumed permissible, "however probable" it might be that legislators were
ignorant as to those constitutional boundaries. See Thayer, Origin and Scope, supra
note 52, at 139. This position seems clearly rooted in a normative judgment that it
would be worse to invalidate a permissible act than to uphold an impermissible act-a
judgment that Thayer does not adequately justify. In my view, such a normative
judgment is difficult to justify, as is the converse normative judgment. See infra text
accompanying notes 142-51.
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In suggesting a political function for judicial review, Thayer's
reasons for deferential "rules of administration" also imply the need
to distinguish clearly between substantive constitutional principles
and adjudicative rules. A public-spirited legislature that is duly
instructed on the substantive principles within which it should feel
constitutionally constrained is less likely to enact unconstitutional
laws than is one that is ill-instructed. Indeed, to the extent that
legislators are duly instructed on the substantive boundaries of their
discretion, one has a rationale for judicial deference to legislative
decisions that does not depend on the normative proposition that
erroneously invalidating a statute is worse than erroneously
upholding a statute. Rather, one has a rationale for a deferential
"rule of administration" based on a probabilistic proposition that the
duly instructed legislature is less likely to have acted
unconstitutionally than the ill-instructed legislature. The less likely
that a legislature has acted unconstitutionally, the more judicial
deference is warranted when performing the adjudicative function. 74
The proposition that legislators are public-spirited as a matter of
course is a bit more optimistic than were the suppositions of the
Federalists who created the Constitution. In justifying the factionthwarting structure of the national legislature, Madison warned that
"enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm."75 In
justifying judicial review, Hamilton warned that "designing men"
might sway legislative choices, and that even when such legislators
choose to remain within constitutional bounds, they would do so
because of "iniquitous intentions."1s
But even assuming that legislators are not all public-spirited,
they still could be less likely to enact unconstitutional legislation if
the Court were more clearly to articulate the substantive
constitutional boundaries on legislative discretion. Even if motivated
by selfish interests, opponents of a bill would have the opportunity to
use constitutional arguments, predicated on the Court's clearly
articulated substantive constitutional principles, to sway legislators
who might be more public-spirited, or otherwise doubtful about the
merits of the policy at issue. Although Thayer's analysis of the
political function might not readily justify the degree of deference to
Congress that he urged, it at least suggests that deference is more
warranted to the extent that the Court's constitutional doctrine can

74. For more on probabilistic considerations for allocating the burden of persuasion
in constitutional adjudication, see infra text accompanying notes 152-57, 198-207, 446·
53.
75. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 80.
76. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469.
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and does "duly instruct" legislators about the substantive boundaries
of their discretion. 77
What more successful implementation of judicial review could
there be than to reduce the probability that legislatures would choose
to make unconstitutional choices? Thayer's analysis implies, and I
agree, that the most successful judicial review would be that which,
through its political function, enhances the responsibility of
legislatures, and thereby reduces the significance of courts and their
adjudicative function for enforcing constitutional mandates. The
means for achieving these objectives, as suggested throughout this
Article, involve careful attentiveness to the structure of
constitutional doctrine. Constitutional doctrine, like doctrine in
virtually every other area of law, must be structured in a way that
explicitly differentiates the derivation and definition of substantive
principles on the one hand, and adjudicative rules on the other.

D. Robert Bork and Legitimacy
For Robert Bork, "[t]he intended function of the federal courts is
to apply the law as it comes to them from the hands of others."78 This
contemplates the adjudicative function. Yet, much of what Bork says
about how the Court should "apply the law as it comes to them from
the hands of others" implies a political function for judicial review as
well.
Bork's grundnorm is "legitimacy." For Bork, to exercise judicial
power legitimately is to decide cases in a manner "ensuring that the
democratic authority of the people is maintained in the full scope
given by the Constitution."79 Bork argues that the cardinal sin in
exercising the power of judicial review is to legislate from the bench;
that the judge's task is to identify policy choices made by the
sovereign. Furthermore, if a court is to decide particular cases
"legitimately" and thereby to avoid wrongly intruding on the
sovereign's prerogatives, it must enforce the Constitution's mandates
"neutrally."80 Bork insists that "[t]he Court can act as a legal rather
than a political institution only if it is neutral . . . in the way it
derives and defines the [constitutional] principles it applies" and that
"[t]he philosophy of original understanding is capable of supplying
[such] neutrality ...."81

77. See infra text accompanying notes 159-91, 310-12, 323-26, 348-49, 382-83, 45465, 475-76.
78. ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 4 (1990).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 143-53.
81. Id. at 146 (emphasis added).
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Beyond the neutral derivation and definition of principle, Bork
urges that "the Court cannot ... avoid being a naked power organ"
without "the neutral application of legal principle" as well.82 Bork
states:
The neutral or nonpolitical application of principle ... is a
requirement, like the others, addressed to the judge's integrity.
Having derived and defined the principle to be applied, he must
apply it consistently and without regard to his sympathy or lack
of sympathy with the parties before him. This does not mean
that the judge will never change the principle he has derived
and defined. Anybody who has dealt extensively with the law
knows that a new case may seem to fall within a principle as
stated and yet not fall within the rationale underlying it. As
new cases present new patterns, the principle will often be
restated and redefined. There is nothing wrong with that; it is,
in fact, highly desirable. But the judge must be clarifying his
own reasoning and verbal formulations and not trimming to
arrive at results desired on grounds extraneous to the
Constitution. 83
In this passage, Bork seems to suggest two notions concerning
the "application" of principle. On the one hand, Bork speaks of
applying identified principle to the facts of a case "consistently, and
without regard to his sympathy" for one party or another.84 On the
other hand, Bork speaks of purposefully changing principle in
response to new circumstances not considered in previous cases.85
The first notion of applying principle neutrally, without bias for
one party or another, seems concerned with "application" in the sense
that I have been using the concept. A non-neutral "application" of law
to facts, in effect, changes the law-albeit on an ad hoc basis. Thus,
toward fulfilling the jury's functions of finding facts and applying to
those facts the law about which they are to be instructed, potential
jurors are screened for bias. Jury bias in performing either the
factfinding function, or the law application function-jury
nullification-effectively transforms the jury into an institution that
makes law rather than one that applies law made by others.86
Bork's second notion of neutrally "applying" principle supposes
that a judge might decide to change the definition of established

82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 151 (emphasis added).
84. BORK, supra note 78, at 151.
85. Id.
86. This notion of "applying'' substantive interpretations of constitutional text to
the facts and circumstances of a particular case requires, as I have suggested,
carefully constructed adjudicative rules designed to account for the possibility of
factfinding error. See supra text at notes 33-38.
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principle in response to facts and circumstances not previously
contemplated. This essentially involves a determination that a legal
principle articulated in a prior case-the reason for the decisionamounted to dicta (that it swept more broadly than necessary to
decide a case because it encompassed facts not actually presented), or
was framed too restrictively, and that the theretofore established
principle should be changed, and then "applied" to the facts and
circumstances found to be presented. Changing (or refining) legal
principle in response to new circumstances not presented in prior
cases is a paradigmatic example of defining legal principle.
It is this second meaning of "application" with which Bork is
most concerned in developing his analysis of legitimacy through
neutrality, and neutrality through originalism. Illustrating this
notion, Bork examines Shelley v. Kraemer.s1 Shelley considered
whether the Equal Protection Clause prohibits racially restrictive
covenants among private parties---or, more precisely, whether it
prohibits state courts from enforcing such covenants.ss The Court
decided that judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants in
a contract among private parties was state action that violated the
Equal Protection Clause.s9
In Bork's view, the Shelley opinion is an example of failing to
apply principle neutrally, because (he posits) the Court would never
"apply" the Shelley principle in contexts beyond racial
discrimination.9o The Court would never, for example, find state
action in violation of the First Amendment if the state were to
enforce its trespass laws on behalf of a property owner who sought to
exclude an invitee for having expressed objectionable opinions. "The
result of the neutral application of the principle of Shelley v. Kraemer

87. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
88. See id. The Shelley decision rested on several propositions. First, "the action
inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may
fairly be said to be that of the States. That Amendment erects no shield against merely
private conduct .... " Id. at 13. Second, so long as the purposes of the restrictive
covenants were achieved through voluntary compliance, there would be no need for
judicial enforcement-therefore no state action and no conceivable violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 12-14. Third, judicial enforcement of the covenants
under circumstances where parties to the agreement do not voluntarily comply does
amount to state action and, therefore, could violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at
13-14.
89. Id. at 20. In particular, this state action, under the facts and circumstances of
Shelley, did violate the Equal Protection Clause because "the difference between
judicial enforcement and non-enforcement of the restrictive covenants is the difference
between being denied rights of property available to other members of the community
and being accorded full enjoyment of those rights on an equal footing." Shelley, 334
U.S. at 19.
90. BORK, supra note 78, at 152-53.
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[here] would be both revolutionary and preposterous. Clearly, it
would not be applied neutrally ...."91
Of course, here Bork is using the notion of "application" not in
the sense of applying a previously defined principle to the facts and
circumstances of a particular case, but in the sense of choosing the
level of generality at which the governing principle should be
defined.92 This focus on the derivation and definition of principleeven as Bork writes of the neutral application of principle for the
adjudicative function and its legitimate exercise-suggests a concern
about the political function of judicial review and its legitimate
exercise.93 Indeed, Bork's animating passion is:
[N]ot ... ultimately about legal theory. It is about who we are
and how we live; it is about who governs us and how, about our
freedom to make our own moral choices, and about the
difference that makes in our daily lives and in the lives of
generations yet to come.94
More directly suggesting concern with the political function,
Bork laments that the non-neutral definition of (substantive
constitutional) principle-the legislating from the bench that he so
abhors-is significant not only because it can wrongly deny to
political majorities their right to enforce preferred policies in
particular cases, but also because the judiciary's arrogation of the
legislature's policymaking discretion damages the perceptions,

91. Id. at 153.
92. Furthermore, Bork's actual concern is not with defining "state action," but with
defining that state action which violates the mandates of equal protection. After all, it
seems undeniable that judicial decisions are state action, and it seems clear that the
Court would treat a judicial decision as such in any context, subject to applicable
substantive constitutional prohibitions. For example, if a litigant alleged that a state
court judge engaged in a pattern of deciding against the claims of black litigants, she
would have alleged conduct which, if proved, not only would qualify as state action,
but also would amount to purposeful discrimination in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. In Shelley, the question was whether the Equal Protection Clause
prohibits state courts from treating racially restrictive covenants as they treat other
contracts. See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 4. This is a matter of defining unconstitutional
racial discrimination when committed by state courts; it is not a matter of defining
state action. More importantly for present purposes, it certainly is not a matter of
applying previously defined substantive principle to the facts and circumstances of a
particular case. The aspect of Shelley with which Bork disagrees is its (substantive
constitutional) principle for identifying those facts and circumstances that trigger a
finding of unconstitutional racial discrimination, not the determination of whether the
facts of the case satisfy an established substantive definition of state action. For
discussion of an analogous definition of unconstitutional racial discrimination when
inflicted by state courts in the context of child custody decrees, see infra note 464.
93. See BORK, supra note 78, at 152-53.
94. Id. at 11.
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values, and conduct of citizens in the processes of democratic selfgovernment.95
Among the stakes is the full right of self-government that the
Founders bequeathed us and which they limited only as to
specified topics. In the long run, however, there may be higher
stakes than that. As we move away from the historically rooted
Constitution to one created by abstract, universalistic styles of
constitutional reasoning, we invite a number of dangers. One is
that such styles teach disrespect for the actual institutions of the
American nation. A great many academic theorists state
explicitly, and some judges seem easily persuaded, that elected
legislators and executives are not adequate to decide the moral
issues that divide us, and that judges should therefore take
their place. But, when Americans are morally divided, it is
appropriate that our laws reflect that fact.96
For Bork, legislating from the bench is the cardinal sin in
constitutional adjudication not only because it promises to invalidate
laws that should be enforced (thereby intruding through the
adjudicative function on the right of self-government with respect to
the particular policies wrongfully invalidated) but also because it
teaches lessons that undermine respect for self-government (thereby
tainting through the political function the manner in which citizens
perceive and exercise their ongoing right of self-government).
It is hardly a stretch from these concerns about the harmful
political consequences of illegitimately articulating and enforcing
constitutional principle to posit beneficial political consequences from
properly articulating and enforcing constitutional principle-in other
words, the complete political function of judicial review as
contemplated by Hamilton and Thayer. Indeed, Bork implicitly
recognizes this broader political function with the following
admonition:
When ... the Supreme Court ... pronounces in the name of the
Constitution upon the meaning of racial justice, sexual
morality, or any other subject, a cultural lesson is taught. Most
people revere the Constitution as a basic compact that defines
American civic morality. A decision does more than decide a
case; it adds weight to one side of our cultural war, even when
the decision is in fact not supported by the actual
Constitution.97
Bork here suggests that judicial decisions add weight to one side or
the other of political controversies-whether those decisions are
"correct" or not. It should follow for Bork that "correctly" articulated
95.
96.
97.

See id. at 1-11
Id. at 352 (emphasis added).
Id. at 137-38.
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substantive constitutional principles would "duly instruct" (Thayer's
words) citizens and their representatives about the extent and the
limits of political discretion, and would enhance the public's ability to
refrain from enacting policy that they understand transgresses
constitutional bounds.
It is significant that a theorist so concerned with the legitimate
exercise of judicial power and so critical of legislating from the bench
could contemplate the political function as so fundamental. Because
Bork's concern for legitimacy contemplates not only the adjudicative
function, but also a political function for judicial review, he could
embrace the proposition that constitutional doctrine should be
comprised of explicitly differentiated substantive constitutional
principles for legitimately deriving and defining the meaning of
constitutional text, and adjudicative rules for legitimately
determining whether a particular challenged governmental act
violates applicable substantive constitutional prohibitions.9s

E.

Cooper v. Aaron and Obedience

In Cooper v. Aaron,99 the Court elaborated on its supreme
authority to interpret and enforce the mandates of constitutional
text. Not only are litigating parties bound to comply with judicial
orders; pursuant to judicial supremacy, all those government actors
who would be bound under the holding of a decided case if an action
were brought against them should comply with that holding, so as to
avoid the need to bring such an action.100 Cooper's judicial supremacy
contemplates the political function of judicial review.
In the aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education,101 some public
officials in Arkansas developed very different notions about their

98. For Bork, deriving and defining (substantive constitutional) principle is not
akin to the inductive common law process of accreting specific cases toward identifying
patterns and inferring general principle under the rubric of stare decisis. Rather, for
Bork, the derivation and definition of principle involves a deductive process of
inferring and declaring as governing principle the intentions and choices of people who
joined together politically to create and ratify constitutional text. This is, perhaps, why
Bork is so concerned with "application" in the sense of defining a principle's
appropriate level of generality. For Bork, the legitimacy of the principles the Court
defines depends on the accuracy of the Court's judgment as to the substantive values
and goals of those who created the constitutional text at issue. Such an articulation of
principle must be in a form that applies in general and for the future, as do the terms
of a statute or of the Constitution itself. Indeed, to a significant extent, articulating
principles in a way that would be dicta in the context of common law adjudication is,
for Bork, an essential judicial task in the context of constitutional adjudication. On
this, I tend to view Bork as correct.
99. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
100. See infra text accompanying notes 110-15.
101. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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prerogatives and responsibilities. On May 23, 1954, the Little Rock
School Board declared their intent to comply with Brown's mandates,
stating that "[i]t is our responsibility to comply with Federal
Constitutional Requirements and we intend to do so when the
Supreme Court of the United States outlines the method to be
followed."102 The Board then developed plans to desegregate Little
Rock's public schools.103 Nine black students were to be admitted to
the otherwise all-white Central High in September of 1957.104
In contrast, the Governor of Arkansas employed the Arkansas
National Guard to prevent this scheduled first step in the
desegregation of Central High. The United States Attorney General
and the U.S. Attorney for the District of Arkansas then brought an
action against the Governor, seeking to enjoin him from further
efforts to resist the desegregation plan by force. The federal district
court issued the injunction. Governor Faubus complied and withdrew
his troops.
The Governor's decision to resist desegregation until he was
directly enjoined from continuing was the last in a series of political
efforts to resist Brown's implications for segregated schools in
Arkansas. The Arkansas Constitution was amended in 1956 to
command the General Assembly to resist Brown. The Assembly
enacted legislation in early 1957 establishing a "State Sovereignty
Commission" and "relieving school children from compulsory
attendance at racially mixed schools."105
In the face of such political resistance, the School Board itself
petitioned the District Court "seeking a postponement of their
program for desegregation."1os The Board argued that despite its
earlier good faith efforts to comply with Brown, subsequent political
resistance had generated "extreme public hostility," and that unless
its desegregation plan were postponed, "maintenance of a sound
educational program at Central High School, with the Negro
students in attendance, would be impossible."101 The District Court
granted the Board's petition.ms The Court of Appeals reversed, and
its judgment of reversal was affirmed by the Supreme Court.109
All of this is background to that aspect of the Court's opinion
that was concerned with reinforcing judicial supremacy, and with it,

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Cooper, 358 U.S. at 7.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Cooper, 358 U.S. at 13.
Id. at 14.
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the political function of judicial review. Even while recognizing its
assertions as dicta, the Court declared, "we should answer the
premise of the actions of the Governor and Legislature that they are
not bound by our holding in the Brown case."110 It continued:
Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution "the
supreme law of the land." ... [Marbury] declared the basic
principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition
of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since
been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent
and indispensable feature of our constitutional system. It
follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law
of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding
effect on the States .... Every state legislator and executive and
judicial officer is solemnly committed by oath taken pursuant to
Art. VI, if 3, "to support this Constitution." ... The principles
announced in [Brown] and the obedience of the States to them,
according to the command of the Constitution, are
indispensable for the protection of the freedoms guaranteed by
our fundamental charter for all of us. Our constitutional ideal of
equal justice under law is thus made a living truth.m
These propositions go well beyond the adjudicative function. The
Court was asserting not only that state judges, but also legislators
and governors were bound by the Court's interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment in Brown~by the substantive constitutional
principles announced in Brown-even if such officials were not
parties to any of the suits actually adjudicated in Brown. When the
Court said that a Governor could not, consistent with judicial
supremacy, nullify a court order, its concerns were derived from the
adjudicative function.112 When the Court said that state judges must
abide by the "principles announced in [Brown]," its concerns also
were derived from the adjudicative function, and the responsibility of
courts deciding a case today to abide by authoritative precedent.113
But when the Court declared that when enacting and enforcing
legislation, state legislatures and governors must abide by "the
principles announced in [Brown]" because such judicially-defined
principles are the supreme law of the land, its concerns were derived
from the political function-<:ounseling political actors that they
have, indeed, been "duly instructed" by the Court on the
constitutional boundaries of their discretion.114

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 17
Id. at 18-20.
See id.
See id.
See Cooper, 358 at 18-20.
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Thus, in asserting, pursuant to judicial supremacy, that judicial
opinions should command broad political obedience, Cooper added
force to Hamilton's own assertion of the political function-that
judicial review:
[O]perates as a check upon the legislative body in passing
[unconstitutional acts]; who, perceiving that obstacles to the
success of an iniquitous intention are to be expected from the
scruples of the courts, are in a manner compelled, by the very
motives of the injustice they mediate, to qualify their
attempts.115
Ill. SUBSTANTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND ADJUDICATIVE
RULES (OR THEIR ABSENCE) IN OPERATION: CASE STUDIES

This section tests the proposition that explicitly differentiating
the derivation and definition of substantive constitutional principles
and adjudicative rules is necessary for effectively fulfilling the
adjudicative and political functions of judicial review. It does so by
closely examining several contexts in which the Court has failed to
construct constitutional doctrine explicitly in terms of these two very
different kinds of legal rule. Before turning to these case studies,
however, I address a potential objection: that in framing
constitutional doctrine, ambiguity is inevitable and, perhaps,
desirable.
A.

Preliminary Observations: Some Reasons for Doctrinal
Ambiguity and their Limited Relevance for this Article's
Prescriptions

One might argue that ambiguity in framing constitutional
doctrine is inevitable because achieving a majority among the
Justices is an intrinsically political process that must accommodate
their different views. An opinion might purposefully obfuscate a
doctrinal point in order to command the support of a majority. One
might further argue that this doctrinal ambiguity is desirable, as it
enables the Justices to work through issues of constitutional
meaning over time, rather than committing themselves, and the
Court, to positions that might come to be viewed as ill-conceived.
Finally, one might argue in the fashion of Bickel that obfuscatory
doctrine can enable to the Court to achieve results that it could not
attain through clarity and candor.
Consider each point in turn. Ambiguity is not inevitable when
there is majority support for a ratio decidendi, or when a Justice
writes a concurrence or dissent for herself. In Bakke, Justice Powell

115.

THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 470.
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was beholden to no one but himself. Yet, as we will see, his opinion in
that case is a model of ambiguity and incoherence that could have
been avoided had he sought to derive and define doctrine through
explicitly differentiating substantive constitutional principles and
adjudicative rules.116
The putative inevitability of doctrinal ambiguity does not
establish its desirability. Some might argue that creating ambiguous
doctrine can enable the Court to work through complex issues, or to
achieve results that otherwise would be resisted. One might respond
briefly to both points. If Justices create doctrinal ambiguity to avoid
resolving issues prematurely, the rationale anticipates their eventual
resolution.117 There comes a point at which areas of constitutional

116. See infra Part 111.C. Furthermore, to posit that not all Justices would follow
suit no more challenges my suggestions for structuring constitutional doctrine than
does the Court's failure to embrace Bork's originalism, or Dworkin's "Herculean"
pursuit of coherent principle, or Bickel's passive virtues, challenges the respective
merits of their proposals. Prescriptions for the manner in which judicial review ought
to be exercised are inherently idealistic. That no prescription could possibly be
achieved in reality does not vitiate its potential for casting new light on otherwise
intractable issues.
117. Richard Fallon has explored the challenges of crafting constitutional doctrine
in the face of "reasonable disagreement." See generally Fallon, supra note 17. He
suggests that because Justices might disagree about foundational values, compromise
is necessary. Id. at 59-60. He acknowledges that compromise undermines the goal of
"fidelity" to the Constitution-that is, of correctly interpreting its meaning. See id. at
60. Thus, he argues, "[m]ore than fidelity theorists have appreciated, constitutional
law needs a theory of the second-best." Id. at 117. Fallon views principles defining
prohibited purposes, for example, as potentially underenforcing true constitutional
meaning, but the best that Justices can do, given reasonable disagreement about
constitutional meaning. See id. at 90-102. He states that "purpose-focused ...
doctrines-at least when they are the practically exclusive mechanisms for the judicial
implementation of constitutional norms-reflect at most a thin, minimalist conception
of the democratic processes to which courts are often asked to defer." Id. at 105.
I would suggest that purpose-focused doctrines reflect more a minimalist conception
of constitutional mandates than a minimalist conception of democratic processes.
Beyond this, I would suggest that any substantive constitutional principle identified
by the Court must be one which the national electorate plausibly has created, or
plausibly would create, in constitutional politics, toward constraining their own
ordinary political discretion. See, e.g, Chang, Critique, supra note 37. From this
perspective, is a constitutional law comprised of "thin" substantive constitutional
principles truly second-best, or is it the most plausible understanding of the roles
accorded to the realms of constitutional and ordinary decisionmaking by those
responsible for creating the Constitution's provisions? See infra note 309. In any event,
the value-indeed necessity-of explicitly differentiated substantive constitutional
principles and adjudicative rules, independently derived and defined to serve their
respective functions, does not depend on any particular view about the substance of
constitutional law. Indeed, recognizing the essential and functional distinctions
between substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules could help to
structure a search for "a theory of the second-best"--or, more precisely, one "theory of
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law mature and crystallize. Even if only at that point, this Article's
main proposition stands: explicitly differentiating the derivation and
definition of substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative
rules is necessary, even if not sufficient, for creating constitutional
doctrine with a clarity most likely to fulfill the adjudicative and
political functions effectively.
If Justices create doctrinal ambiguity toward making decisions
that would be more politically unpalatable or resisted if reached
through clearly derived and defined principles, one might seriously
question the tactic's legitimacy, as Joseph Goldstein challenged
Alexander Bickel's "passive virtues."11s One's view of such willful
ambiguity depends on one's conception of judicial review, and of the
Justices' responsibilities when wielding that power. Bickel sees
Justices as exercising platonic judgment in ways concerned as much
about preserving political peace as enforcing properly construed
constitutional mandates. Goldstein far more emphasizes the latter,
and would condition any pursuit of the former on a candid and
explicit acknowledgement of the Court's agenda. In my view, like
Goldstein's, the Court has no business making decisions that intrude
(or fail to intrude) on governmental discretion in the name of the
Constitution except in pursuit of its best judgment, clearly and
candidly explained, as to what the Constitution prohibits, and what
it permits.
For those who would advocate willful ambiguity, prescriptions
for achieving doctrinal clarity might be of little use.119 Yet even they
the second-best" for deriving and defining substantive constitutional principles, and
another "theory of the second-best" for deriving and defining adjudicative rules.
ll8. Compare JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, THE INTELLIGIBLE CONSTITUTION (1992), with
BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 54.
ll9. Cass Sunstein urges "minimalism" in adjudicating "issues on which the nation
is sharply divided." Sunstein, supra note 17, at 50. By "minimalism," he means
"deciding only those issues that were necessary for disposition" of the particular case.
Id. at 49. He suggests that minimalism would have been appropriate for cases such as
Dred Scott, Brown, and Roe. Id. at 48-51. Minimalism does not necessarily entail
providing an ambiguous rationale for decision, but it does contemplate giving an
incomplete explanation of the decision as the result of legitimate interpretation.
Sunstein views Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), as a good, if flawed, example of
minimalism. He notes that Romer must be understood as defining a new category of
constitutionally impermissible purpose-a purpose "to discourage homosexuality or
homosexual behavior." Sunstein, supra note 17, at 62. He acknowledges that this is
not minimalist in the sense that the decision was predicated on a real and contested
substantive judgment-that, indeed, the Court had taken sides in Justice Scalia's
culture wars. Id. at 63. Sunstein also acknowledges that Justice Kennedy's rationale
for framing the contested value judgment as a new constitutional mandate could have
been "clearer" and "more coherent." Id. at 63-64. He acknowledges that the Court
failed "even to do what is minimally necessary for self-defense." Id. at 64. Yet, he views
the case as "a legitimate and in many ways salutary exercise in judicial minimalism,"
id. at 52, because the Justices could not agree on a deeper rationale, or lacked
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must recognize that not all constitutional issues arise in a context
that calls for willful ambiguity. For non-Bickelian contexts,
inadvertent ambiguity undermines the adjudicative and political
functions in ways that will be elaborated below. If the Court were to
follow this Article's prescriptions toward creating more clarity, at
least in non-Bickelian contexts, the contrast with those willfully
obscured Bickelian contexts would be stark. Willful obfuscation could
be less effective if it were transparent that there has been an attempt
to muddle. Thus, those who wish to preserve space for willful
ambiguity must determine whether the benefits of preserving that
option are more significant than the costs incurred through a body of
constitutional doctrine that is universally more ambiguous and
unjustified than it otherwise could be and, therefore, that is less well
suited to serve the adjudicative and political functions across the
broad range of constitutional issues on which the Court pronounces
its judgment.

B.

The Pre-Bakke Adjudication of Claims that Racial
Classifications Violate the Equal Protection Clause
1.

The Implicit Substantive Constitutional Principle and
Implicit Adjudicative Rule

In Korematsu v. United States,120 the Supreme Court determined
that a military order excluding persons of Japanese ancestry from

confidence that they were correct, or "because of strategic considerations having to do
with the timing of judicial interventions into politics." Id. at 64.
BU:t if Romer's result was correct, the failure of derivational "self-defense," the
failure to identify interpretive method, and the failure to connect to the
impermissibility of purposes rooted in racist animus or sexist value judgments, all
undermined the potential of the case to fulfill the political function-to articulate with
clarity the principles by which governmental actors should feel constrained. Sunstein,
supra note 17, at 64 .. If Romer's result was not correct, the failure of derivational selfdefense hardly diminished decision costs and error costs-Sunstein's two prime
concerns. Id. at 16-19. If the Justices were indeed unable to reach consensus on a
deeper rationale for the impermissibility of purposes rooted in anti-gay animus, but
could reach consensus on the principle itself, or at least the result, each could have
written a separate opinion, each with its own effort toward self-defense and
interpretive depth. Cf. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 118. If the Justices truly were unsure
that they were correct, certiorari could have been deemed improvidently granted. Any
strategic considerations about the timing of judicial interventions into politics would
have been better served by dismissal, rather than a politically controversial decision
unsupported by anything resembling interpretive legitimacy. For further discussion of
Sunstein's "minimalism," see infra note 309.
120. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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presence within certain areas on the west coast did not violate
principles of equal protection.121 Justice Black stated:
[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single
racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all
such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts
must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny."122
This statement begs several questions. Why are laws with racial
classifications "immediately suspect"? What is a court to look for in
closely scrutinizing laws with racial classifications? What
distinguishes racial classifications that are unconstitutional from
those which are not?
Significantly, Justice Black also said: "[p]ressing public necessity
may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial
antagonism never can. ''123 Applying these propositions to the facts
and circumstances of the case, Justice Black determined that these
racial classifications should not be invalidated, saying that "[t]he
judgment that exclusion of the whole group was . . . a military
imperative answers the contention that the exclusion was in the
nature of group punishment based on antagonism to those of
Japanese origin."124 He concluded:
To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without
reference to the real military dangers which were presented,
merely confuses the issue. Korematsu was not excluded from
the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race. He was
excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire ....

121. Principles of equal protection have been deemed applicable to federal policies
through the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. This proposition was crystallized
nearly a decade after Korematsu was decided. See generally Bolling, 347 U.S. 497. For
a review of the Court's application of equal protection principles to the federal
government before Bolling, see Justice O'Connor's opinion in Adarand v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200, 213-17 (1995). O'Connor notes that the Court left quite an ambiguous picture
in Korematsu and Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), of how principles
of equal protection applied to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment.
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 213-15. One might suggest that these ambiguities could have
been mitigated significantly had the Court attended explicitly to the distinction
between substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules, as developed in
this section. On the applicable substantive constitutional principle, should the federal
government have been viewed as having more discretion than the states to pursue
purposes rooted in racial prejudice? If not, on the applicable adjudicative rule, should
the federal government be viewed as less likely than states to have pursued purposes
rooted in racial prejudice when adopting policies containing racial classifications? For
analysis of these two questions, see David Chang, Discriminatory Impact, Affirmative
Action, and Innocent Victims: Judicial Conservatism or Conservative Justices?, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 790, 825-27 (1991) [hereinafter Chang, Judicial Conservatism].
122. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. Id. at 219.
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There was evidence of disloyalty on the part of some, the
military authorities considered that the need for action was
great, and the time was short.125
Justice Black thus implied a substantive definition of
unconstitutional racial discrimination framed in terms of prohibited
purposes-that if a racial classification were enacted because of
racial antagonism, then it would be unconstitutional. Having
determined that the challenged racial classification in fact was not
adopted because of purposes rooted in racial antagonism, but because
of bona fide considerations of military necessity, he determined that
this particular racial classification should be upheld.
Furthermore, Black's opinion implied an adjudicative rule for
determining whether a law containing racial classifications will be
upheld or invalidated.126 Laws with racial classifications are
presumed unconstitutional. Such laws are viewed with suspicion.
About what is the Court suspicious when faced with a law containing
racial classifications? The implicit answer: the Court is suspicious
that the law was adopted because of purposes rooted in racial
antagonism. What must the government demonstrate to rebut the
presumption that its policy contammg racial classifications
discriminates unconstitutionally because of race? The implicit
answer: the government must prove that the law was not adopted
because of purposes rooted in racial antagonism.121 Thus, implicitly,
the Court would subject a law containing racial classifications to "the
most rigid scrutiny" to determine whether it was enacted because of
racial antagonism.12s

125. Id. at 223-24 (emphasis added).
126. See id. at 216.
127. See id.
128. In Palmore u. Sidoti, Chief Justice Burger articulated these substantive and
adjudicative propositions more clearly and explicitly than the Court ever had before, or
since, stating: "(c]lassifying persons according to their race is more likely to reflect
racial prejudice than legitimate public concerns." 466 U.S. at 432. This single, simple
sentence implicitly expresses an antiracism principle as the applicable substantive
constitutional principle: Racial prejudice is not a legitimate public concern. It also
implies a rationale for the presumed unconstitutionality of racial classifications-they
are categorically more likely to reflect racial prejudice than permissible purposes. In
other words, in choosing to use racial classifications, the government probably violated
the antiracism principle. Therefore, it is the government's burden to show that this
statute is among the minority of laws containing racial classifications that are
constitutionally permissible. Furthermore, the sentence implies something of the
nature of the showing that the government must make. The government must
persuade the court that the statute in question was not adopted because of racial
prejudice, but instead was adopted for legitimate public concerns.
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Failures in Explicitly Deriving and Defining
Substantive Constitutional Principles and Adjudicative
Rules Undermine the Adjudicative Function
a.

Substantive Constitutional Principles for Properly
Identifying Issues of Relevant Fact

Definitional Ambiguity. Justice Black declared that "racial
antagonism" could never "justify" a racial classification.129 He also
stated that laws "which curtail the civil rights of a single racial
group" are "suspect," and "that courts must subject them to the most
rigid scrutiny."130 As suggested above, these statements imply a
substantive definition of unconstitutional racial discrimination: If the
government "justifies" a law containing racial classifications with
"racial antagonism," then that law violates the Equal Protection
Clause.
If one were to have considered this implicit proposition explicitly,
however, one would have identified ambiguities reqmrmg
clarification. First, what does it mean for the government to "justify"
a law by reference to racial antagonism? Is the concept of
governmental "justification" concerned with the actual purposes for
which the challenged law was enacted? Is it concerned with the
purposes that the government asserts during litigation, regardless of
what the actual purposes might have been? These two different
definitions of "justify" would make different facts and circumstances
constitutionally relevant. It surely must matter for determining
whether a particular racial classification should be upheld which of
these two concepts of "justification" the Court were to choose.
Second, what, exactly, does "racial antagonism" mean? Does it
mean a dislike of people of a particular race solely because of their
race? Does it extend to making policy judgments about members of a
certain race, apart from whether there is antagonism or dislike,
because of assumed facts about that race-because, in other words, of
racial stereotyping? These different definitions of "racial antagonism"
each would make different facts and circumstances constitutionally
relevant.131 It surely must matter for determining whether a
particular racial classification should be upheld which of these
definitions of "antagonism" the Court were to choose.
Derivational Ambiguity. For the sake of further analysis, one can
posit that Justice Black was concerned about the actual reasons a
challenged policy was adopted, and that his notion of prohibited
129.
130.
131.

Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
Id.
See id.
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antagonism was limited to disliking people solely because of their
Japanese ancestry. Again, he said that "Korematsu was not excluded
from the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race."132
Justice Murphy, in dissent, seemed to have a broader substantive
definition of unconstitutional racial discrimination than that implied
by Black's opinion. Murphy said that the rationality required by
equal protection:
[I]s lacking because the exclusion order necessarily must rely
for its reasonableness upon the assumption that all persons of
Japanese ancestry may have a dangerous tendency to commit
sabotage and espionage.133
For Murphy, this unexamined, unsupported assumption that race
correlates with behavioral tendencies amounted to a "legalization of
racism" that violates the Equal Protection Clause.134 In other words,
Murphy's (implicit) substantive constitutional principle was
concerned with racial stereotyping; Black's was not.
Does the constitutional mandate of equal protection, properly
interpreted, encompass substantive constitutional principles
prohibiting only laws enacted because of purposes rooted in racial
antagonism or, more broadly, laws enacted because of purposes
rooted in racist values and racial stereotypes? This question lies at
the heart of effectively performing the adjudicative function in
Korematsu and in other cases challenging laws with racial
classifications. How one defines an applicable substantive rulewhether a definition of manslaughter in criminal law, or a
substantive constitutional principle defining impermissible racial
discrimination in constitutional law-is centrally significant in
identifying which questions of fact and circumstance are legally
relevant and, therefore, in shaping the course and the outcome of
cases in which those rules are invoked. Murphy's implicit principle
made relevant some issues of fact that Black's did not. Murphy's
underlay a finding of unconstitutionality; Black's did not.135
Explicitly endeavoring to derive a substantive constitutional
principle as sound interpretation would require focusing on its
elements. Had he done so, Justice Black more likely could have
acknowledged that his definition of unconstitutional racial
discrimination-establishing the irrelevance of stereotype-was

132. Id. at 223.
133. Id. at 235.
134. Id. at 242.
135. Of course, Justice Black's conclusion that the exclusion order was not
unconstitutional is also explained by his failure to follow through with the adjudicative
rule he purported to employ-the presumption that laws containing racial
classifications are unconstitutional. See infra text accompanying notes 139-57.
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substantially narrower than that of Justice Murphy. Had he done so,
Justice Black would have been put to the task of justifying his
narrower definition of unconstitutional racial discrimination as a
better interpretation than Justice Murphy's.
Adjudicative Legitimacy. Whether a putative substantive
constitutional principle is a proper interpretation of relevant
constitutional text requires confronting questions of interpretive
methodology. Should the substantive meaning of the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause be defined according to the
original understanding? If so, why? If not, then what methodology
should be employed, and why? Whether the interpretive method a
Justice invokes is Bork's originalism, Wellington's conventional
morality, Dworkin's philosophically coherent "principle,"136 Ely's
representation reinforcement,137 Amar's documentarianism,13s or
something else, an explicitly identified interpretive method provides
benchmarks that must be accounted for in defining the applicable
principle's particular elements. Confronting these questions could be
far more likely if our legal culture conceptualized constitutional
doctrine explicitly in terms of substantive constitutional principles
and adjudicative rules. Such a conceptualization would engender an
expectation that rules designated as substantive constitutional
principles must be justified as such-that is, as principles properly
derived from and evoking values deemed to underlie constitutional
text. Apart from noting their central relevance in deriving
substantive constitutional principles, further exploring such
questions of interpretive method is beyond the scope of this Article.
b.

Adjudicative Rules for Properly Resolving Issues of
Relevant Fact

An essential component of both criminal and civil adjudication is
a clearly defined and justified burden of persuasion with respect to
disputed legally significant facts. If the factfinder lacks a clear sense
of which party has the burden of persuasion and why, it must be
hindered, perhaps to the point of incapacity, in determining whether
such facts and circumstances have been proved to the necessary
degree of certainty.
The Analysis Black Did Pursue. In Korematsu, Justice Black
suggested that the order excluding persons of Japanese ancestry
from certain west coast areas would be presumed unconstitutional.

136. See Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 516-17
(1981) (arguing that Justices should define constitutional meaning in pursuit of
philosophically coherent principle more than instrumental policy).
137. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
138. See Amar, supra note 17.
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[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single
racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all
such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts
must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.139
One might explore certain definitional ambiguities in this statement.
In particular, what is the nature of the "most rigid scrutiny" that
Justice Black promises? For what is such scrutiny searching? What
must the government do to persuade a court that what the scrutiny
is looking for is (or is not) present?
Perhaps because Justice Black did not explicitly confront any of
these issues essential to deriving and defining the applicable burden
of persuasion, his analysis collapsed in determining whether his
implicit substantive constitutional principle had, in fact, been
violated. Justice Black concluded, as a matter of fact, that the order
was not adopted because of racial antagonism, but to serve purposes
of military necessity, simply because the government said so.140 Of
course, concluding that the government wins simply because it has
"answer[ed] the contention" of racial antagonism reveals a posture of
deference.141 Resting satisfied with a government contention is
inconsistent with any notion of "suspicion," let alone the focused
suspicion that could have been framed if Black had explicitly sought
to derive and define adjudicative rules for determining whether a
particular policy containing racial classifications should be deemed
impermissible.
An Analysis Black Should Have Pursued. Why, then, should laws
which curtail the civil rights of specified racial groups be viewed as
"suspect"-not necessarily unconstitutional, but "subject to the most
rigid scrutiny"? Why not apply James Bradley Thayer's deferential
"rule of administration"? Why not accord such laws the same
presumption of permissibility that is applied in adjudicating most
claims of unconstitutionality? Then again, why are most
constitutional claims adjudicated under a presumption that the
challenged governmental act is not unconstitutional? What analytical
139. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
140. See id. at 222-24.
141. Id. at 219. Earlier, Black took the same posture of deference to the asserted
interest in military necessity that the Court had taken in Hirabayashi.
[W]e cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the military authorities and
of Congress that there were disloyal members of that population, whose
number and strength could not be precisely and quickly ascertained. We
cannot say that the war-making branches of the Government did not have
ground for believing that in a critical hour such persons could not readily be
isolated and separately dealt with, and constituted a menace to the national
defense and safety, which demanded that prompt and adequate measures be
taken to guard against it.
Id. at 218 (quoting Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 99) (emphasis added).
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frameworks and factors are relevant for determining whether
particular kinds of governmental act should be presumed
permissible, or presumed impermissible?
I will now present an extended analysis of methodologies
relevant for deriving and defining adjudicative rules in constitutional
cases. Though the virtues and vulnerabilities of originalism and the
many competing methodologies for deriving and defining substantive
interpretations of constitutional text have been exhaustively
considered through the generations, scant attention has been devoted
to methodologies for deriving and defining adjudicative rules in the
context of constitutional adjudication.142 For criminal adjudication,

142. But see Berman, Guillen and Gullability, supra note 12, at 1522. Professor
Roosevelt has conceptualized the creation of "decision rules"-or, in my terms,
adjudicative rules-not only in terms of assigning a burden of proof, but also in terms
of whether the Court should "choose decision rules that differ substantially from the
operative propositions they are intended to implement." Roosevelt, supra note 20, at
1658 (emphasis added). By the latter, I believe, he refers to rules identifying issues of
subsidiary fact from which inferences about issues of ultimate fact (dispositive under
the [operative] substantive constitutional principle) might be made. See infra text
accompanying notes 402-11 (suggesting that doctrine concerned with whether
regulated activity has a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce serves as
an adjudicative rule for enforcing a substantive constitutional principle requiring
congressional pursuit of economic purposes under the Commerce Clause). Roosevelt
identified five factors relevant for constructing "decision rules"-including
institutional competence, costs of error, frequency of unconstitutional action,
legislative pathologies, enforcement costs, and guidance for other governmental actors.
See Roosevelt, supra note 20, at 1658-67. In my view, Roosevelt's five factors are
reducible to the probabilistic and normative analyses presented here, see infra text
accompanying notes 143-57.
Roosevelt acknowledges that "institutional competence could be a general answer,
subsuming many of the other factors." Roosevelt, supra note 20, at 1659. I would agree
and, indeed, would suggest that even those facets of institutional competence on which
he focuses are subsumed by other essential considerations. For example, Roosevelt
suggests that:
If a constitutional operative proposition sets up a question that is within the
peculiar competence of the courts, then the Court might adopt a decision rule
that closely tracks the operative proposition and grants no deference to other
actors .... Alternatively, a court confronting a question within the legislative
competence might craft a deferential rule-such as the rational basis testthat will tend to uphold almost all legislative acts, even those that judges
would deem unconstitutional if not deferring.
Id. at 1660-61. Roosevelt provides no example of a constitutional operative proposition
constraining legislative discretion that poses issues peculiarly within the competence
of courts. If issues were particularly within the judicial competence, one might suppose
that the Constitution would allocate to courts primary authority for their resolutionand that any operative propositions would constrain judicial discretion. Principles of
due process constraining adjudication, and principles governing the exercise of judicial
review itself, would seem paradigmatic examples of contexts in which decisionmaking
authority is vested with courts-and constrained by operative propositions applicable
to courts-precisely because courts are viewed as having special competence. In
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contrast, Roosevelt identifies the "rational basis test" as an example of a deferential
decision rule for implementing an operative proposition that frames questions
particularly within legislative competence. See id. In one sense, the operative
proposition that he views rationality review as implementing-"the government may
not treat some people worse than others without adequate justification"-does refer to
questions of policy peculiarly with the legislative competence. Id. at 1657 (quoting
Amar, supra note 17, at 45). Legislatures are viewed as having those institutional
traits that justifies vesting them with authority to make policy choices within
constitutional boundaries. The deference of rationality review, however, is applied only
in circumstances in which legislatures are viewed as unlikely to have acted for
constitutionally prohibited reasons. See id. at 1660-61. Such deference is not applied in
contexts where legislatures, though still better suited than courts for choosing
"adequate justifications" for statutory requirements, are viewed as more likely to have
acted for constitutionally prohibited reasons-for example, when classifying by race.
See id. at 1663-64. Thus, at least for the example of rationality review, it seems that
the "institutional competence" factor may be subsumed within the probabilistic basis
for allocating a burden of persuasion. Roosevelt, supra note 20, at 1661. Of course, it
might be that a substantive constitutional principle (or an operative proposition) poses
issues that courts are not well suited to answer reliably-for example, whether
Congress acted for a constitutionally authorized purpose under the Commerce Clause.
See infra text accompanying notes 386-411. Here, the Court might adopt a decision (or
adjudicative) rule providing a best-available basis from which inferences of dispositive
fact might be drawn-for example, as alluded to earlier in this footnote, a rule
concerned with effects from which congressional intent might be inferred. See infra
text accompanying notes 406-11. Yet this would be a function of relative judicial
competence to answer different questions of fact made relevant by one substantive
constitutional principle or another, toward reducing the probability of erroneously
upholding or invalidating acts under the applicable substantive constitutional
principle. It would not be a function of whether the substantive constitutional
principle (or operative proposition) poses a question more within the judicial
competence or legislative competence.
By "costs of error," see Roosevelt, supra note 20, at 1661-63. Roosevelt refers to
considerations that I analyze under "the normative analysis" for allocating
presumptions in constitutional adjudication. See infra text accompanying notes 14351. By "frequency of unconstitutional action," see Roosevelt, supra note 20, at 1663- 64,
he refers to considerations that I analyze under "the probabilistic analysis" for
allocating such presumptions. See infra text accompanying notes 152-57. By
"legislative pathologies," Roosevelt refers to "justification for an anti-deferential
decision rule . . . when there is reason to doubt the good faith of the legislature."
Roosevelt, supra note 20, at 1664. As an example, he cites laws that entrench
legislators, and those that benefit "locals while burdening out-of-staters." Id. In my
view, this point restates concerns about the probability of unconstitutional action in
relation to operative propositions (substantive constitutional principles) mandating
particular definitions of legislative "good faith." Roosevelt also identifies concerns
about "enforcement costs"-where "operative propositions may require courts to decide
questions that they simply cannot," at least not "without burdensome ... evidence
gathering." Id. at 1665. Yet, such concerns seem less relevant for allocating the burden
of persuasion than for devising adjudicative rules defining questions of subsidiary fact
from which the questions of ultimate fact, dispositive under the applicable operative
proposition, might be resolved. Finally, he suggests a "guidance for other
governmental actors factor" for constructing decision rules. Id. at 1666-67. But this
seems less relevant for determining what decision rules should be adopted and how
they should be framed, and more relevant to rationales for explicitly differentiating
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however, rules allocating the burden of persuasion regarding
contested issues of material fact have been exhaustively analyzed.
One might consider whether the basis for allocating the burden of
persuasion in criminal prosecutions might inform analysis of the
analogous issue for constitutional adjudication.
A normative approach for allocating the burden of persuasion in
constitutional adjudication. Consider a prosecution for murder. A
(substantive) definition of murder is "intentionally to cause the death
of another human being." This (substantive) definition of murder
makes certain facts and circumstances relevant, and determines the
issues of fact and circumstance that must be adjudicated when in
dispute-specifically, whether the defendant intended to kill his
victim; if so, whether the defendant engaged in conduct with such
intent; and, if so, whether the defendant's conduct caused such death.
Accordingly, in a prosecution for murder, the state would need to
make the factual argument that the defendant did intend to kill; the
defendant would need to deny that he intended to kill.
Similarly, in the constitutional context, an applicable
substantive constitutional principle would make certain facts or
quasi-factual circumstances legally relevant.143 Where the parties
dispute those relevant facts, rules allocating the burden of
persuasion are necessary because the court might erroneously adopt
the challenger's version of the facts (and therefore erroneously
invalidate the challenged governmental act); or erroneously adopt

substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules in the first place---i.e.,
toward serving the political function of judicial review. On the political function, and
its service through explicitly differentiating substantive constitutional principles and
adjudicative rules, see supra Part II; infra text accompanying notes 159-91, 310-12,
323-26, 348-49, 382-83, 454-65, 475-76.
143. The term "quasi-factual circumstances" contemplates rules such as those that
require determining, first, what interest the government was pursuing in enacting a
challenged policy, and second, whether such state interest qualifies as "compelling."
Whether the determinations are matters of "pure" fact, or mixed questions of Jaw and
fact, and whether the determinations are for the court, as is finding the existence of
duty in a negligence action, or for the jury, as is finding the existence of breach in a
negligence action, are questions that largely have been neglected in the Court's
definition of constitutional doctrine. See supra note 30. These questions far more likely
could be addressed if constitutional doctrine were derived and defined in a manner
explicitly distinguishing between substantive constitutional principles and
adjudicative rules. Because carefully analyzing whether an issue presented by a
particular element of a particular constitutional rule should be deemed one of pure fact
(for the jury), mixed law and fact, or pure law (for the court) would warrant its own
article-length treatment, and because such an analysis must build on first having
made the case for distinguishing between substantive constitutional principles and
adjudicative rules, this Article will eschew unpacking the concept of "quasi-factual"
circumstance in favor of focusing on the more foundational set of issues.
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the government's version of the facts (and therefore erroneously
uphold the challenged governmental act).
Consider how this analysis, far from complete so far, applies to
Justice Black's opinion in Korematsu. Recall the implicit substantive
constitutional principle (which I have suggested should have been
explicitly derived and defined)-if a law curtailing the rights of a
specified racial group was adopted because of purposes rooted racial
antagonism, then that law is unconstitutional. This substantive
principle makes certain facts and circumstances relevant, and
determines the issues of fact and circumstance that must be
adjudicated when in dispute-specifically, was the challenged law
adopted because of purposes rooted in racial antagonism? Given the
substantive principle with which Justice Black implicitly was
working, Korematsu would have had to make the factual argument
that the exclusion order was adopted because of racial antagonism.
The government would have had to make the factual argument that
the order was not adopted because of racial antagonism.
In the criminal context, our legal culture has determined that
the prosecution should bear the burden of persuasion with respect to
all issues of material fact, and that the burden should be heavy. The
rationale for these adjudicative rules begins with the recognition that
adjudicative error is a real possibility. A court might erroneously
convict a (truly) innocent defendant, or might erroneously acquit a
(truly) guilty defendant. Based on a normative judgment that one of
these errors is far worse than the other-that it would be far worse to
convict the innocent than to acquit the guilty-our society has
determined that the state should bear the burden to prove beyond a
·reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime
charged.144
Consider how a normative analysis of adjudicative error applies
to the constitutional context. In the adjudication of constitutional
claims, a court might erroneously determine that a (truly)
permissible law is unconstitutional, or erroneously determine that a
(truly) unconstitutional law is permissible. Would invalidating a law
that, in fact, is not unconstitutional be worse than upholding a law
that, in fact, is unconstitutional? Might one reach the opposite
conclusion? If so, how?
In my view, the normative evaluation of potential adjudicative
errors can be of only questionable helpfulness in the constitutional
context.145 The criminal context has made this normative judgment

144. See generally In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
145. Cf. Berman, Guillen and Cul/ability, supra note 12, at 1522 (positing that
judges "might reasonably believe that the social disutility of false positives and false
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by defining, then evaluating, the social costs of each kind of
adjudicative error. The social cost of an erroneous acquittal is a lost
opportunity to enforce criminal prohibitions and to vindicate their
underlying policies. The social cost of an erroneous conviction
includes the unjust deprivation of an individual's liberty, the risk of
over-deterrence, and the dilution of the retributive condemnation of
the guilty.146 Because the social costs of erroneous conviction are
viewed as so much worse than the social costs of erroneous acquittal,
whether the crime in question is murder or trespass, we have made
the categorical determination that the prosecution must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt all facts necessary to establish the crime
charged.147
Can one make a categorical determination that it is worse to
uphold a (truly) unconstitutional act than to invalidate a (truly)
permissible act, or vice versa? Toward making this comparative
judgment, one must define the relevant social costs of each
adjudicative error. For constitutional adjudication, the stakes must
be framed in constitutional terms. Though Korematsu involved a
challenge to a military policy authorized by congressional delegation,
it will be more broadly instructive, at least initially, to frame this
normative analysis in terms of a typical constitutional challenge to a
legislative act. Thus, what is lost of constitutional significance in an
erroneous decision to invalidate a statute? What is lost of
constitutional significance in an erroneous decision to uphold a
statute? What are the constitutional values relevant to each kind of
adjudicative error?
In the broadly categorical sense now in question, the failure to
invalidate a (truly) unconstitutional statute leaves unenforced some
constitutional restriction on governmental discretion, and the values
from which that restriction is derived. The invalidation of a (truly)
permissible statute intrudes on the legislative discretion that the
Constitution, properly enforced, would require to be respected. Which
category of constitutional value is more important-those
constitutional values which restrict legislative discretion, or the
foundational constitutional value that legislatures have the right to
make policy within constitutional bounds? 14s

negatives in the adjudication of any particular constitutional operative proposition are
not identical").
146. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 363-64.
147. Justice Harlan made the point in his Winship concurrence: "I view the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a
fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an
innocent man than to let a guilty man go free." Id. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring).
148. My characterization of the relevant competing considerations in a normative
analysis for allocating the adjudicative presumption in constitutional cases-weighing
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Are all constitutional restrictions on legislative discretion of
equal importance, and categorically more important than the norm
that legislatures have the right to legislate within constitutional
the value of the particular restriction on governmental discretion against the broad
norm of politically accountable governmental discretion within constitutional boundsdiffers from the mode of ad hoc balancing that characterizes judicial inquiry in many
constitutional contexts. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of
Balancing, 96 YALE L. J. 943 (1987). This ad hoc balancing seeks to weigh the relevant
constitutional norm against the particular state interest pursued through the
challenged governmental act.
Indeed, it is important to recognize that the normative analysis-or balancingabout which I am concerned is functionally different from, and must be prior to, the
balancing that occurs in, for example, the fundamental rights version of "strict
scrutiny." The ad hoc balancing involved in determining whether, say, a state's
interest in protecting a fetus is more important than a woman's right to choose (and
whether a particular law's pursuit of the state interest is more significant than that
law's intrusion on the competing constitutional right) is a function of the applicable
substantive constitutional principle. Such balancing cannot be undertaken without a
prior determination of which party bears the burden of persuasion on the ultimate
question of constitutionality-in other words, a determination of the applicable
adjudicative presumption.
Thus, Justice Blackmun's balancing in Roe was a function of an implicit substantive
constitutional principle: If a law intrudes on a woman's right to choose, and if the
constitutionally significant value gained through its enforcement is not greater than
the constitutionally significant value lost through its enforcement, then it is
unconstitutional. Enforcing this substantive constitutional principle requires
evaluating the particular state interest at stake--whether protecting a fetus, enforcing
sexual morality, or protecting maternal health. But determining which party should
bear the burden of persuasion for adjudicating the constitutionality of an act
challenged under such a balance-oriented substantive constitutional principle cannot
depend on the particular state interest asserted (and its putative weight), because the
particular state interest asserted (and its putative weight) are elements of the
applicable substantive constitutional principle. Determining the constitutionally
significant weight of a state's interest in maternal health, or preserving a fetus,
therefore, is an issue that must be answered under the applicable substantive
constitutional principle limiting state discretion-and is an issue with respect to which
the burden of persuasion must be allocated. Put another way, particular state interests
can be weighed against particular constitutional mandates under either a presumption
of priority (permissibility) or a presumption of inferiority (impermissibility). Thus, the
relevant considerations in a normative analysis for allocating the burden of persuasion
would seem to be the relative importance of, on the one hand, the particular
substantive constitutional principle limiting electorally accountable discretion and, on
the other hand, the competing substantive constitutional principle that the people,
through their representatives, have the right to create and enforce their preferred
policies within constitutional bounds.
Professor Aleinikoff critiqued the ad hoc balancing required by balancing-oriented
substantive constitutional principles in large part because of methodological problems
involved in calibrating the balance in a constitutionally meaningful and justifiable
way. See Aleinikoff, supra note 148, at 972-79. This problem is a more intense version
of the problems I have suggested undermine the helpfulness of a normative approach
for deriving and defining adjudicative rules that allocate burdens of persuasion in
constitutional adjudication. See supra text accompanying notes 142-51.
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bounds? Or, perhaps, is there some hierarchy of restrictions on
legislative discretion, such that even the least important restriction
on legislative discretion is more important than the norm that
legislatures have the right to legislate within constitutional bounds?
Unless one can answer either of these two questions in the
affirmative, one cannot justify in the constitutional context the kind
of sweeping categorical normative judgment and correspondingly
allocated burden of persuasion that so easily determines the
adjudicative presumption in the context of criminal law.
No one would argue that all constitutional restrictions on
legislative discretion have equal weight. The freedom of speech, for
example, would seem to be more foundational, more important, than
is the requirement that "[t]he terms of the President and Vice
President shall end at noon on the 20th day of January."149 It also
would be difficult to argue persuasively that the least significant
restriction on legislative discretion-whether the January 20th
provision, or another-is more important than the foundational
principle that legislatures have the right to make law within
constitutional bounds. Thus, the presumed impermissibility of
Korematsu 's challenged order cannot be justified on such a
categorically defined normative basis.
One might evaluate whether each particular substantive
constitutional principle limiting legislative discretion is more, or less,
important than is the principle that legislatures have discretion to
make policy within constitutional boundaries. Such a comparative
evaluation begs the question of the methodology a judge should
employ for making this comparative judgment. Choosing the proper
methodology for identifying the relative weight of different
substantive constitutional principles involves precisely the same
challenges as determining the proper methodology for deriving the
definition of substantive constitutional principles-whether Bork's
originalism, Wellington's conventional morality, Dworkin's coherent
"principle,'' or something else.
Beyond choosing an interpretive methodology, a court must
apply it. The challenges involved in the derivation and definition of
substantive constitutional principles are daunting. But defining the
relative weight of substantive constitutional principles must be even
more challenging. Indeed, determining the weight of a substantive
constitutional principle is essentially a matter of defining the content
of that principle to a greater level of precision and refinement than is
required "merely'' for identifying its elements. An analogy: However
difficult it is to peer into a distant field, obscured by fog, to determine
whether two grazing animals are cows, horses, or one of each, would
149.

U.S. CONST. amend. XX.
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be little compared to the difficulty of trying to determine whether the
animal that might be a cow weighs more, or less, than the animal
that might be a horse.
Having identified these difficulties, one might question whether
a normative approach could have helped Justice Black to justify a
doctrinal proposition that laws with racial classifications are
constitutionally suspect, and should be presumed unconstitutional.
First, he would have had to identify the constitutionally relevant
costs in erroneously upholding the exclusion order and erroneously
invalidating the exclusion order.150 Second, analyzing which mistake
is worse would require determining whether to evaluate the
competing constitutional norms in the abstract, or in the particular
context presented.151 Third, analyzing which mistake is worse would
require determining whether the relative weights of the competing
constitutional norms should be determined with an originalist
methodology, or something else. Thus, employing a normative
analysis for deriving and defining adjudicative presumptions might
reveal critical questions, but would present perhaps intractable
methodological challenges in justifying any answers.
A probabilistic approach for allocating the burden of persuasion
in constitutional adjudication. Consider another approach for
allocating the burden of persuasion that seeks to minimize the
systemic costs of adjudicative error by maximizing the probability of
factfinding
accuracy.
Recall
Black's
implicit
substantive
constitutional principle: if a law was adopted because of purposes
150. Erroneously upholding the exclusion order would have failed to enforce the
substantive constitutional principle prohibiting laws adopted because of racial
antagonism. Conversely, erroneously invalidating the exclusion order-that is,
wrongly determining that it was adopted because of racial antagonism when, in fact, it
was not-would have sacrificed the constitutional norm that government may exercise
discretion (more precisely, military discretion established pursuant to a congressional
delegation) within constitutional bounds.
151. Is the prohibition of racial antagonism more important when individual liberty
is at stake, or exclusion from one's home, or admission to a school, or eligibility for a
driver's license, or the choice of a marital partner, or is its significance to be
determined in an abstract and broadly categorical sense? Similarly, is the principle of
politically accountable government discretion within constitutional bounds more
important when the policy at issue is concerned with national security, or traffic
safety, or marital morality, or is its significance to be determined in an abstract and
broadly categorical sense? Some might argue that the normative approach for
allocating a presumption in constitutional adjudication can be dispositive when the
challenged policy is justified on grounds of national security, whether created by the
military or by legislative choice, to the extent that the costs of erroneously invalidating
such a policy might be viewed as categorically more significant than the costs of
erroneously invalidating ordinary police power legislation and, arguably, as
categorically more significant than (at least certain) constitutional limits on
policymaking discretion. Indeed, this point might be prominently urged especially
today-and vigorously contested-as during any time of war. Cf. supra note 148.
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rooted in racial antagonism, then it is unconstitutional. Laws with
racial classifications are not per se unconstitutional, but laws
adopted because of racial antagonism are. Implicitly, when Black
proclaims "suspicions" about such laws, and declares that such laws
are subject to "the most rigid judicial scrutiny," he suggests a
"suspicion" that such laws were. adopted because of racial
antagonism. But why?
One might have reason for a meaningful suspicion if one
believed, in a categorical sense, that a law curtailing the civil rights
of a single racial group probably was adopted because of racial
antagonism and, therefore, probably violates the applicable
substantive constitutional principle. If one were to determine that
most laws with racial classifications were adopted because of
purposes rooted in racial antagonism, and if all one knew about a
particular law is that it contains a racial classification, it would be
rational to wager-based on the categorical probabilities, without
additional information, and toward minimizing the systemic costs of
adjudicative error-that such particular law was adopted because of
racial antagonism.
Indeed, there is good reason to believe that a law targeting a
single racial group for harmful treatment was adopted because of a
purpose rooted in racial antagonism, animus, disdain, or some other
similar negative value judgment about race. One can look, most
obviously, to the historical use of laws with classifications targeting a
specific racial group. The "Black Codes" enacted in southern states
during the immediate aftermath of the Civil War fit the category of
"laws which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group," and
clearly were adopted because of racial antagonism. One could
canvass and catalogue all laws targeting a racial group for harmful
treatment enacted through the time Korematsu was decided. In doing
so, one would find a stark pattern suggesting that nearly all, if not
all, were indeed adopted because of purposes rooted in antagonism.
The historical pattern would suggest a probability that any
particular law within the category (i.e. laws which curtail the civil
rights of a single racial group) was indeed adopted because of racial
antagonism.152
Beyond this empirically-rooted rationale for positing relevant
probabilities, one could canvass the range of conceivable state
purposes which might rationally be pursued by enacting a law
152. One might posit a similar historically-indicated probability that laws with
racial classifications have been adopted because of purposes rooted in the racial
stereotyping about which Justice Murphy was concerned. For the proposition that
racial stereotyping tends to characterize people's thoughts when thinking explicitly in
terms of race, see, for example, GORDON ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 187-99
(1958).
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containing a classification that specifies a racial group for harmful
treatment. Few purposes that are not tainted by racism could be
rationally pursued with laws that contain racial classifications. Most,
if not all, purposes that are tainted by racial antagonism can
rationally be pursued with laws containing racial classifications.
Thus, beyond an analysis of historical usage, an analysis of the
logical relationships between racial classifications and the universe
of governmental objectives also suggests a probability that laws with
racial classifications were adopted because of purposes rooted in
racial antagonism.153
One way to reduce the systemic costs of adjudicative error-in
this context, upholding an act that is unconstitutional, or
invalidating an act that is not unconstitutional-is to reduce the
likelihood of adjudicative error. If the majority within an identified
category of governmental act are unconstitutional, a rational
approach for reducing the likelihood and systemic costs of
adjudicative error would place the burden on the government to
prove that a particular challenged act (possessing the relevant
categorical characteristic) is among the minority of permissible acts
within that category.154
153. In McLaughlin v. Florida, the Court articulated this probabilistically-framed
rationale for the "strict scrutiny'' of racial classifications-that such classifications are
"in most cases irrelevant to any constitutionally acceptable legislative purpose." 379
U.S. 184, 191 (1964) (quoting Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100).
154. Lawrence Sager has suggested that some constitutional norms are
"underenforced" while others are "overenforced." See Sager, supra note 17. Professor
Roosevelt builds on the proposition-stating, for example, that "knowledge that certain
kinds of classification have been used for illegitimate reasons, and seldom for
legitimate ones, would justify overenforcement of equal protection." See Roosevelt,
supra note 20, at 1663. In my view, these concepts can be clarified by reference to the
normative and probabilistic rationales for allocating a burden of persuasion in
constitutional adjudication, and for defining supplemental adjudicative rules (for
example, those making a law's effects a basis from which to infer legislative purpose
under a substantive constitutional principle concerned with such purposes). See supra
note 142; infra text accompanying notes 402-11. To the extent that an adjudicative
presumption is justified by probabilistic considerations, as Roosevelt contemplates
above, there ought not to be "overenforcement" or "underenforcement" of the relevant
substantive constitutional principle. Indeed, a probabilistically justified adjudicative
rule seeks to maximize adjudicative accuracy. In contrast, adjudicative rules that are
justified by normative considerations might well result in "overenforcement" or
"underenforcement," at least as viewed in relation to the number of cases in which a
false finding of permissibility, or a false finding of unconstitutionality, is made. This
would be so in the sense that the burden of persuasion in criminal prosecutions,
normatively justified, results in more false acquittals than false convictions and,
therefore, in a purely numerical sense, an "underenforcement" of the criminal law. But
the point of the normative basis for allocating the adjudicative burden of persuasion,
and for defining supplemental adjudicative rules, is that one adjudicative error is more
significant than the other and, therefore, is more to be avoided. Thus, from the
perspective of social utility, as opposed to simply counting the number of false

2006]

STRUCTURING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE

829

Based on such probabilistic reasoning, had he sought explicitly
to derive and define an adjudicative presumption, Justice Black
might have said that all laws which curtail the civil rights of a single
racial group are immediately suspect, because most laws containing
such racial classifications were adopted because of racial antagonism.
Any given law within that category, therefore, probably violates the
governing substantive constitutional principle and, therefore,
probably is unconstitutional.155 Thus, any particular challenged
policy within the category of laws curtailing the civil rights of a
single racial group is subject to the most rigid judicial scrutiny: The
government bears the burden of showing that the particular
challenged policy was not adopted because of racial antagonism and,
therefore, is among the minority of acts within that category adopted
for permissible purposes.156
positives versus false negatives (an appropriate benchmark for a probabilisticallyallocated burden of persuasion) the normative perspective results not in
"overenforcement" or "underenforcement," but, rather, in optimal enforcement---or, at
least, such is its design. Indeed, "overenforcement" or "underenforcement" could result
to the extent that adjudicative rules are defined in a way that ineffectively accounts
either for probabilistic or normative considerations, which is precisely why properly
deriving and defining adjudicative rules are essential tasks for the adjudicative
function.
155. In Palmore, the Court succinctly articulated a probabilistic rationale for the
"strict scrutiny" of racial classifications. See Palmore, 466 U.S. at 432; see also supra
note 128. The Court has settled on a definition of prohibited racial prejudice that
includes purposes rooted in racist values (whether animus or favoritism) or racial
stereotypes. See infra note 197.
156. In contrast, consider laws that do not contain racial classifications. The Court
has employed an implicit substantive constitutional principle: If a facially neutral law
was adopted because of purposes rooted in racial prejudice, then it violates the
mandates of equal protection. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-71; Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Chang, Judicial Conservatism, supra note 121, at 791,
842 n.178, 843 n.179. Though the Court has not explicitly derived adjudicative rules
for enforcing the prohibition of racist purposes in this context, it has defined applicable
adjudicative presumptions more explicitly than in most doctrinal contexts. The
challenger bears a burden to show than an "invidious discriminatory purpose," Davis,
426 U.S. at 248, was "a motivating factor" in the government's having adopted the
challenged policy. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266. If the challenger meets that
burden, the act will be invalidated unless the state meets a burden to prove "that the
same decision would have been made even had the impermissible purpose not been
considered." Id. at 271 n.21.
The foundational adjudicative presumption in this context-the presumption of
permissibility-is readily justifiable with a probabilistic analysis. It seems obvious
that, as a category, facially neutral laws probably were not adopted because of racial
prejudice. Most laws are facially neutral; most laws do not contain racial
classifications. Traffic regulations, principles of tort liability, employment
discrimination statutes, contract law, criminal statutes, environmental regulations,
tax laws, zoning laws, rules of evidence---one could go on and on-almost all such
provisions fall within the category of "facially neutral" laws. Indeed, suppose one
randomly pulled a statute book from the library shelves, and opened the book
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Such an explicit identification of the governing substantive
constitutional principle, the applicable adjudicative presumption,
and the probabilistic rationale for that presumption, would have
rendered painfully apparent the weaknesses of Justice Black's
analysis of the facts of Korematsu's case. If Justice Black were truly
focused on the proposition that a law which curtails the civil rights of
a single racial group probably was adopted because of an
impermissible purpose rooted in racial antagonism, tpen he could not
have been satisfied that the government simply asserted a purpose of
"military necessity." Indeed, an explicit and focused suspicion that
the challenged exclusion order was adopted because of anti-Japanese
antagonism would have generated a series of context-specific
questions of fact-relevant to the ultimate question of impermissible
purpose-that the court, or the challenger, could have posed to the
government.157 Such specific questions thereby would have
crystallized the content of the government's burden beyond any
opaque formulation of "strict scrutiny." Failure to respond to these
focused questions in a way that persuasively allays suspicions of
racial antagonism would mean that the government fails to meet its
burden and, therefore, should lose.

***
The foregoing has illustrated the proposition that to serve the
adjudicative function of judicial review, a court not only must
randomly to find a statute. Suppose, as well, that all one knew about that statute was
its facial neutrality. Suppose, based on just that information, one had to place a wager
as to whether that statute was adopted because of purposes rooted in racism. It would
seem rational to bet that the law was not adopted because of purposes rooted in
racism, based on the fact that the policies addressed by most facially neutral laws
simply have nothing to do with particular contexts and particular policies in which
racism tended to be manifested in American history. Thus, if courts were to determine
that most facially neutral laws were not adopted because of racial prejudice, and if all
one knew about a law is that it does not contain a racial classification, it would be
rational to wager-based on the categorical probabilities, without additional
information, and toward reducing the systemic costs of adjudicative error-that such
law was not adopted because of racial prejudice. It would be rational to place the
burden of demonstrating unconstitutionality on the challenger. One might note,
however, that because the Court has not explicitly derived and defined substantive
constitutional principles and adjudicative rules in this context, the resulting doctrine
is plagued by ambiguities that inhibit both the adjudicative and political functions in
ways similar to those revealed by this Article's close examination of other doctrinal
contexts.
157. Why the Japanese? What was the basis for the belief that persons of Japanese
ancestry would commit acts of sabotage and espionage against the United States? Why
not impose similar restrictions against persons of Italian and German ancestry on the
east coast? Why were these policies framed without providing for an individualized
assessment of each internee's ties to and sympathies for Japan, and likelihood of
committing acts endangering the national interest?
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explicitly derive and define substantive constitutional principles for
identifying issues of relevant fact, but also must explicitly derive and
define adjudicative rules for resolving issues of relevant fact. Because
Justice Black's applicable substantive constitutional principle was
only implicit, the prohibition of "racial antagonism" was poorly
defined. Not a word was written toward deriving this substantive
constitutional principle as sound interpretation. Furthermore,
because the definition and derivational rationale for the adjudicative
presumption in Korematsu was only implicit, Justice Black shifted
from a presumption of impermissibility to deference, and found that
the challenged policy was not adopted because of racial antagonism.
In short, when the Court fails explicitly to derive and define
substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules, the costs
to the adjudicative function are poorly derived and defined
propositions oflaw and poorly made findings offact.158
3.

Doctrinal Clarity, Correctness, and the Political
Function

From Madison and Hamilton, to Thayer and Bork, and from the
Supreme Court through its insistence on judicial supremacy, those
who have thought seriously about judicial review have contemplated

158. Professor Berman suggests that "full appreciation of constitutional decision
rules could pave the way for a more robust congressional role in the enterprise of
constitutional implementation: The Court could permit Congress to substitute its
judgment for the Court's on just what the applicable decision rule should be." Berman,
Constitutional Decision Rules, supra note 12, at 104. I am skeptical about this. The
adjudicative function of judicial review requires, as does any adjudicative context,
substantive rules (for identifying issues of relevant fact) and adjudicative rules (for
resolving issues of relevant fact). See supra text accompanying notes 33-38.
Furthermore, the Court should derive and define adjudicative rules from either a
normative perspective or a probabilistic perspective. See supra text accompanying
notes 142-57. If a judicially-defined adjudicative rule has been derived from a
normative analysis, see supra text accompanying notes 142-51, a congressionally
enacted rule to the contrary would intrude on the Court's interpretive authority to
define the Constitution's meaning. If a judicially defined adjudicative rule were
predicated on a probabilistic analysis, see supra text accompanying notes 152-57, a
congressionally enacted rule to the contrary would intrude on the judiciary's
factfinding authority. Thus, to the extent that the Court determines that a particular
adjudicative rule is necessary for the optimal enforcement of a particular substantive
constitutional principle, whether from the normative or probabilistic perspective, that
adjudicative rule would seem no less worthy of protection by judicial supremacy from
legislative erosion than is the substantive constitutional principle itself. In short,
adjudicative rules can be deemed just as much a function of constitutionally mandated
meaning in court as are the substantive constitutional principles themselves. For a
broad challenge to judicial supremacy, see generally Chang, Critique, supra note 37.
For the proposition that some aspects of constitutional doctrine have not been framed
by the Court as constitutionally mandated interpreted meaning, see generally Fallon,
supra note 17; Monahan, supra note 17.
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a function beyond the adjudication of particular cases. Indeed, as
elucidated in Cooper, judicial supremacy is designed to inhibit the
enactment and enforcement of unconstitutional policies, through
mandating that political actors seek to remain within judiciallydefined constitutional boundaries. Because it is a systemic part of the
political process, unlike the episodically intrusive nature of the
adjudicative function, this political function of judicial review can
promise greater benefits as well as higher risks. The better a
substantive constitutional principle is derived and defined, the better
it can be enforced through the decisions of political actors who seek to
remain within constitutional bounds. Conversely, poorly conceived
constitutional doctrine could inhibit the enactment of laws that are
not unconstitutional, as well as fail to inhibit the enactment of laws
that are unconstitutional. One would suppose that Korematsu's
doctrinal ambiguities undermined not only the adjudicative function,
but also the political function. Rather than explore Korematsu's
relationship to the political function, however, the following will so
examine another foundational case that helped to shape the "suspect
classification" doctrine.159
a.

Substantive Constitutional Principles: Definitional
and Derivational Ambiguity Preclude a "Duly
Instructed" Electorate

In Bolling v. Sharpe,160 the Court invalidated a congressionallyenacted policy providing for racial segregation in the public schools of
the District of Columbia. Chief Justice Warren stated that
"[c]lassifications based solely upon race must be scrutinized with
particular care."161 Defining the principles of equal protection that
govern the federal government through the "liberty" protected by the
Fifth Amendment, Warren said:
Liberty under law extends to the full range of conduct which
the individual is free to pursue, and it cannot be restricted
except for a proper governmental objective. "162

159. One might note, however, that the essential point concerns deviations from
doctrinal clarity and correctness-which result from failures explicitly to derive and
define substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules, and which result in
barriers to fulfilling both the adjudicative and political functions. Thus, one just as
well could analyze Bolling and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), in relation to the
adjudicative function, and Korematsu in relation to the political function.
160. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
161. Id. at 499. The Court continued: "since they are contrary to our traditions and
hence constitutionally suspect." For discussion of this proposition as a rationale for the
close scrutiny of laws with racial classifications, see infra text accompanying notes
189-91.
162. Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499-500 (emphasis added).
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Applying that principle to the facts of Bolling, Warren concluded:
Segregation in public education is not reasonably related to any
proper governmental objective, and thus it imposes on Negro
children of the District of Columbia a burden that constitutes
an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due
Process Clause."163
In focusing on whether D.C.'s segregation was adopted because
of a "proper" governmental objective, Warren implicitly applied a
substantive constitutional principle similar to that applied in
Korematsu. A similar adjudicative rule-the presumption that laws
with racial classifications were adopted because of improper
purposes-is implicit in the Court's declaration that racial
classifications "must be scrutinized with particular care," and in its
nondeferential, rather conclusory determination that the D.C.
segregation policy was not adopted for a "proper" purpose.164
Although Bolling's implicit substantive constitutional principle
conceptualized invalid racial discrimination in terms of
impermissible purposes, there was not a word that defined those
objectives that are constitutionally "improper." There was not a word
that identified the putative "improper" objectives underlying the
District of Columbia policy. Beyond this, Warren's Bolling opinion
did nothing to derive the substantive constitutional principle
proscribing certain (undefined) "improper" purposes-nothing to
justify it as a sound interpretation of equal protection.
This Article thus far has suggested in broad strokes that judicial
review cannot effectively fulfill the political function unless
applicable substantive constitutional principles are explicitly
defined.165 Unless applicable legal rules are clearly defined, those
subject to their strictures-whether lower court judges or political
actors-cannot be "duly instructed." Beyond this, prior discussion
suggested that judicial review cannot effectively serve the political
function unless clearly defined substantive constitutional principles
are also expressly and persuasively derived as sound interpretation.
The Hamiltonian justification for vesting with federal judges the
power to interpret and enforce the Constitution's mandates
presupposes that judges reach their decisions through the exercise of
"judgment," not "will."166 Derivation that is express and plausible-if
not persuasive-not only can help political actors understand the

163. Id. at 500 (emphasis added).
164. Unstated, but implicit, was a finding of material fact-that the District of
Columbia policy of racial segregation was enacted for the same racist purposes as were
similar policies of racial segregation throughout the South.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 39-115.
166. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465.

834

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:4

content of the principle they are bound to obey, but also might soften
the resolve of those otherwise not inclined to comply.
Definitional Clarity. Consider how greater clarity in the
definition of Bolling's (otherwise ambiguous and implicit) substantive
constitutional principle might have affected the political function.
Few personified the political resistance at which the Court targeted
its lectures in Cooper more than Senator James Eastland of
Mississippi. Senator Eastland made the southern politician's typical
assertions about segregation. "The principle of segregation of the
white and colored races in the institutions of the South is not and has
never been based upon the concept that one race should be inferior to
the other before the law."161 He further declared:
The white people of the South do not have race prejudice. They
have race consciousness, and they are proud to possess this
awareness of the significance of race. Had they not possessed it,
the South would have been mongrelized and southern
civilization destroyed long ago. The South is historically
justified in its unflinching stand for racial integrity.168
Eastland's formal (and fantastic) assertions about southern
segregation rest on several propositions. First, race consciousness is
not equivalent to "race prejudice."169 Second, the prevention of
"mongrelization," and the preservation of "racial integrity" are not
the equivalent of race prejudice.110 Third, segregation in pursuit of
"racial integrity" is not predicated on the proposition that one race
should be inferior to another before the law.m All of these
propositions raise conceptual and legal questions for defining that
"race prejudice" (or consciousness) which is constitutionally
167. 100 CONG. REC. 7129, 7253 (1954).
168. 100 CONG. REC. 7129, 7256 (1954).
169. This proposition is valid, and had been at least implicitly recognized in
Korematsu and Bolling. All racial classifications discriminate based on race and,
therefore, are a product of race consciousness. Korematsu implied that only those
classifications adopted because of "racial prejudice" or "antagonism" are
unconstitutional. Bolling implied that only those classifications adopted because of
"improper" purposes are unconstitutional. Whether "the people of the South" acted
with permissible or impermissible "race consciousness" depended on the particular
"significance of race" of which they proudly proclaimed awareness.
170. This proposition identifies particular southern objectives relevant to race-preventing "mongrelization" and protecting "integrity." Like the first proposition, this
second acknowledges that race prejudice underlying public policy is at least politically
(and perhaps constitutionally) problematic. Furthermore, it asserts the key proposition
that Bolling failed to confront-that these purposes of preventing racial
"mongrelization" and protecting racial "integrity" are not manifestations of (politically
and constitutionally vulnerable) racial prejudice.
171. This proposition implicitly acknowledges that a prescription of mandated legal
inferiority would qualify as racial prejudice, and raises factual issues about the
purposes that did underlie segregation.
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problematic, and factual questions about the purposes that did
underlie policies of racial segregation. Significantly, however, by
these assertions, Eastland at least implicitly acknowledges that if
segregation were predicated on "race prejudice," it would be
politically vulnerable, if not constitutionally so.
By following Korematsu in conceptualizing unconstitutional
racial discrimination in terms of prohibited purposes, Bolling
presented an opportunity for the Court to address the very questions
that people like Eastland were raising. Yet, Bolling's vague
propositions about "proper" purposes left unchallenged Eastland's
conceptual assertion that the pursuit of "racial integrity" is not race
prejudice, as it left unchallenged Eastland's implicit assertion that
the pursuit of "racial integrity" is not unconstitutional.
If the Court had defined "improper" purposes in Bolling, the
political function could have been better served. Indeed, imagine that
Bolling had defined impermissible racial discrimination as that
pursued for purposes rooted in racist values or racial stereotypes-a
proposition on which the Court has (at least implicitly) settled
today.112 Framing such a principle explicitly in Bolling would have
required defining what it means to place value on race per se,
explaining why such racist value judgments are constitutionally
prohibited, and demonstrating how the purposes for which public
schools were segregated did, indeed, transgress such prohibitions.
Such an analysis could have made clear that a purpose of preserving
"racial integrity" values an individual of one race more than an
individual of another race, and institutions that are mono-racial
more than those that are multi-racial. Such an analysis, therefore,
could have directly confronted Eastland's assertion that the purpose
of preserving "racial integrity" is not racial prejudice. Thus, by failing
to define "improper" purposes-by failing explicitly to define the
applicable substantive constitutional principle-Bolling did less than
it could have to place on political actors like Eastland a burden of
defending their cherished policies, long predicated on a pervasive
ideology of racism, against a clarified constitutional challenge.173
172. See infra note 197 and accompanying text. This assumes that Justice Warren
intended the implications of framing the proscription in terms of "improper" purposes,
and the implications of finding that the D.C. schools were segregated for no "proper"
purpose at all. Of course, the Court cannot clearly frame a substantive constitutional
principle until it has itself developed a clear understanding of the definition of
unconstitutionality at issue.
173. This failure to define "improper" purposes can be contrasted with Justice
Warren's opinion in Loving v. Virginia thirteen years later. In Loving, Justice Warren
determined that Virginia's criminalization of interracial marriage was "designed to
maintain White Supremacy" and suggested that such a purpose was not legitimate
under the Equal Protection Clause. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 & n.11. Yet even here,
Justice Warren clouded the content of the applicable substantive constitutional
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One might raise an objection. Even if clarity in defining
substantive constitutional principles might influence the way that
political actors exercise discretion in ordinary circumstances, the
struggle over racial segregation involved such raging emotion that
any judicial declarations, whether clear and nuanced or not, would
have vaporized in the heat. Eastland perhaps revealed unreachable
irrationality with statements such as those he made at a 1956 rally
of the White Citizens' Council: 'When in the course of human events
it becomes necessary to abolish the Negro race, proper methods
should be used. Among these are guns, bows and arrows, slingshots
and knives .... All whites are created equal with certain rights,
among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of dead niggers."114 One
who says this-and that "the white people of the South do not have
race prejudice," and that racial segregation is not predicated on a
view that blacks "should be inferior [to whites] before the law"115might be entirely beyond the reach of rational discourse. What of the
political function of judicial review in such circumstances?
Indeed, contemplating such sentiments, Alexander Bickel urged
the "passive virtues" toward avoiding judicial decisions that would
risk disobedience by parties directly subject to court order.176 Rather
than confrontation through judicial decision, he urged judicial sidestepping through misdirection and duplicity. Along these lines, even
if the Court were to make (rather than to avoid) a controversial
principle in declaring, ''There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry
solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause." Id. at 12 (emphasis added). This statement badly conflates the
essential concern of the implicit substantive constitutional principle (the prohibition of
discrimination because of racist purposes) and the implicit adjudicative rule (the
probabilistically-rooted presumption that laws with racial classifications were adopted
because of racist purposes). Apart from the fact that it is difficult to fathom what
discrimination "solely because of racial classifications" might mean, this statement at
best muddies the message to citizens and their representatives as to the normative
proposition-the repudiation of purposes rooted in racism-which the Court
(implicitly) deemed mandated by the Equal Protection Clause. Like jurors who would
be ill-instructed in a murder prosecution if the court did not clearly distinguish
between the substantive criminal statute (with all its elements) and the adjudicative
rule requiring the prosecution to prove facts establishing each element beyond a
reasonable doubt, so citizens and their representatives were ill-instructed by this
Loving opinion as to the substantive constitutional principle that they should endeavor
to respect in their policymaking. Again, were the Court explicitly to define
constitutional doctrine in terms of substantive constitutional principles and
adjudicative rules, it would be less likely to conflate elements from the two types of
rule. Recall the discussion, above, of a hypothetical murder statute that conflates
substantive and adjudicative considerations. See supra note 51.
174. ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: MAsTER OF THE SENATE 767
(2002).
175. 100 CONG. REC. 7129, 7253 (1954).
176. See BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 54, at 244-72.
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decision, as it did in Bolling, might it not be better to obscure the
grounds of decision, toward avoiding direct ideological confrontation?
Might resistance be less likely if political actors could maintain a
pretense of continuing commitment to their constitutionally
problematic ideology?
Perhaps so, but the point seems vulnerable. Bickelian
obfuscation would have the Court choose a strategic path toward
maximizing compliance with judicially-declared mandates by issuing
opinions designed to hide the content of those constitutional
mandates. It would have the Court refrain from communicating
clearly with those inclined to obey by anticipating the resentment of
those inclined to rebel. It is an approach that seems akin to blurring
the definition of murder for fear of inflaming the emotions of the
criminally insane.
Beyond this, it hardly makes sense to measure the success of
rules aimed at deterrence by focusing on the undeterred and the
undeterrable. Simply because some people continue to commit
murder does not establish that the death penalty does not deter
others. Even if some would disobey clearly defined substantive
constitutional principles, it does not follow that clearly defining such
principles would not maximally deter the enactment (or promote the
repeal) of unconstitutional laws through influencing the decisions of
those inclined to obey. Constructing vague doctrine might have
anticipated the feared rebel, but it ensured that those political actors
who could have felt constrained by judicial supremacy were left
guessing about the limits on their discretion-here, the definition of
"improper" purposes applied in Bolling.
All of this assumes that Eastland and his ilk were the political
equivalents of the criminally insane. If they were not, but merely
duplicitous and stubborn, would not engagement, rather than
avoidance, have been the best weapon for maximizing the political
function? Indeed, one imagines that if the Bolling Court had
explicitly defined a substantive constitutional principle withdrawing
discretion to pursue purposes rooted in racist values or stereotypes,
Eastland would have responded not only with his factual assertion
that segregation is not predicated on notions of racial inferiority, but
also with the legal assertion that equal protection, as originally
understood, permitted racial segregation. This brings us to another
critical proposition for this Article-that the political function can be
enhanced not only by clearly defining substantive constitutional
principles, but through their explicit derivation, as well.
Derivational Clarity. Indeed, perhaps because Bolling's ratio
decidendi was ill-defined, the ire of the white southern establishment
was focused not on Bolling, but on Brown. It is important to
recognize that Bolling and Brown were decided with respect to
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fundamentally different (implicit) substantive constitutional
principles. Bolling rested on an implicit prohibition of purposes
rooted in racial prejudice. This implicit principle cast aside Plessy v.
Ferguson's111 "separate but equal" as no longer applicable as a matter
of law. In Brown, Warren declared that "in the field of public
education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place."178
Critically important is Warren's reason for displacing Plessy's
doctrine in Brown. His point was not that "separate but equal" was
inapplicable as a matter of law, but rather that the principle was not
satisfied as a matter of fact. "Separate educational facilities are
inherently unequal," he declared, as a matter of fact, because even
assuming equal tangible facilities, black students derive less benefit
from such schools than do white students.179
Eastland closely examined Warren's reasoning in Brown, to the
point of quoting, and endeavoring to rebut, extended portions of the
opinion.180 Eastland focused particularly on Warren's suggestion that
"we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was
adopted."181 He responded that "the 14th amendment ... did not
prevent segregation, and it was so understood at the time .... [T]he
meaning of the Constitution or an amendment is fixed when it is
adopted. It cannot conceivably have one meaning at one time, and
another meaning in later years."182
It could have been profoundly important for the political function
if the Court had asserted explicitly that it was turning back the clock
to 1868-at least in defining the substantive constitutional principle
under which Brown was decided. What warranted the invalidation of
racially segregated schools was not so much a change of legal
principle-i.e., that segregated facilities are permissible so long as a
mandate of equal facilities is satisfied-but the evolution of societal

177. 163 U.S. 527 (1896).
178. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
1 79. See id.; see also David Chang, The Bus Stops Here: Defining the Constitutional
Right of Equal Educational Opportunity and an Appropriate Remedial Process, 63
B.U. L. REV. 1, 7-10 (1983) [hereinafter Chang, Equal Educational Opportunity].
180. Eastland also criticized Brown on other grounds, including allegations that
some members of the Court were corrupt, see, for example, 100 CONG. REC. 11319,
11526 (1954), and some were subject to Communist influence, see, for example, 100
CONG. REC. 7129, 7255 (1954).
181. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492.
182. 100 CONG. REC. 7129, 7252 (1954). Most agree that the original understanding
of the Equal Protection Clause did not prohibit racial segregation. See, e.g., Alexander
M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV.
1 (1955) [hereinafter Bickel, Original Understanding]; cf. Michael W. McConnell,
Original ism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 94 7 (1995) (reinterpreting
historical evidence).
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facts relevant to that principle's mandate of equality.183 It is
(arguably) a very different matter-more responsive to Eastland's
Bork-like insistence on interpretive legitimacy-to apply an
originalist principle to the changed facts of the modern world, than to
create a nonoriginalist principle, and apply that nonoriginalist
principle to its relevant facts.184 Making this distinction clearly could
have been facilitated by explicitly distinguishing between
substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rulesbetween those constitutional principles that identify issues of
relevant fact, and those constitutional rules devised for resolving
issues of relevant fact.
These arguments would not have persuaded Senator Eastland.
He ridiculed the Court's determination that "segregated schools are
inherently unequal," and its reliance on the findings of psychologists
about the effects of segregated schools on black children.185 Indeed,
recogmzmg the distinction between deriving and defining
substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules would
have placed a burden on the Court to explain how it determined that
segregated educational facilities are inherently unequal-to address
who should bear the burden of persuasion on that issue of fact, and
why. Addressing this question would not have eliminated resistance
and resentment, but it could at least have helped to crystallize the
points in dispute. It would have "duly instructed" (or, at least, better
instructed) political actors. And that is precisely what the political
function is about.
One should turn now from Brown and focus again on Bollingsomething the public never did. I have suggested that Bolling was, by
far, more doctrinally radical and significant.186 Brown applied
Plessy's originalist "separate but equal" principle. Bolling repudiated
it. Bolling rested on an implicit substantive constitutional principlea prohibition of "improper" purposes-that was to confront the
ideology of racism. Had the Bolling Court made this clearer, by
having explicitly defined a substantive constitutional principle
prohibiting purposes rooted in racist values or stereotypes, it surely
183. It is, of course, arguable that Brown changed the content of the "separate but
equal" principle by redefining what had to be equal-from equality of tangible facilities
to equality of experiential benefits from those facilities. See Chang, Equal Educational
Opportunity, supra note 1 79, at 8-9.
184. For the former, the derivational task must explain why the originalist principle
should continue to govern (a point that Eastland and his ilk would not contest) and
why the Court should recognize the relevant implications of modern facts (a point that
might be difficult to contest). For the latter, the derivational task must explain why
the originalist principle should be modified, and to what. This is, of course, the
essential point contested by those who proclaim allegiance to originalism.
185. 100 CONG. REC. 7129, 7252 (1954).
186. See generally Chang, Equal Educational Opportunity, supra note 179.
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would have drawn more of Eastland's ire. It would have needed to
anticipate that ire with an explanation as to why such a
nonoriginalist interpretation of equal protection-one that fully
repudiated racist values in law-was appropriate in 1954.187 Yet, not
only did Warren's Bolling opinion fail effectively to define the
substantive constitutional principle proscribing certain "improper"
purposes; it did nothing to derive the principle-to justify it as a
sound interpretation of equal protection. Thus, Eastland and his
comrades not only lacked "due instruction" on the content of their
constitutional boundaries; beyond this, had they noticed Bolling's
doctrinal implications, they would have been left with less reason to
follow the Court's instructions-to abide by their responsibilities
under judicial supremacy-as they resentfully pondered the Court's
failure to meet its own responsibilities of justification.188
b.

Adjudicative Rules: Definitional and Derivational
Ambiguity Preclude a "Duly Instructed" Electorate

Warren's Bolling opm1on briefly sought to justify the
adjudicative proposition that laws with racial classifications are

187. Bolling has been so overshadowed by Brown that Professor McConnell did not
mention the case when reexamining the original understanding and the Supreme
Court's desegregation decisions. See McConnell, supra note 182, at 1117-39. This is all
the more significant because in McConnell's view, the original position on segregation,
at least that of Senator Charles Sumner, did not depend on sociological judgments
about the effect of segregation on educational performance. Rather, that original
condemnation of segregation was rooted in repudiation of any "formal expression of
subordination" because of racism. Id. at 1138-39. This is precisely the notion implied
by Bolling. See supra text accompanying notes 160-76. For an effort to derive the
Bolling principle (prohibiting racist purposes even in the originally protected context
of segregation) as sound interpretation, see Chang, Constitutional Intent, supra note
41, at 828-55.
188. In Loving, Chief Justice Warren endeavored explicitly to derive the proposition
that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits Virginia's criminalization of interracial
marriage. Virginia argued that the original understanding of the Equal Protection
Clause contemplated that anti-miscegenation statutes would remain permissible.
Justice Warren's response was initially tentative, ultimately adamant, and internally
inconsistent. On the one hand, Warren followed Brown in acknowledging that
"although these historical sources 'cast some light,' they are not sufficient to resolve
the problem; 'at best, they are inconclusive."' Loving, 388 U.S. at 9 (citation omitted).
On the other hand, Warren declared that "the clear and central purpose of the 14th
Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial
discrimination ...." Id. at 10. Yet, to refer to the purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment in the past tense seems to be a statement about its original intent---0ne
that views that original purpose as clear, not inconclusive. Thus, in Warren's Loving
opinion, the derivation of the (implicit) substantive constitutional principle was
incoherent. One might question which derivational failure-the complete absence of
interpretive justification or the presentation of incoherent justification--engenders
more political resentment and confusion, and more undermines the political function.
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presumed unconstitutional. "Classifications based solely upon race
must be scrutinized with particular care since they are contrary to
our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect."1s9 The proposition
that racial classifications are "contrary to our traditions" is, at best,
contestable, and at worst, laughable. There has been a tradition in
the United States of laws with racial classifications. That tradition
has been pervasive and at least regionally deep. To say that such
laws are "contrary to our traditions" must have rung hollow not only
to those citizens and their representatives who favored segregation,
but also to others who might have been more agnostic about such
policies. Whatever one's response to the Court's bottom-line decision,
reasoning that depended on such an odd statement about "our
traditions" could not inspire confidence. It could only further
undermine Bolling's potential to instruct political actors as to the
substantive constitutional significance of the purposes they pursue,
and the probabilistically-justifiable adjudicative presumption
attaching to racial classifications.190
The Court could have sent a message more capable of "duly
instructing" political actors had it explicitly differentiated the
derivation and definition of applicable substantive constitutional
principles and adjudicative rules-had it clearly stated in Bolling
that racial classifications are constitutionally significant because
they indicate a probability that a substantive constitutional principle
prohibiting racist purposes has been violated. Indeed, had it
explicitly pursued the probabilistic rationale, the Court could have
said that racial classifications serve this adjudicative function
precisely because there has been a tradition of their use in such a
manner.191 Thus, Bolling's substantive message concerning
"improper purposes"--obscured first by the failure explicitly to derive
and define the applicable substantive constitutional principle-was
obscured further by the failure explicitly to derive and define the

189. Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499.
190. To the contrary, because the use of racial classifications is a part of the
American tradition, and forms a pattern so clearly rooted in racism, the probabilistic
rationale for the presumed impermissibility of racial classifications is well-warranted.
See supra text accompanying notes 152-57.
191. The pursuit of purposes rooted in racism is contrary to our better traditions.
But as suggested above, because many such purposes were permitted by the original
understanding, the Court had a responsibility to explain a substantive constitutional
principle broadly repudiating such purposes as sound interpretation. Beyond this, the
Court might have sent a clearer but entirely different normative message by
suggesting that racial classifications have some normative significance independent of
this evidentiary and adjudicative function-a normative significance that implicates
some substantive constitutional principle other than the prohibition of purposes rooted
in racial antagonism. See infra text accompanying notes 234-40 (discussing Powell's
concerns about "justice" in Bakke).
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applicable adjudicative presumption. Also obscured was an important
concomitant message: Legislatures may use racial classifications so
long as they do not act because of "improper" purposes.
C.

Powell in Bakke: Adjudicating Challenges to ''Affirmative
Action" Racial Classifications

In Regents of University of California v. Bakke,192 the Supreme
Court considered whether a state university medical school's
"special" admissions program violated the Equal Protection Clause.
The school reserved sixteen of one hundred seats for blacks,
Chicanos, Asians, and American Indians. It argued that these racial
classifications should not be subjected to "strict scrutiny," because
they were unlike those challenged in previous cases.193 The exclusion
of Japanese-Americans in Korematsu, the prohibition of interracial
marriage in Loving, and the racial segregation in Bolling, aimed
legal harms at traditional targets of racism. The U.C. Davis racial
classifications aimed legal benefits at traditional targets of racism.
Addressing the school's doctrinal argument, Justices Powell and
Brennan vigorously debated the proper "standard of review." Justice
Powell rejected the school's position, as he determined that "racial
and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus
call for the most exacting judicial examination."194 For Powell, the
U.C. Davis racial classifications, like all racial classifications, should
be subject to "strict scrutiny"-that is, struck down unless the state
meets a burden of showing that its racial classifications are
"necessary" to serve "a compelling governmental interest."195 For
Brennan, U.C. Davis' special admissions program should be
presumed unconstitutional, but to a lesser degree. The U.C. Davis
racial classifications, like other classifications "designed to further
remedial purposes," must be struck down unless the state
demonstrates that they "serve important governmental objectives"
and are "substantially related to achievement of those objectives."196
The intense dialogue between Powell and Brennan on the
appropriate "standard of review" suggests that there is a meaningful
distinction between a state interest that is "compelling" and one that
is merely "important," and between a racial classification being
"necessary" to achieve the state's objective, and one that is merely
"substantially related" to achieve that objective. The following will

192. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
193. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287-88 (arguing that "strict scrutiny" "should be
reserved for classifications that disadvantage 'discrete and insular minorities"').
194. Id. at 291.
195. Id. at 299.
196. Id. at 359.
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suggest that in considering whether something other than "strict
scrutiny" should be applied to U.C. Davis' racial classifications,
Powell failed to distinguish between substantive constitutional
principles and adjudicative rules. He failed to build upon the implicit
structure of constitutional doctrine developed by the Court in
Korematsu, Bolling, and Loving. He failed to focus clearly on the
implicit
substantive
constitutional
principle
(defining
unconstitutional racial discrimination in terms of prohibited
purposes rooted in racist values-whether animus or favoritism--or
racial stereotypes)197 and the implicit adjudicative rule (designating
laws with racial classifications as presumptively unconstitutional
because, more likely than not, they were enacted because of
impermissible purposes rooted in racist values or racial stereotypes).
Indeed, the following discussion will suggest that rather than
pursue an analysis about the adjudicative presumption appropriate
for enforcing the substantive prohibition of purposes rooted in
racism, Powell's analysis implicitly created new substantive
constitutional principles, without any effort to define such principles
with precision, or to derive such principles as sound interpretations
of constitutional text and legitimate bases for judicial intrusion on
legislative discretion. The resulting doctrinal confusion had profound
consequences both for the new substantive constitutional principles
that Powell implicitly created, and for the established substantive
constitutional principle (prohibiting purposes rooted in racism) from
which he departed.

197. This assumes an explicit definition of prohibited purposes broader than that
suggested by Black's Korematsu opinion, but implied in subsequent Supreme Court
decisions-purposes rooted in racist value judgments, whether animus or favoritism,
and purposes rooted in racial stereotypes, violate the Equal Protection Clause. Justice
Powell's opinion in Bakke implied this fuller notion of prohibited racial prejudice. For
Powell's view that racial favoritism is prohibited, see, for example, Bakke, 438 U.S. at
307 ("Preferring members of any one group for no reason other than race . . . is
discrimination for its own sake. This the Constitution forbids."). For Powell's view that
purposes rooted in racial stereotyping are prohibited, see infra note 243. After Bakke,
the Court has made rather clear that state action disfavoring people solely because of
race is constitutionally prohibited (racial animus), as is state action preferring people
solely because of race (racial favoritism), as is state action predicated on racial
stereotypes. For example, Justice O'Conner, writing for the Court in Grutter v.
Bollinger, indicated that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits racial classifications
"motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority," and motivated by "simple
racial politics," or "illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype." 539 U.S. at 326.
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Building on a Structurally Ambiguous Doctrinal
Foundation: Exacerbating Doctrinal Distortion
a.

Explicitly Deriving and Defining Adjudicative Rules
for the U.C. Davis "Type" of Racial Classification:
The Analysis Powell Should Have Pursued

Immediately preceding his first pronouncement that U.C. Davis'
racial classifications, like all other racial classifications, should be
subject to "strict scrutiny," Powell cited statements from Hirabayashi
and Korematsu that implicitly conveyed the substantive
constitutional principle prohibiting purposes rooted in racial
prejudice, and the adjudicative rule, justifiable from a probabilistic
perspective, presuming that laws with racial classifications were
adopted because of impermissible purposes rooted in racism. Powell
said:
Racial and ethnic classifications ... are subject to stringent
examination .... "[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil
rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is
not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to
say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny."19s
If Powell had considered Bakke's "standard of review" issue with an
explicit focus on the substantive principles and adjudicative rules
that theretofore had implicitly comprised "strict scrutiny," how might
his analysis have proceeded?
Assuming this probabilistic rationale for "strict scrutiny," why
insist that the state validate Bakke's racial classifications by proving
them "necessary" (rather than substantially related) to achieve a
"compelling" (rather than important) interest? What is the difference
between a "compelling'' interest and an "important" interest? Indeed,
what is the proper definition of a "compelling interest"? What
distinguishes a "necessary" relationship (between a classification and
the state's asserted purpose) from a "substantial" relationship?
Indeed, what is the proper definition of the required relationship of
"necessity" between the challenged racial classifications and the
asserted state purpose? For whatever reason, neither Justice Powell,
nor Brennan, nor anyone on the Court before or since, has engaged
these definitional issues.
Basic legal method resolves ambiguities in legal rules by
reference to the functions and policies that those rules are created to
serve. If the rationale for the "strict scrutiny" of racial classifications
is a probabilistic suspicion that they were adopted because of
purposes rooted in racist values or stereotypes, then all facets of the
198.

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 290-91 (quoting Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216).
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government's burden should be framed toward allaying that
suspicion, and persuading the court that the particular racial
classification in question is exceptional in not having been adopted
because of racism. A "compelling'' interest, therefore, might be
defined as one satisfying two elements: first, an interest that, on its
face, does not manifest racist values or stereotypes-in other words,
a purpose that is, on its face, constitutionally legitimate; and, second,
an interest that, in relation to other facts and circumstances
presented in the case at hand, persuasively allays suspicions that the
classifications would not have been adopted but for purposes rooted
in racist animus, favoritism, or stereotypes.199
How might one conceptualize the requirement that the racial
classifications in question be "necessary" to achieve the asserted
"compelling" interest?200 A necessary or close relationship between
the racial classification as a means of regulation, and the asserted
"compelling" (or suspicion-allaying) non-racist purpose, would be one
that persuasively helps to rebut the suspicion that the classifications
were, in fact, employed because of purposes tainted by racist values
or stereotypes. Use of racial classifications in a way that sweeps
overinclusively in relation to the asserted legitimate purpose, or
cherry-picks underinclusively, would reinforce the initial suspicion of
racism.
Indeed, analyzing particular aspects of a classification's
overinclusiveness or underinclusiveness in relation to the state's
asserted legitimate purposes would crystallize suspicions about
actual impermissible purposes,201 and could generate questions about
specific racist values or stereotypes that might have tainted the
challenged policy.202 Answering these specific questions persuasively
199. Consider how this definition of "compelling" would apply to the interest
asserted by Virginia in Loving. Virginia claimed that it criminalized interracial
marriage involving white persons because it sought to "preserve racial integrity." See
Loving, 388 U.S. at 7, 11 & n.11. Such an asserted purpose would not get past the first
element suggested above for defining "compelling," because the purpose itself reflects a
racist value judgment: that persons of one racial background-"pure white"-are to be
preferred over persons of mixed racial background. Indeed, in Loving, Justice Warren
determined that either a purpose of "maintaining White supremacy" or one of
"preserving the integrity of all races" would be deemed invalid on its face. Id.; see also
supra note 173.
200. It is not self-evident why either of the phrases discussed by Powell and
Brennan ("necessary to achieve a compelling state interest" or "substantially related to
an important state interest") are effectively framed as adjudicative rules for
determining whether a particular racial classification was not adopted because of
purposes rooted in racist valU:es or stereotypes. There will be more to say about this
point as we delve deeper into Justice Powell's opinion. See infra Part 111.C. l.b.
201. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
202. For discussion of particular questions that might have been raised about the
special admissions program, see infra text accompanying notes 248-55, 278-80.
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would become part of the burden the state would be required to
overcome, and would be a far more focused and meaningful burden
than that framed by the otherwise abstract terms of "strict
scrutiny."203
Given this understanding of the "strict scrutiny" applicable to
racial classifications like those challenged in Korematsu, Bolling, and
Loving, how might one analyze the doctrinal issue about which
Powell and Brennan so vehemently disagreed? Is there a basis for
believing, as a categorical matter, that the Bakke-type of
classification is less (or, indeed, more) likely to have been adopted in
violation of the substantive constitutional principle prohibiting
purposes rooted in racist values or stereotypes than was the type of
classification challenged in Korematsu, Bolling, and Loving?
Brennan suggested that the U.C. Davis classifications should be
subject to "intermediate scrutiny" because they were adopted for
''benign" purposes. But whether a racial classification was adopted
for impermissible purposes is precisely the question that close
judicial scrutiny is supposed to answer. Thus, to posit a ''benign"
purpose is to assume the dispositive matter at issue.204 Yet, one
might reformulate Brennan's characterization. The Bakke
classification seems to benefit traditional targets of racism. This is
quite unlike the classifications in Korematsu, Bolling, or Loving,
which fit the historic pattern of racial classifications that seemed to
harm unpopular groups for purposes rooted in racist animus.205
Thus, one might view the Bakke classifications as less likely to have
been adopted because of racist animus than is a classification that
seems to harm traditional targets of racism.206

203. See supra text accompanying notes 155-58.
204. Indeed, on this point, Powell himself said, "Justice Brennan ... offer[s] no
principle for deciding whether preferential classifications reflect a benign remedial
purpose or a malevolent stigmatic classification, since [he is] willing in this case to
accept mere post hoc declarations by an isolated state entity-a medical school
faculty-unadorned by particularized findings of past discrimination, to establish such
a remedial purpose." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295 n.34.
205. In Wygant u. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986), Powell himself
suggested another way to reformulate Brennan's characterization of the Bakke-type of
classification-a reformulation that would not assume the ultimate conclusion about
the purpose underlying the challenged classification. He viewed Wygant's challenged
classification as "operat[ing] against a group that historically has not been subject to
governmental discrimination." Id. at 282. With a category of racial classifications so
characterized, one might then explore whether there is reason to subject racial
classifications that operate against groups not historically the targets of racial
discrimination to a lesser (or different) presumption of unconstitutionality than is
applicable to racial classifications that operate against groups that historically have
been the targets of racial discrimination.
206. See Bakke, 438 U.S. 265.
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Yet, this analysis is presupposing an explicit substantive
constitutional principle prohibiting purposes rooted in not only racial
animus, but also favoritism and stereotypes.201 If (and only if) there
is also reason to be less suspicious that a law seeming to benefit
traditional targets of racism was adopted because of racial favoritism
and stereotypes than was a law containing the Korematsu, Bolling,
or Loving type of classification, then a fully relaxed burden of
persuasion could be warranted. If, however, there is reason to believe
that most racial classifications seeming to benefit traditional targets
of racism were probably adopted because of purposes rooted in racial
favoritism or purposes rooted in racial stereotypes, then judicial
scrutiny of these classifications should still focus closely on the
government's burden to allay these particular suspicions-despite a
lessened suspicion that the policy was adopted because of prohibited
animus.
It is not necessary to posit answers to these questions to make
the point at hand: Given the implicit substantive constitutional
principles and adjudicative rules inherited from Korematsu, Bolling,
and Loving-and making those implicit rules explicit-the issue,
properly framed, concerns the probability that the substantive
prohibition of purposes rooted in racism was violated, and whether
there is some categorical basis for distinguishing (on such
probabilistic grounds) between Bakke's classifications, which seem to
benefit traditional targets of racism, and the Korematsu-BollingLoving classifications, which seemed to harm traditional targets of
racism. Debating adjectives and adverbs as Powell and Brennan
did-"compelling" versus "important," and "necessary" versus
"substantially related"-is fussing about form without content, and
cannot begin to derive or define adjudicative rules for effectively
avoiding both the failure to invalidate the unconstitutional law that
was adopted because of impermissible racist purposes, and the
invalidation of the permissible law that was not.
b.

Confusing the Nature and Role of Substantive
Constitutional Principles and Adjudicative Rules:
The Analysis Powell Did Pursue

Powell's rationale for the "strict scrutiny" of Bakke's racial
classifications is complex, and warrants extended quotation and
examination. The early part of his analysis was marred by the failure
to distinguish explicitly between the nature and functions of
substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules. The
latter part of his analysis was further marred by affirmatively
confusing of the nature and functions of substantive constitutional
207.

See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
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principles and adjudicative rules, and the factors relevant to the
derivation and definition of each. In what follows, omitting only his
citations, I present Justice Powell's discussion, interrupted by
analysis and commentary. Powell began:
Over the past 30 years, this Court has embarked upon the
crucial mission of interpreting the Equal Protection Clause with
the view of assuring to all persons "the protection of equal
laws," ... in a Nation confronting a legacy of slavery and racial
discrimination .... Because the landmark decisions in this area
arose in response to the continued exclusion of Negroes from
the mainstream of American society, they could be
characterized as involving discrimination by the "majority"
white race against the Negro minority. But they need not be
read as depending upon that characterization for their results.
It suffices to say that "[o]ver the years, this Court has
consistently repudiated '[d]istinctions between citizens solely
because of their ancestry' as being 'odious to a free people whose
institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.'"2os

In these sentences, Powell articulates part of the substantive
constitutional principle implicitly invoked by the Court in
Korematsu, Bolling, and Loving: Discrimination "solely because of'
race is impermissible. In other words, discrimination in pursuit of
racist value judgments-placing value on race, per se-is
impermissible. Powell suggests that this principle is universally
applicable to value judgments about any race, not simply animus
against African-Americans, and to racist value judgments underlying
discrimination in any policy context, not just those contexts to which
the reach of the Equal Protection Clause was originally limited.209
Powell continues:
Petitioner urges us to adopt for the first time a more restrictive
view of the Equal Protection Clause and hold that
discrimination against members of the white "majority" cannot
be suspect if its purpose can be characterized as ''benign."
[Powell's footnote 34] The clock of our liberties, however, cannot
be turned back to 1868.... It is far too late to argue that the
guarantee of equal protection to all persons permits the
recognition of special wards entitled to a degree of protection
greater than that accorded others. [Powell's footnote 35)210

208. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 293-94 (citations omitted).
209. As did the Court in Korematsu, Bolling, and Loving, Powell fails to address
whether this is a nonoriginalist interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause and, if
so, why this expansion beyond its original meaning is appropriate, thus generating
questions about the legitimacy of the Court's decisions in enforcing the putative
mandates of the Equal Protection Clause.
210. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 294-95 (citations omitted).
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Powell confronts U.C. Davis' argument-embraced by Brennanthat racial classifications adopted for benign purposes are not
suspect. In his footnote 34, Powell correctly recognizes that positing a
permissible, remedial purpose is to assume the matter at issue.211
U.C. Davis (and Brennan) "offer no principle for deciding whether
preferential classifications reflect a benign remedial purpose or a
malevolent stigmatic classification, since they are willing in this case
to accept mere post hoc declarations by an isolated state entity-a
medical school faculty-unadorned by particularized findings of past
discrimination, to establish such a remedial purpose."212 So far, the
discussion is consistent with implicit recognition of the substantive
prohibition of purposes rooted in racist values, whether animus or
favoritism, and of the adjudicative task to determine whether a
particular challenged racial classification was, in fact, adopted
because of such an impermissible purpose.
Significantly, however, when he declares that "it is far too late to
argue that the guarantee of equal protection to all persons permits
the recognition of special wards entitled to a degree of protection
greater than that accorded others,"213 Powell veers from the
substantive prohibition of purposes rooted in racism. To decide that
laws apparently benefiting traditional targets of racism warrant less
suspicion than do laws apparently harming traditional targets of
racism would not necessarily accord "less protection" to whites
harmed by U.C. Davis' special admissions program than was
accorded to blacks harmed, say, by the District of Columbia's racially
segregated schools in Bolling. Rather, all people could be equally
protected by a single substantive constitutional principle in both
contexts-the prohibition of purposes rooted in racism. If different
kinds of statute categorically warrant different degrees of suspicion
that they were enacted because of racism-if they suggest different
probabilities of unconstitutionality-then a different adjudicative
presumption would be warranted for the sake of adjudicative
accuracy.214
211. Id. at 294-95 n.34.
212. Id. (emphasis added).
213. Id. at 295 (emphasis added).
214. Indeed, black applicants to the D.C. police force in Davis were not accorded
"less protection" against unconstitutional racial discrimination than were black school
children in Bolling, nor indeed less protection than Bakke himself, simply because in
Davis, an adjudicative rule presuming permissibility was employed, while in Bolling
and Bakke adjudicative rules presuming impermissibility were employed. See
generally Davis, 426 U.S. 229. Though the same substantive constitutional principle
was at stake in all cases-the prohibition of purposes rooted in racist values or
stereotypes-different kinds of statute (facially neutral versus facially discriminatory)
categorically suggest different probabilities of unconstitutionality and, therefore,
warrant different adjudicative presumptions. See supra note 156 and accompanying

850

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:4

In his footnote 35, Powell quotes Alexander Bickel's views on the
remedial use of racial classifications:
The lesson of the great decisions of the Supreme Court and the
lesson of contemporary history have been the same for at least a
generation: discrimination on the basis of race is illegal,
immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of
democratic society. Now this is to be unlearned and we are told
that this is not a matter of fundamental principle but only a
matter of whose ox is gored. Those for whom racial equality was
demanded are to be more equal than others. Having found
support in the Constitution for equality, they now claim support
for inequality under the same Constitution.215
Of course, the Court has never said that discrimination on the
basis of race is illegal. If it had, there would be no "strict scrutiny" of
racial classifications, because all racial classifications, by definition,
discriminate on the basis of race, and all racial classifications would,
therefore, be impermissible. Bickel was suggesting a substantive
constitutional principle beyond that applied in Korematsu, Bolling,
and Loving. Powell's reference to Bickel confuses analysis of the
question at hand-whether a different adjudicative rule should be
applied to determine the permissibility of the U.C. Davis
classification in relation to the established substantive constitutional
principle prohibiting purposes rooted in racial prejudice.
Moving beyond Bickel, Powell continues:
The Fourteenth Amendment is not directed solely against
discrimination due to a "two-class theory"-that is, based upon
differences between "white" and "Negro." Once the artificial line
of a "two class theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment is put
aside, the difficulties entailed in varying the level of judicial

text. The same "degree of protection" is provided by a single, consistent, substantive
constitutional principle. The adjudicative presumption appropriate for enforcing that
substantive constitutional principle has varied in the doctrine that the Court has
created for racial classifications and facially neutral laws and, from a probabilistic
perspective, appropriately so. Thus, the proposition that people of all races are entitled
to the same "degree of protection" does not advance Powell's analysis; it is simply
beside the matter at issue. Professor Roosevelt makes this point as well in critiquing
Justice O'Connor's requirement of "consistency" in Adarand-the requirement that all
racial classifications be subject to the same scrutiny, regardless of the races benefited
or burdened. See Roosevelt, supra note 20, at 1701-05. "The argument that consistency
demands strict scrutiny for affirmative action . . . is mistaken. The operative
proposition of equal protection is indeed symmetrical, protecting no person more than
any other. But decision rules will have special favorites, as long as, and to the extent
that, state actors have special victims." Id. at 1703.
215. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295 n.35 (quoting ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF
CONSENT 133 (1975)).
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review according to a perceived "preferred" status of a
particular racial or ethnic minority are intractable.216
Here, Powell frames the question as varying the level of judicial
review "according to a perceived 'preferred' status of a particular
racial or ethnic minority." It is not quite clear at this point what
Powell means by this. Yet, a program's distribution of benefits based
on race undeniably reflects the policymaker's preference based on
race. As suggested above,211 the fact that a policymaker-say, a
legislature-has chosen to "prefer" racial groups that traditionally
have been targets of racism frames the issue relevant for
determining the appropriate adjudicative presumption: Is there a
categorical basis for distinguishing the probability that the
"preferential" racial classifications at issue were adopted because of
purposes rooted in racism, from the probability that a KorematsuBolling-Loving type of classification was adopted because of racism?
A court's determination that some categories of racial
classification are less likely to have been adopted because of racial
prejudice and, therefore, warrant a lesser presumption of
unconstitutionality, would not depend on whether a particular
legislature, in enacting a particular statute, has or has not chosen to
enact such preferences. Furthermore, for a court to apply different
adjudicative presumptions to different kinds of classification would
not necessarily suggest that the court itself prefers some racial
groups over others. Rather, determining whether legislative choices
to benefit particular racial groups should be subject to a different
adjudicative presumption-different from that applicable to
traditional racial classifications-would require the Court to make a
social, political, and historical judgment about the nature and
prevalence of racism with respect to the particular groups in
question. Whether making this kind of categorical probabilistic
judgment involves "intractable" problems is a question Powell simply
did not address.21s
Powell continues:
The concepts of "majority" and "minority" necessarily reflect
temporary arrangements and political judgments. As observed
above, the white "majority" itself is composed of various
minority groups, most of which can lay claim to a history of
prior discrimination at the hands of the State and private
individuals. Not all of these groups can receive preferential
treatment and corresponding judicial tolerance of distinctions
drawn in terms of race and nationality, for then the only

216.
217.
218.

Id. at 295 (citation omitted).
See supra text accompanying notes 198-207.
See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295.
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"majority" left would be a new minority of white Anglo-Saxon
Protestants.219
This passage is ineffective in addressing the "standard of review"
issue in two ways. First, Powell clearly now is confusing the
judgments that policymakers might make in adopting preferences
based on race, and the judgments that a reviewing court must make
in determining whether the chosen policy based on race was adopted
because of race. He says that not all racial groups can receive
preferential treatment, presumably by policymakers creating
affirmative action programs. This seems self-evident, and one could
hardly imagine a sensible policy that was designed to give all racial
groups a preference based on race.
Beyond this, turning to issues relevant to the judicial review of
legislative choices, Powell suggests that not all racial classifications
that distribute benefits could receive a corresponding judicial
tolerance.220 This might be true, or might not, but it misstates the
matter at issue. As suggested above, the issue is whether the Bakketype of racial classification is categorically distinguishable from the
Korematsu-Bolling-Loving type of racial classification in terms of the
probabilities of having violated the substantive constitutional
principle prohibiting purposes rooted in racial prejudice.
Having asserted that racial classifications distributing benefits
should not be accorded more "judicial tolerance" than are those
imposing burdens, Powell considers whether there might be a basis
for identifying other categories of racial classification that would
warrant greater judicial tolerance, and concludes that none exists.221
There is no principled basis for deciding which groups would
merit "heightened judicial solicitude" and which would not.
Courts would be asked to evaluate the extent of the prejudice
and consequent harm suffered by various minority groups.
Those whose societal injury is thought to exceed some arbitrary
level of tolerability then would be entitled to preferential
classifications at the expense of individuals belonging to other
groups. Those classifications would be free from exacting
judicial scrutiny. As these preferences began to have their
desired effect, and the consequences of past discrimination were
undone, new judicial rankings would be necessary. The kind of
variable sociological and political analysis necessary to produce
such rankings simply does not lie within the judicial
competence-even if they otherwise were politically feasible
and socially desirable.222

219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. at 295-96.
See id.
Id. at 296-97.
Id. (emphasis added).
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In this passage, by referring to "the extent of prejudice ...
suffered by various minority groups," Powell comes as close as he
ever does to "the analysis that Powell (and Brennan) should have
pursued," sketched above.223 Yet, the analysis remains deeply
confused-still conflating the judgments that a policymaker might
make with those that the reviewing court must make; and still failing
to analyze questions about appropriate adjudicative presumptions by
reference to the probabilities that the racial classifications at issue
were, indeed, adopted in violation of the substantive constitutional
principle prohibiting laws adopted because of purposes rooted in
racial prejudice. Consider each sentence, in turn.
"There is no principled basis for deciding which groups would
merit 'heightened judicial solicitude' and which would not. '224 The
question, of course, is not which groups warrant greater 'judicial
solicitude," but which legislatively chosen classifications warrant less,
or different, judicial suspicion. Legislative solicitude for certain
groups would underlie legislative choices to use racial classifications
that seem to benefit traditional targets of racism. And, as suggested
above, there could be a principled basis for determining whether
such legislative choices might warrant less susp1c10n of
impermissible underlying purposes, or a different presumption of
unconstitutionality, than is applicable to classifications that seem to
harm traditional targets of racism.225
"Courts would be asked to evaluate the extent of the prejudice and
consequent harm suffered by various minority groups. '22s Here,
Powell seems to have in mind a legislature's choice to use racial
classifications for remedial purposes-to redress the effects of past
racial discrimination. He seems to be suggesting that a court must
second-guess the policymaker's judgment about the extent to which
designated groups were targets of past racism, and the extent to
which they bear the continuing effects of past racism. True or not,
this point is simply irrelevant to the burden of proof question.
Regardless of whether "strict scrutiny" or something less is appliedwhatever adjudicative presumption is employed-a reviewing court
would have to make some kind of judgment about the legislature's
basis for believing that the groups were targets of past racial
discrimination, and about the legislature's basis for believing that
any present and relevant underrepresentation of the group is the
result of that past discrimination.

223.
224.
225.
226.

See supra text accompanying notes 198-207.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 296 (emphasis added).
See supra text accompanying notes 198-207.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 296 (emphasis added).
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"Those whose societal injury is thought to exceed some arbitrary
level of tolerability then would be entitled to preferential
classifications at the expense of individuals belonging to other groups.
Those classifications would be free from exacting judicial scrutiny. "221
Powell continues to confuse the question of policy that the legislature
might address and the question of constitutional law that the court
must address. Whether a group is deemed entitled to preferential
treatment is a question of policy for legislatures. Whether a
legislatively-chosen classification warrants other than "strict
scrutiny" is a question of law for the Court-the adjudicative rule
with respect to which the policy's constitutionality is determined.
This question of law properly can be resolved based on the likelihood
in relevant categorical circumstances that legislatures act because of
racist values or stereotypes.22s
"As these preferences began to have their desired effect, and the
consequences of past discrimination were undone, new judicial
rankings would be necessary. ''229 Still, Powell confuses the question of
policy that the legislature addresses from the question of
constitutional doctrine that the court must address. As the
continuing effects of past racial discrimination become mitigated,
legislatures would need to consider whether, in their view, the racebased preferences remain necessary to redress the effects of past
racial discrimination. Such legislative judgments would be subject to
judicial review, but the question for courts is not the policy
determination about whether the effects of past racial discrimination
should be deemed redressed, but a factual question as to whether a
legislative assertion of, or belief about, the continued need for such
policies has been tainted by racist values or stereotypes.
This issue of fact, relevant under the substantive constitutional
principle prohibiting purposes rooted in racist values or stereotypes,
might be answered with a more demanding adjudicative
presumption, or one less demanding. Determining the appropriate
adjudicative presumption, based on the categorical likelihood that
prejudice tainted a legislative judgment about historical facts, is
analytically distinct from determining those historical facts
themselves, just as determining whether a murder defendant acted
in the heat of passion is distinct from the question of who should bear
the burden of proving such material facts, and why.2ao Indeed, it is
through the chosen adjudicative rule that a court determines the
extent to which it views with deference, or suspicion, the legislature's

227.
228.
229.
230.

Id. at 297 (emphasis added).
See supra text accompanying notes 198-207.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 297 (emphasis added).
See supra text accompanying notes 144-47.

2006]

STRUCTURING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE

855

assertions about the facts with respect to which its policy was
framed.
"The kind of variable sociological and political analysis necessary
to produce such rankings simply does not lie within the judicial
competence-even if they otherwise were politically feasible and
socially desirable. ''231 The point should be that making a policy
determination as to whether particular groups should be accorded
preferential treatment for remedial purposes would involve the
exercise of will, would amount to "legislating from the bench," would
be beyond the judicial role-and therefore would be beyond the
judicial competence. Determining whether a legislature's choice to do
so was tainted by racist values or stereotypes, however, is within the
judicial role and competence. Indeed, such is a question that courts
must answer, given a substantive constitutional principle prohibiting
purposes rooted in racism. And this question of fact must be
answered, whether through an adjudicative rule of "strict scrutiny"
for racial classifications, or the Arlington Heights presumption of
permissibility for facially neutral governmental policies,232 or an
adjudicative rule tailored to laws with racial classifications that seem
to benefit traditional targets of racism.
The foregoing misdirection in Powell's "standard of review"
analysis resulted from a failure to focus clearly, and explicitly, on the
conceptual distinction between substantive constitutional principles
and adjudicative rules. Justice Powell failed to recognize that
deriving and defining an appropriate adjudicative rule-which was
the issue that he was debating with Brennan-requires a
probabilistic (or normative) analysis tailored to the particular
substantive constitutional principle at stake. Powell should have
framed the issue as whether racial classifications that seem to
benefit traditional targets of racism are categorically less likely to
have been adopted because of racist values or stereotypes than were
the more familiar kinds of classifications that seem to harm
traditional targets of racism. Instead, he framed the issue as whether
different racial groups should be accorded preferential treatmentclearly an issue of policy for legislatures, rather than one of law for
courts, at least in the context of the substantive constitutional
principle prohibiting purposes rooted in racist values or stereotypes.
But there was more confusion to come, with even more
significant consequences. As he continued justifying the formalities
of "strict scrutiny" in Bakke, Powell turned to "problems of justice
connected with the idea of preference."233 In discussing these

231.
232.
233.

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 297 (emphasis added).
See supra note 156.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298.
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"problems of justice," Powell not only failed to explore the
probabilistic rationale for "strict scrutiny" as an adjudicative rule for
enforcing the well-established substantive constitutional principle
prohibiting purposes rooted in racial prejudice. Beyond this, Powell
implicitly created two new substantive constitutional principles.
He continued:
Moreover, there are serious problems of justice connected with
the idea of preference itself. First, it may not always be clear
that a so-called preference is in fact benign. Courts may be
asked to validate burdens imposed upon individual members of
a particular group in order to advance the group's general
interest.... Nothing in the Constitution supports the notion
that individuals may be asked to suffer otherwise
impermissible burdens in order to enhance the societal standing
of their ethnic groups. Second, preferential programs may only
reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain groups are
unable to achieve success without special protection based on a
factor having no relationship to individual worth .... Third,
there is a measure of inequity in forcing innocent persons in
respondent's position to bear the burdens of redressing
grievances not of their making.234
The first "problem of justice"-that members of the preferred
racial groups might suffer "otherwise impermissible burdens in order
to enhance the societal standing of their ethnic groups"-seems to
contemplate that the community might simply assume that most
members of the covered group would not have been admitted but for
the special admissions program. This is, essentially, a concern that
such programs might encourage racial stereotypes. Indeed, his
second "problem of justice" refers explicitly to the possibility that
"preferential programs may only reinforce common stereotypes
holding that certain groups are unable to achieve success without
special protection based on a factor having no relationship to
individual worth." Thus, one might view both of these "problems of
justice" as concerns that "preferential" racial classifications might
promote racial prejudice, with harmful consequences for members of
the preferred racial groups, as well as for the broader society.
How does this concern help to justify the "strict scrutiny" of the
U.C. Davis racial classifications? Is this concern at all relevant for
the traditional (though implicit) rationale for the "strict scrutiny" of
racial classifications, which is comprised of a substantive
constitutional principle prohibiting purposes rooted in racist values
or
stereotypes,
and
an
adjudicative
rule
presuming
unconstitutionality based on the categorical proposition that a law

234.

Id.
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containing racial classifications probably was adopted in pursuit of
purposes rooted in racism?
It is not self-evident why the fact that a policy might promote
racism prospectively is relevant for determining whether that policy
was itself adopted because of purposes rooted in racial prejudice.
Indeed, one can think of laws that promoted racism, despite having
been intended to curb racism and its effects. The Fourteenth
Amendment, and other Reconstruction policies designed to protect
the freedmen and women, promoted southern racism.235 Powell did
nothing to connect a law's possible promotion of racism to the
probabilistic rationale for strictly scrutinizing racial classifications.
To this extent, the concern about promoting racism was entirely out
of place in analyzing whether the U.C. Davis program should be
examined under a different adjudicative rule than were the
classifications challenged in Korematsu, Bolling, and Loving-at
least toward determining whether the substantive constitutional
principle prohibiting racist purposes had been violated.
More significant than having tainted analysis of the proper
adjudicative presumption for enforcing the established substantive
prohibition of purposes rooted in racist values or stereotypes,
Powell's discussion can be understood as implicitly creating an
entirely new substantive constitutional principle. Powell's discussion
implies that if a racial classification excessively promotes racial
prejudice, then it violates the Equal Protection Clause. But why
should the Court measure legislation against this norm? Is this an
originalist interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause? If so, its
provenance should have been identified. If not, whatever
methodology was employed for its derivation and definition should
have been identified, and justified.
Beyond identifying the interpretive methodology with respect to
which this new, implicit substantive constitutional principle was
derived, Powell needed to define the principle's elements in some
meaningful way. What does it mean to determine that a racial
classification excessively promotes racial prejudice? Does the concept
require balancing the significance of the prejudice fomented against
the significance of the public objectives served by the program at
issue? If so, what factors are relevant in determining the significance
of the public benefits served by the challenged program? How is a
court to determine whether a challenged policy will indeed foment
racial prejudice, in what contexts, to what extent, and with what
effects? And what factors are relevant in determining the significance

235. See, e.g., ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION
119-23, 425-44 (1988).
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of the prejudice fomented, to be measured against the significance of
the public benefits obtained?236
Beyond the responsibility explicitly to derive and define this new
substantive constitutional principle-if, indeed, creating a new
boundary on legislative discretion was his objective-Powell also
needed explicitly to derive and define the adjudicative rules with
respect to which that new substantive principle would be enforced. If
laws are to be invalidated when they excessively promote racial
prejudice, should laws with racial classifications be presumed to
violate this substantive constitutional principle, or presumed not to?
Do laws with racial classifications more likely than not excessively
promote racial prejudice-under a necessary definition of
"excessively" as discussed above? Would it be worse wrongly to
uphold a classification that does have excessively unfair effects, than
to strike down a law that does not? If the "excessively unfair effects"
principle does warrant enforcement, it warrants enforcement
through adjudicative rules tailored to enforcing that principleoptimally tailored to avoid both striking down a law that does not
violate that principle, and upholding a law that does violate that
principle.
Consider, now, Powell's third "problem of justice."231 As part of
his rationale for the "strict scrutiny" of racial classifications that
seem to benefit traditional targets of racism, Powell said that "there
is a measure of inequity in forcing innocent persons in respondent's
position to bear the burdens of redressing grievances not of their
making."23s Does this concern with "inequity" have anything to do
with the traditional rationale for closely scrutinizing racial
classifications? Powell made no such point, and drew no connection
between an "unfairness" concern and a suspicion that racial
classifications were adopted because of impermissible purposes
rooted in racial prejudice.239 Indeed, the concern about excessively
unfair effects was entirely out of place in analyzing whether the U.C.
Davis program should be examined under a different adjudicative
236. See Chang, Judicial Conservatism, supra note 121, at 808.
237. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298.
238. Id. (emphasis added).
239. It is not self.evident why the proposition that a policy might have excessively
unfair effects on "innocents" bears any relevance to whether that policy was adopted
because of purposes rooted in racist values or stereotypes. Indeed, without defining
this concept of "excessively unfair effects on innocents," it is simply impossible to
determine whether making such a finding of "unfairness" in any way suggests a
probability that the substantive constitutional principle prohibiting purposes rooted in
racism has been violated. Powell neither demonstrated, nor made demonstrable, a
connection between a racial classification's putatively unfair effects on innocents and
the question of whether "strict scrutiny" should be applied to the classifications at
issue in Bakke.
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rule than were the classifications challenged in Korematsu, Bolling
and Loving, toward determining whether the established substantive
constitutional principle prohibiting racist purposes had been violated.
As with the concern about excessively promoting racism, Powell's
concern that racial classifications might have excessively unfair
effects on "innocent" persons implicitly created a new substantive
constitutional principle. Powell implied that if a racial classification
has excessively unfair effects on "innocent" parties, then it violates
the Equal Protection Clause. Observations made above about the
nascent "excessively promoting prejudice" principle apply to this
nascent substantive constitutional principle as well. Why should the
Court measure legislation against this putative constitutional norm?
Is this an originalist interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause? If
so, its provenance should have been identified. If not, whatever
methodology was employed for its derivation and definition should
have been identified, and justified.
Beyond identifying the interpretive methodology with respect to
which the principle was derived, Powell needed to define its elements
in some meaningful way. An ill-defined substantive constitutional
principle can be neither effectively justified as sound interpretation,
nor effectively applied to adjudicate particular cases or controversies.
An ill-defined substantive constitutional principle cannot effectively
identify issues of material fact. What does it mean to determine that
a racial classification has an excessively unfair effect on innocents?
Does the concept requiring balancing the significance of the harms
suffered by innocents against the significance of the public objectives
served by the program at issue? If so, what factors are relevant in
determining the significance of individual harms? What factors are
relevant in determining the significance of the public benefits served
by the challenged program?
Powell needed not only explicitly to derive and define this new
substantive constitutional principle, but also explicitly to derive and
define the adjudicative rules with respect to which it would be
enforced. The traditional rationale for the "strict scrutiny" of laws
with racial classifications had nothing to do with whether such laws
should be presumed to impose excessively unfair effects. If laws with
racial classifications are to be invalidated when they have excessively
unfair effects on innocents, should they be presumed to violate this
substantive constitutional principle, or presumed not to? Should the
burden be allocated by reference to a probabilistic analysis? If so, do
laws with racial classifications more likely than not impose
excessively unfair effects on innocents-under a necessary definition
of "excessively" as discussed above? Should the burden be allocated
by reference to a normative analysis? If so, would it be worse wrongly
to uphold a classification that does have excessively unfair effects,
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than to strike down a law that does not? If the "excessively unfair
effects" principle does warrant enforcement, it warrants enforcement
through adjudicative rules tailored to optimally avoiding both the
invalidation of laws that do not violate that principle, and the failure
to invalidate laws that do.240

***
To summarize: Powell's analysis of the "standard of review" to
apply to U.C. Davis' racial classifications was deeply flawed because
it failed, even implicitly, to recognize the essential distinction
between substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules,
and the very different analyses appropriate for their respective
derivation and definition. Before he turned to the "problems of
justice," Powell's analysis obscured the fact that "strict scrutiny" at
least implicitly had been comprised of two standards-a substantive
standard and an adjudicative standard. Thus, Powell failed properly
to frame the "standard of review" issue: whether there was a
categorical basis for distinguishing the U.C. Davis classifications
from the Korematsu, Bolling, and Loving classifications with respect
to the probability of having been adopted in violation of the
substantive constitutional principle prohibiting purposes rooted in
racism.
Beyond failing to frame and address this essential issue, Powell's
justification of "strict scrutiny" relied on, and implicitly created, two
new substantive constitutional principles-a prohibition of racial
classifications that excessively promote racism; and a prohibition of
racial classifications that have excessively unfair effects on
"innocents." Invoking these new substantive constitutional principles
distorted the inherited, established meaning of "strict scrutiny." If
they were to be enforced legitimately against legislative discretion,
these new substantive constitutional principles needed to be derived
and defined on their own terms as interpretations of the Equal
Protection Clause. Furthermore, if these two new substantive
constitutional principles were to be enforced effectively, Powell ought
to have derived and defined adjudicative rules tailored to enforcing
each.
The following will examine some consequences of Powell's failure
to recognize the distinct nature and functions of substantive
240. This new implicit substantive constitutional principle was confirmed by Justice
Powell's opinion in Wygant, and provided the rationale for invalidating a policy
containing racial classifications. All the foregoing issues concerning the substantive
constitutional principle's derivation and definition, and the issues concerning the
adjudicative presumption through which the principle ought to be enforced, remained
just as unaddressed in Wygant as they were in Bakke. See infra text accompanying
notes 313-22.
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constitutional principles and adjudicative rules. In determining the
legal significance of Bakke's facts. fowell undermined the
adjudicative function in two significant ways. First, he failed
effectively to determine whether the U.C. Davis program violated the
established substantive constitutional principle prohibiting purposes
rooted in racism. Second, he measured the Davis program against
the prohibition of excessively unfair effects, without having analyzed
whether this new (implicit) substantive constitutional principle
should .be enforced, and how. Beyond this, Powell's opm10n
undermined the political function. It failed to instruct political actors
effectively as to the principles against which their policy choices
would be measured. It failed to articulate clearly derived and defined
substantive constitutional principles capable of inhibiting the
enactment of unconstitutional law, while leaving legislators free to
choose policy within constitutional bounds.241

2.

Consequences of Doctrinal Distortion
a.

Failing Explicitly to Derive and Define New
Substantive Constitutional Principles Undermines
the Adjudicative Function in Enforcing Previously
Established Substantive Constitutional Principles

U.C. Davis asserted four purposes that it sought to serve with
the special admissions program:
(i) "reducing the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored
minorities in the medical schools and the medical profession;"
(ii) countering the effects of societal discrimination; (iii)
increasing the number of physicians who will practice in
communities currently underserved; and (iv) obtaining the
educational benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse
student body.242

241. Professor Roosevelt also considers the potentially pernicious consequences of
failing to distinguish carefully between substantive constitutional (operative)
principles and adjudicative (decision) rules. "Sometimes, when a stable jurisprudential
regime has persisted for a period of time, decision rules can start to be mistaken for
constitutional operative propositions. When this happens, a number of undesirable
consequences follow. These consequences include ill-advised doctrinal reform, attempts
to bind non-judicial actors to decision rules rather than operative propositions, and an
undoing of the benefits of decision rules." See Roosevelt, supra note 20, at 1693. I
would suggest that these pernicious consequences can result not only in the context of
stable doctrine, but also with respect to new and evolving doctrine. Powell's opinion in
Bakke provides a stark example, as do the affirmative action decisions that grew out of
that opinion. For a discussion of one such case, see infra text accompanying notes 31326.
242. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306 (citations omitted).
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Justice Powell considered each purpose, and determined that with
respect to none of them was U.C. Davis able to overcome the
demands of "strict scrutiny."
Powell's consideration of two of U.C. Davis' asserted purposes"reducing the historic deficit of minorities in the medical schools and
the medical professions," and "increasing the number of physicians
who will practice in communities currently underserved," was largely
consistent with the inherited (implicit) meaning of "strict scrutiny."
Because a close examination of Powell's disposition of these two state
objectives would not contribute significant additional insight into the
adjudicative perils of failing explicitly to distinguish between
substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules,243 we

243. The deficiencies in these parts of Powell's opmion are much like those in
Korematsu, Bolling, and Loving-deficiencies caused by failing explicitly to derive and
define the substantive constitutional prohibition of purposes rooted in racism, and the
adjudicative presumption that laws with racial classifications were adopted because of
racial prejudice. Powell determined that the third asserted purpose--''increasing the
number of physicians who will practice in communities currently underserved"-could
not help to validate the program because there was "virtually no evidence in the record
indicating that petitioner's special admissions program is either needed or geared to
promote that goal. . . . Indeed, petitioner has not shown that its preferential
classification is likely to have any significant effect on the problem." Id. at 310-11.
Why, exactly, is the lack of evidence demonstrating that minority doctors will choose to
practice in underserved communities a reason to find that the burdens of "strict
scrutiny'' have not been met? One might frame an answer simply in terms of the
formal elements of "strict scrutiny:" with no evidence that persons admitted through
the special admissions program would practice in underserved communities, U.C.
Davis had failed to show that its racial classifications were necessary to achieve its
asserted interest, "compelling'' or not. Yet, this answer elevates the terms of "strict
scrutiny'' to the level of substance, rather than maintaining clear the formulation's
role as an adjudicative rule in service of the prohibition of purposes rooted in racist
values or stereotypes. A better explanation would focus on the connection between that
lack of evidence and the relevant substantive constitutional principle. Lacking
evidence demonstrating in fact that blacks, Chicanos, Asians, and American Indians
admitted through the special program would practice in underserved communities, all
Davis had was an assumption that they would do so--an unexamined, unsupported
assumption that race correlates with fact (behavior and career choices). This
assumption is the very definition of prohibited racial stereotyping. The state's
justification for the program as a means to educate doctors who would serve in
underserved communities confirmed, rather than rebutted, the presumption of
unconstitutionality.
Powell rejected the first purpose--''reducing the historic deficit of traditionally
disfavored minorities in the medical schools and the medical profession"-as
impermissible, per se. Id. at 306. He said: "If petitioner's purpose is to assure within
its student body some specified percentage of a particular group merely because of its
race or ethnic origin, such a preferential purpose must be rejected not as insubstantial
but as facially invalid. Preferring members of any one group for no reason other than
race is discrimination for its own sake. This the Constitution forbids." Id. This point
essentially states that aspect of the traditional substantive constitutional principle
that prohibits purposes rooted in racist value judgments. If U.C. Davis acted based on
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turn immediately to his consideration of the remaining two purposes
on which U.C. Davis relied-"obtaining the educational benefits that
flow from an ethnically diverse student body" and "countering the
effects of societal discrimination."
In this section, I will examine how Powell's importation of new
substantive constitutional principles-in particular, the concern with
"unfair effects"-distorted the meaning of "strict scrutiny" as
adjudicative rule, and rendered it ineffective for enforcing the
established and (by then) uncontroversial substantive constitutional
principle prohibiting purposes rooted in racist values or stereotypes.
Indeed, when applying his normatively contaminated conception(s) of
"strict scrutiny" to Bakke's facts, Powell's opinion identified as
constitutionally significant a range of factual issues that should have
been deemed irrelevant-at least with respect to the established
prohibition of purposes rooted in racism. Powell's focus on these
unwarranted issues of fact generated an analysis inclined to strike
down policies that should be deemed permissible under the
substantive constitutional principle prohibiting purposes rooted in
racism, and-perhaps paradoxically-to uphold policies that should
be deemed impermissible under that established substantive
constitutional principle.244
1.

Invalidating Policies That Do Not Violate an
Established Substantive Constitutional Principle

U.C. Davis claimed that it sought to enroll a student body in
which fifteen percent of students were black, Chicano, Asian, or
American Indian for a purpose of countering the effects of societal
discrimination.245 When considering whether this asserted purpose
race (i.e., used racial classifications) solely because of race, its purpose placed value on
race, per se, and therefore was constitutionally impermissible. This analysis was
fatally flawed, however, because Powell merely articulated the substantive
constitutional principle, and never turned to determine whether the School's purpose
of reducing the deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in the medical profession
was, in fact, rooted in placing value on race, per se. In other words, in examining this
asserted purpose, he never even began to apply the adjudicative rule of "strict
scrutiny" that he labored so hard to justify. This is yet another occasion in which the
adjudicative function of judicial review was undermined by a failure to focus explicitly
on the different nature and functions of substantive constitutional principles and
adjudicative rules.
244. It should be emphasized that this analysis does not assert that a substantive
constitutional principle prohibiting racial classifications having an excessively unfair
effect on "innocents" is necessarily erroneous and should not be enforced. Rather, it
suggests that if such a substantive constitutional principle is to be enforced, it should
be derived and defined on its own terms, and should be enforced independently of any
other substantive constitutional principle, through adjudicative rules specifically
derived and defined for its enforcement.
245. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 362.
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could validate the challenged racial classifications, Powell revealed
no clear vision as to what "strict scrutiny" should entail. Apparently
elaborating on the meaning of "compelling'' and "necessary," he
developed three requirements that must be met if a state is to
validate racial classifications by asserting a remedial purpose.246 But
a close examination reveals that two of these three requirements
undermined "strict scrutiny'' as an adjudicative rule for enforcing the
substantive constitutional principle prohibiting purposes rooted in
racist values or stereotypes, and were the product of Powell's concern
with the "unfair" effects principle.
The analysis Powell should have pursued. The traditional notion
of "strict scrutiny" was comprised of an implicit substantive
constitutional principle prohibiting of purposes rooted in racism;247
and an implicit adjudicative rule, justifiable from a probabilistic
perspective, presuming that laws with racial classifications were
adopted in violation of that substantive prohibition.248 Analyzing the
facts and circumstances of Bakke's case, the judge (and the
challenger's attorney) could have generated a series of pointed
questions about the special admissions program to give specific
content to otherwise vague suspicions of purposes rooted in racial
prejudice.
First, is the asserted purpose facially legitimate, or is it per se
impermissible?249 Here, the asserted purpose of countering the effects
of societal discrimination is not inherently rooted in racist values or
stereotypes. Determining that members of a racial group bear the
continuing effects of past discrimination does not necessarily reflect
stereotype. Furthermore, determining that the continuing effects of
past racial discrimination ought to be mitigated no more necessarily
reflects improper favoritism than does providing a statutory remedy
for individual instances of racial discrimination or, indeed, federal
assistance for a region devastated by a hurricane.
Second, does the asserted purpose qualify as "compelling''?250 As
previously suggested, if one ·conceptualizes "strict scrutiny" as a
probabilistically derived adjudicative rule for enforcing a substantive
constitutional principle prohibiting purposes rooted in racism, one

246. See infra text accompanying notes 256-75.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 120-38, 197.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 152-57.
249. Recall that in Loving, Virginia failed to meet the burdens of "strict scrutiny"
because it asserted a purpose that revealed racist values on its face-maintaining the
"integrity" of the race. See supra notes 173, 199.
250. Why should the scrutiny of racial classifications with respect to the substantive
prohibition of purposes rooted in racism be concerned with qualifying an asserted
purpose as "compelling" rather than "legitimate"? See supra notes 199-200 and
accompanying text.
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would define "compelling'' as meaning not only legitimate, but also
persuasive toward rebutting suspicions of racism.251 One might view
the asserted remedial purpose of countering the effects of societal
discrimination as helpful in rebutting a suspicion of traditional racist
animus.
Yet, the state's assertion that it sought to achieve this purpose
through the special admissions program should raise specific
suspicions of racial favoritism or stereotype-suspicions focused on
ways in which the program's details may seem an overinclusive or
underinclusive means for achieving that purpose.252 These specific
suspicions should generate specific questions. In particular, why did
U.C. Davis include each group? Since Asians were well represented
in the population of students admitted in the regular admissions
program, why were they included in the special program?25a What
societal discrimination against Asians did U.C. Davis identify that,
in its view, had continuing effects in medical education?254 Is the
inclusion of Asians in its program predicated on stereotype-the
unexamined, unsupported assumption that race (Asian) correlates
with fact (suffering the present effects of past racial
discrimination)?255
The state might be able to answer these specific questions
persuasively; it might not. In the absence of persuasive answers, it
251. See supra text accompanying note 199.
252. Indeed, to ask whether a "legitimate" purpose is also "compelling'' obscures the
point that any asserted purpose might allay some suspicions about impermissible
purposes rooted in racism, and exacerbate other suspicions. Rather than ask whether
an asserted purpose qualifies as "compelling," the "strict scrutiny" of racial
classifications, focusing on the probabilistically-rooted suspicion that laws with racial
classifications were adopted in violation of the substantive prohibition of purposes
rooted in racism, would require the reviewing court to identify the specific suspicions
that the asserted facially legitimate purpose allays, if any, and the specific suspicions
that it reinforces.
253. From 1971 through 1974, thirty-seven Asian students were enrolled through
the regular admissions program, and twelve Asians were enrolled through the special
admissions program. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 275-76.
254. See id.
255. In relation to the formalities of "strict scrutiny," one might conceptualize these
questions as relevant to determining whether the racial classifications are "necessary''
to achieve the asserted purpose. Conceptualizing the questions in terms of "necessity,"
however, may obscure, rather than sharpen, their significance. Indeed, consider an
alternative conceptualization of these questions that connect them to the governing
substantive constitutional principle: Posing such specific questions to the government
crystallizes the suspicions of racial prejudice that it must overcome, and gives specific
content to the burden it must meet-that is, to rebut a presumption that its racial
classifications were adopted because of purposes rooted in racial prejudice. Such
specific questions frame the government's burden far better than does the generic
formulation requiring proof that the classification is "necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest."
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would fail to rebut the presumption that it adopted the special
admissions program because of purposes rooted in racist values or
stereotypes, and the policy should be invalidated. The adjudicative
function thus could be fulfilled, through an explicit and focused
distinction between substantive constitutional principles and
adjudicative rules.
The analysis Powell did pursue. Toward determining that U.C.
Davis' asserted purpose of redressing the effects of past racial
discrimination did not validate its use of racial classifications, Powell
said:
We have never approved a classification that aids persons
perceived as members of relatively victimized groups at the
expense of other innocent individuals in the absence of judicial,
legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or
statutory violations .... Without such findings of constitutional
or statutory violations, it cannot be said that the government
has any greater interest in helping one individual than in
refraining from harming another. Thus, the government has no
compelling justification for inflicting such harm. Petitioner does
not purport to have made, and is in no position to make, such
findings. . . . [I]solated segments of our vast governmental
structures are not competent to make those decisions, at least
in the absence of legislative mandates and legislatively
determined criteria.256
These observations about the U.C. Davis program suggest three
conditions that must be satisfied if a remedial purpose is to validate
the use of racial classifications. First, the entity that uses racial
classifications for remedial purposes must make contemporaneous
findings of fact identifying the past discrimination, the effects of
which it seeks to redress. Second, that past discrimination must have
been illegal-a violation of constitutional or statutory mandates.
Third, the entity must be competent to make such findings and to
adopt the policy at issue.
The following analysis will consider how Powell justifies each of
these requirements. It also will consider how each of these
requirements, and Powell's justifications for them, relate to the
traditional (implicit) rationale for the "strict scrutiny" of racial
classifications-that a law with racial classifications is presumed
unconstitutional because it probably violates the substantive
constitutional principle prohibiting purposes rooted in racist values
or stereotypes.257 Finally, it will suggest that two of these three
requirements place restrictions on governmental discretion
unwarranted by the prohibition of purposes rooted in racist values or
256.
257.

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307-310 (emphasis added).
See supra text accompanying notes 152-57, 198-207.
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stereotypes, and flow instead from Powell's new (implicit)
substantive constitutional principle prohibiting excessively unfair
effects on "innocents."
First, before adopting racial classifications for remedial
purposes, a policymaker must make "findings of constitutional or
statutory violations."25s Although Powell seems to treat this as one
requirement,259 I would like to consider separately the requirement of
contemporaneous factfinding to identify the relevant past racial
discrimination, and the requirement that such identified past racial
discrimination must have amounted to a constitutional or statutory
violation. How do each of these two factfinding requirements relate to
the traditional (implicit) rationale for the "strict scrutiny'' of racial
classifications?
To require factfinding can be understood as directly tailored to
the probabilistically-rooted presumption that racial classifications
were adopted because of racial stereotyping.260 Indeed, if U.C. Davis
had made findings of fact identifying the historic discrimination
against blacks, Chicanos, Asians, and American Indians that
explained their putative underrepresentation, it less likely would
have used racial classifications in a way that was tainted by the
unexamined, unsupported assumption that all such groups were
targets of past racial discrimination, and that such past
discrimination has continuing effects in medical school admissions.261
Because relevant factfinding can reduce the probability that
government will have acted unconstitutionally in this way, imposing
such a requirement seems supportable as an adjudicative rule for
enforcing the relevant substantive constitutional principle
prohibiting purposes rooted in racial prejudice.262
258. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 308.
259. Id. at 308-09.
260. See supra note 152.
261. Formal factfinding could have induced U.C. Davis to reconsider, for example,
its inclusion of Asians in the special admissions program-as a significant number of
Asians were admitted each year through the regular admissions program. See supra
note 253 and accompanying text.
262. Viewing Powell's factfinding requirement as a device to reduce the probability
of constitutional violations does not make it vulnerable in the way that Mitchell
Berman views Miranda's exclusionary rule as vulnerable. See Berman, Constitutional
Decision Rules, supra note 12, at 21. Scholars have grappled with the implications of
Miranda's original characterization of the exclusionary rule as not mandated by the
Fifth Amendment, but as "prophylactic" in relation to the amendment's prohibition of
compelled self-incrimination. See id. For Berman, and others, the injunction that "'[n]o
person . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself" is
"directed to trial courts, not to the police." See id. at 116-17 (citing U.S. CONST. amend.
V). Professor Berman goes to great lengths to characterize Miranda's exclusionary rule
as a "decision rule," (that is, in my terms, an adjudicative rule) designed to promote
adjudicative accuracy in enforcing an "operative proposition directed to judges (do not
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Second, how does the requirement that the past identified
discrimination must have been illegal-a constitutional or statutory
violation-relate to enforcing the substantive prohibition of purposes
rooted in racist values or stereotypes? Consider the implications of
the illegality requirement. If a policymaker may not seek to redress
the effects of identified past discrimination that was not illegal, then
the effects of slavery, of Jim Crow, of racial segregation through
1954, all would be off-limits, because all such discrimination was
legal. Resting on a bedrock of historic legal discrimination, the many
and vast sedimentary layers of racially disproportionate
disadvantage could not be addressed by policies employing racial
classifications-if Powell's requirement of "constitutional or statutory
violations" were taken seriously.
Yet, one surely can conceive of a policymaker who determineswithout having been animated by any racist value judgment or
stereotype-that slavery, Jim Crow, and racial segregation were
gravely wrong, even when legal, and that their continuing
consequences should be mitigated.2sa Thus, while the factfinding
admit a statement against a criminal defendant that has been compelled) .... " See id.
at 136-38. Recognizing that Miranda's doctrine of mandated warnings also "is
intended to affect police behavior," he nevertheless suggests that this purpose is not an
independent end, but a means to the end of promoting adjudicative accuracy on the
question of whether a confession was compelled. See id. at 129-32. Berman does so for
two reasons. First, to constrain the behavior of police is of questionable legitimacy as a
device to enforce an operative proposition (substantive constitutional principle)
directed to trial judges. See id. Second, he suggests more broadly that "a decision rule's
legitimacy is likely to be most secure insofar as it is designed to reduce adjudicatory
error." See Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, supra note 12, at 129.
Berman suggests that deterring police conduct compelling confessions serves
adjudicative accuracy because trial courts are otherwise unable effectively to sift the
compelled from the voluntary confessions on a case-by-case basis. See id. at 131.
Whatever the supportability of this view, such analytical maneuvers are not necessary
for viewing Powell's factfinding requirement as a legitimate and prophylactic
adjudicative rule-at least in the sense that, unlike for Berman's view of Miranda's
doctrine, both the substantive constitutional principle (prohibiting purposes rooted in
racism) and the adjudicative rule (the factfinding requirement) are directed at the
same governmental actors. Under such circumstances, I suggest that the legitimacy of
a decision rule (or adjudicative rule) can, and should, be measured beyond the
parameter of adjudicative accuracy. In framing adjudicative rules applicable to the
same government actor constrained by the governing substantive constitutional
principle, the Court can and should seek to serve the political function, at least to the
extent that doing so does not undermine the goal of minimizing adjudicative error.
Under such circumstances, preventing the breach of substantive constitutional
principles by inhibiting the creation of unconstitutional policies has to be understood
as a legitimate basis for framing adjudicative rules-especially if the foundational
adjudicative rule makes the challenged act presumptively unconstitutional based on a
probabilistic rationale. For a similar analysis of a factfinding requirement in the
context of Commerce Clause challenges to congressional acts, see infra Part 111.E.3.
263. See Chang, Judicial Conservatism, supra note 121, at 821-23.

2006]

STRUCTURING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE

869

requirement directly confronts-and reduces-the probability of
purposes rooted in racial stereotyping, the "illegality" requirement
bears no relationship to enforcing the prohibition of purposes rooted
in racist values or stereotypes.
Instead, Powell's "illegality" requirement was derived from his
concern with the "unjust" effects of affirmative action programs on
"innocent" white victims who otherwise would receive the program's
benefits.264 He introduced the "illegality" requirement by
characterizing the U.C. Davis program as one aiding "persons
perceived as members of relatively victimized groups at the expense of
other innocent individuals .... "265 Pointing even more clearly to his
concern with "unfair" effects, Powell declared that "[w]ithout such
findings of constitutional or statutory violations, it cannot be said
that the government has any greater interest in helping one
individual than in refraining from harming another."266
As discussed above, a concern that laws with racial
classifications should not have an excessively unfair effect on
"innocents" is distinct from a norm prohibiting purposes rooted in
racism.267 If this concern warrants enforcement, it should be justified
as a properly derived and defined substantive constitutional
principle, and enforced through its own explicitly derived and defined
adjudicative rules.268 But to rely on this "fairness" norm in
generating an "illegality" requirement, and to apply that "illegality"
requirement in identifying constitutionally significant issues of fact,
contaminates the adjudication of whether a given racial classification
violates the prohibition of purposes rooted in racist values or
stereotypes-and promises to invalidate policies that are permissible
in relation to that substantive constitutional principle.269
Third, a policymaking institution that chooses to use racial
classifications for remedial purposes, and that makes the requisite
264. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 290.
265. Id. at 307 (emphasis added).
266. Id. at 308-09. Similarly, Powell declared that a purpose to help "victims of
societal discrimination"-as opposed to victims of identified illegal discrimination"does not justify a classification that imposes disadvantages upon persons like
[Bakke], who bear no responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special
admissions program are thought to have suffered." Id. at 310.
267. See id.
268. See supra Part III.B.2.b.
269. Indeed, Powell framed the requirement of factfinding to identify past illegal
discrimination as a precondition for finding the state's remedial purpose to be
"compelling." He said: "Without such findings of constitutional or statutory violations,
it cannot be said that the government has any greater interest in helping one
individual than in refraining from harming another. Thus, the government has no
compelling justification for infl,icting such harm." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 308-09 (emphasis
added).
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findings of fact, must be "competent" to do so.210 In Powell's view,
neither the California Board of Regents nor U.C. Davis qualified as
"competent."2n He said:
For reasons similar to those stated in Part III of this opinion,
isolated segments of our vast governmental structures are not
competent to make those decisions, at least in the absence of
legislative mandates and legislatively determined criteria.
Before relying on these sorts of findings in establishing a racial
classification, a governmental body must have the authority
and capability to establish, in the record, that the classification
is responsive to identified discrimination.272
By disparaging "isolated segments of our vast governmental
structures," and by seeming to require "legislative mandates and
legislatively determined criteria," Powell suggests that electoral
accountability is an essential element of institutional "competence."
How does disabling electorally insulated governmental institutions
from using racial classifications for remedial purposes relate to
enforcing the prohibition of purposes rooted in racist values or
stereotypes?
Unless one posits that electorally accountable decisionmakers
are categorically less likely to pursue purposes rooted in racism when
using racial classifications, Powell's requirement of institutional
"competence" seems irrelevant to the traditional probabilistic
rationale for the "strict scrutiny" of racial classifications. Yet, this
categorical proposition is problematic. A political community might
well make the judgment that biases of various sorts-including
racism and beyond-are less likely pursued by institutions less
politically accountable, rather than more. That is a theory underlying
the formation of independent commissions and agencies. Federal
courts are not electorally accountable, and this design has been
justified, at least in part, to inhibit decisionmaking tainted by bias.273
Indeed, our system relies on electorally insulated federal courts to
police legislative decisions for purposes rooted in racism.
270. Id. at 309.
271. See id. at 309-10.
272. See id. Part III of Powell's opinion focused on justifying the "strict scrutiny" of
all racial classifications, including those challenged by Bakke, and was discussed
extensively above. See supra Part III.C.l.b. It is difficult to fathom what Powell meant
in suggesting that his reasons for the "strict scrutiny'' of all racial classifications also
explain why "isolated" governmental segments are not "competent" to make findings
as to which groups suffer what effects of past racial discrimination.
273. See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816}
(positing that federal courts were accorded jurisdiction over certain categories of case
to avoid impediments to "the regular administration of justice" resulting from the
influence on state courts of "state attachments, state prejudices, state jealousies, and
state interests").
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What, then, explains this "competence" requirement?214 Perhaps
it is a view that legislatures are less likely than are politically
"isolated" decisionmakers to adopt race-specific remedial programs
and less likely, therefore, "unfairly" to trammel the interests of
innocent victims. Perhaps Powell believed that the potentially
"unfair" intrusion on the interests of innocent whites is legitimate
only if adopted by politically accountable decisionmakers. Both of
these rationales emanate from the concern with "excessively unfair
effects."215 Neither of these rationales, however, is related to
enforcing the substantive constitutional principle prohibiting
purposes rooted in racism. Indeed, like the requirement that
government may use racial classifications only to redress the effects
of illegal past discrimination, the requirement of "competence"
promises to undermine the adjudicative function by invalidating
policies that were not adopted because of purposes rooted in racism.

***
It bears repeating: To say that the concern with "unfair effects"
undermined enforcing the prohibition of racist purposes is not to
suggest that one principle is correct, and the other interpretive error.
It is to suggest, however, that each substantive constitutional
principle should be understood and treated as if it were a separate
cause of action, or a separate "constitutional crime." A racial
classification might be impermissible if enacted because of purposes
rooted in racism.21s A racial classification also might be
impermissible if it has excessively unfair effects on innocents.211 To
address both bases of potential impermissibility through analytical
garble and confusion-rather than determining whether each basis of
impermissibility was violated through separate and specifically
tailored analyses-is akin to determining whether a defendant
should be civilly liable by asking whether there was negligent
consideration (mixing elements of tort and contract); or whether a
criminal defendant should be convicted by asking whether the victim
consented to be killed (mixing elements of rape and murder). Quite
obviously, a civil defendant might be liable in tort, or contract, or
both, or neither. A criminal defendant might be guilty of murder, or

274. In his dissent, Justice Brennan challenged Powell's requirement of
"competence," stating that "the manner in which a State chooses to delegate
governmental functions is for it to decide," and that the California constitution's
delegation of legislative authority over the University to the Board of Regents "is
certainly a permissible choice." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 366 n.42 (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
275. See Chang, Judicial Conservatism, supra note 121, at 821-31.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 198-207.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 237-40.
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rape, or both, or neither. But it enforces no legal principle
effectively-it undermines adjudicative efficacy-to fail to enforce
each substantive legal rule separately, on its own terms.
n.

Failing To Invalidate Policies That Do Violate an
Established Substantive Constitutional Principle

U.C. Davis' fourth claimed purpose was to attain the educational
benefits flowing from a racially diverse student body.21s Powell's
application of "strict scrutiny" to this purpose was an odd
combination. His analysis not only imposed restrictions unwarranted
by the substantive constitutional principle prohibiting purposes
rooted in racist values or stereotypes, but also licensed policies that
clearly would violate that principle. Both problems were created by a
meandering analysis that was contaminated by his new substantive
concern with "unfair" effects on "innocents," and by his failure
explicitly to differentiate the derivation and definition of substantive
constitutional principles and adjudicative rules.21s
The Analysis Powell Should Have Pursued. Based on a
probabilistically-rooted presumption that a racial classification was
adopted in violation of a substantive constitutional principle
prohibiting purposes rooted in racist values or stereotypes, the judge
and the challenger's attorney could generate a series of questions
about the special admissions program's details in relation to the
purpose it is purported to serve. First, is the asserted purpose of
attaining the educational benefits of a racially diverse student body
inherently rooted in racist values or stereotypes, or is it possible for
such a purpose to be permissible? Second, if the asserted purpose is
conceivably permissible, was U.C. Davis' particular version of that
purpose rooted in racist values or stereotypes?
Digging deeper, the judge (or challenger's attorney) might ask,
for example: What educational benefits do you seek to gain? What is
your basis for believing that such benefits can flow better from a
student body that is racially diverse than from one that is not? What
is your basis for believing that such benefits can flow by forging a
student body in which at least fifteen percent are black, Chicano,
Asian, or American Indian? What specific educational benefits do you
believe members of each group can bring? What is your basis for
believing that having a particular racial background enables a
particular student to bring such educational benefits to the
classroom?
U.C. Davis, or schools in other cases defending their own racespecific programs on similar grounds, might provide persuasjve
278.
279.

See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311.
See id. at 307.
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answers to these questions, and thereby rebut the probabilistic
suspicion that the challenged program was adopted because the
school placed value on race per se, or because the school acted
because of unexamined, unsupported assumptions that race
correlates with fact. Failure to provide persuasive responses,
however,
would
leave
the
adjudicative
presumption of
unconstitutionality unrebutted, and would render the program
properly subject to invalidation.280
The Analysis Powell Did Pursue. Consider Powell's analysis of
whether the asserted purpose of "obtaining the educational benefits
that flow from an ethnically diverse student body"281 is "legitimate,"
whether it qualifies as "compelling,'' and whether the use of racial
classifications is "necessary" to achieve a "compelling'' state
purpose.282 He begins:
The fourth goal asserted by petitioner is the attainment of a
diverse student body. This clearly is a constitutionally
permissible goal for an institution of higher education.
Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated
constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern
of the First Amendment. The freedom of a university to make
its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its
student body.283
Powell easily concludes that a purpose to attain a diverse
student body is constitutionally permissible because academic
280. This analysis does not mechanically apply the formal elements of "strict
scrutiny." It did not ask whether the asserted purpose qualifies as "compelling."
Indeed, previous analysis has suggested that the "compelling'' requirement obfuscates
the scrutiny that racial classifications should bear toward determining whether they
violate the proscription of racist purposes. See supra note 252. Nor does it ask whether
the racial classification is "necessary" to achieve the asserted legitimate purpose,
though many of the specific questions, derived from a focus on the presumption of
racism, can be conceptualized as consistent with a requirement of "necessity." See
supra note 255. Once again, I suggest that properly framed adjudicative rules, tailored
to determining whether a particular challenged policy violates a particular substantive
constitutional principle, can effectively serve the adjudicative function of judicial
review-avoiding the invalidation of permissible policies, and the failure to invalidate
impermissible policies-far better than can an all purpose, abstract formalism such as
the elements of "strict scrutiny." Indeed, the elements of "strict scrutiny'' must be
defined, and their definition must be a function of the reasons for applying "strict
scrutiny." It is those reasons for close scrutiny that generate the nature of the scrutiny
that is appropriate, rather than the otherwise abstract terms of "strict scrutiny," as
will be further illustrated in the discussion that follows immediately below. Recall the
discussion, above, deriving definitions of "compelling'' and "necessary" for enforcing the
substantive constitutional principle prohibiting purposes rooted in racist values or
stereotypes. See supra text accompanying notes 198-207.
281. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306.
282. See id. at 306-15.
283. Id. at 311-12.
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freedom is rooted in the First Amendment.284 One might ask,
however, what academic freedom has to do with whether a university
has made choices rooted in racist values or stereotypes-purposes
illegitimate under the Equal Protection Clause. Brown and Bolling
make clear that academic freedom does not trump the prohibitions of
equal protection. One readily can imagine certain notions about the
educational benefits of racial diversity that would reflect purposes
rooted in racist values-for example, that a student body of one race
or another is intrinsically better than one of many races; or that a
student body that is racially balanced in a particular way is
intrinsically better than one that is not. Similarly, certain notions
about the educational benefits that flow from a racially diverse
student body also could be rooted in racial stereotypes-for example,
an unexamined, unsupported assumption that members of particular
racial groups have particular views to contribute to classroom
discussion. Thus, diverted by the First Amendment, unfocused on the
applicable substantive constitutional principle, and unmindful of the
adjudicative presumption of unconstitutionality based on the
probabilistic suspicion of racist purposes, Powell squandered the
occasion to crystallize the ways in which the U.C. Davis policy might
indeed have violated the equal protection proscription of purposes
rooted in racial prejudice.
Powell then turned, mechanically, to the "strict scrutiny"
requirement of a "compelling" interest.285 He concluded, without
analysis, that a goal of student body diversity is (or can be) not only
"legitimate," but also "compelling."286 Immediately thereafter,
however, when purporting to turn (again mechanically) to the
element of "strict scrutiny" requiring that the classification be
"necessary" to achieve the state's "compelling" interest, Powell makes
clear not only that mere racial or ethnic diversity is not "genuine
diversity," but also that a purpose of attaining the educational
benefits of mere racial diversity cannot qualify as "compelling."281
It may be assumed that the reservation of a specified number of
seats in each class for individuals from the preferred ethnic
groups would contribute to the attainment of considerable
ethnic diversity in the student body. But . . . the argument
misconceives the nature of the state interest that would justify
consideration of race or ethnic background. It is not an interest
in simple ethnic diversity .... The diversity that furthers a
compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of
qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic
284.
285.
286.
287.

See id. at 312.
See id. at 315.
Id. at 314-15.
See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314-15.
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origin is but a single though important element. Petitioner's
special admissions program, focused solely on ethnic diversity,
would hinder rather than further attainment of genuine
diversity.288
Consider the failings of this analysis-both its internal
contradictions and its irrelevance for determining whether U.C.
Davis' asserted purpose can help rebut a presumption that the
special admissions program actually was adopted because of
prohibited purposes rooted in racist values or stereotypes. Recall that
Powell relied on the First Amendment value of academic freedom in
determining that a purpose of fostering educational diversity is not
only "legitimate," but also "of paramount importance."289 Yet,
Powell's conclusion that the purpose of attaining a racially diverse
student body does not qualify as "compelling"-because narrower
than his own concept of "genuine" diversity290--reflects an odd (more
to the point, incoherent) notion of academic freedom.291
Furthermore, a purpose of attaining educational benefits from
"mere" racial diversity is not necessarily rooted in racist values or
stereotypes. Perhaps a university believes (as a matter of value) that
enrolling students having perspectives shaped by racism against
blacks in America is the only specific element of diversity that
warrants compromising the usual highest test score approach for
choosing among applicants. Perhaps the university believes (as a
matter of fact) that one must experience life and discrimination as an
African-American truly to understand the experiences of blacks with
racism in America. Perhaps the university has evidence that
supports this view, beyond unsupported, unexamined assumptions.
Perhaps the university asks applicants to write an essay discussing
their experiences with racism. A university claiming an interest in
securing educational benefits from racial diversity might well rebut a
presumption that it acted because of racist values or stereotypes. If a
university were to rebut this presumption, neither the notion of
academic freedom, nor the more fundamental norm of legislative
discretion within constitutional boundaries, could even begin to
support disqualifying its purpose as not "compelling."292 Justice
Powell's analysis, however, foreclosed a route to validate the U.C.
Davis program-and other schools' programs in subsequent cases-in
288. Id. at 315 (emphasis in original).
289. See id at 311-13; see also supra text accompanying notes 281-84.
290. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315.
291. Beyond this, as previously suggested, tethering the conclusion of '1egitimacy"
to academic freedom was irrelevant to the issue of whether the state had exercised
that "freedom" in pursuit of purposes prohibited under the Equal Protection Clause.
See supra text accompanying notes 284-85.
292. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315.
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relation to the substantive constitutional principle prohibiting
purposes rooted in racial prejudice, as enforced through the
traditional notion of "strict scrutiny" developed in Korematsu,
Bolling, and Loving.293
What, then, explains the line Powell drew designating as
"compelling" the pursuit of his broader concept of diversity, but
rejecting as inadequate the pursuit of a more focused view of
diversity?294 Once again, Powell seems to have in mind his concerns
about excessively unfair effects on "innocents."295 He cautions that
"although a university must have wide discretion in making the
sensitive judgments as to who should be admitted, constitutional
limitations protecting individual rights may not be disregarded."296
Though it is conceivable that Powell is talking about the individual
right to be free from regulation that violates the prohibition of
purposes rooted in racism, it seems more likely that Powell is
reverting to his new substantive concern that racial classifications
must not have excessively unfair effects on "innocents."291
Indeed, Powell lauds certain characteristics of Harvard's
approach to attaining educational diversity in ways that not only
suggest the unfair effects concern, but also demonstrate how the
focus on fairness distorts analysis necessary for effectively enforcing
the prohibition of purposes rooted in racist values or stereotypes.298
The Harvard program awarded points to applicants based on their
having characteristics on which Harvard placed special value.299
Those diversity-enhancing characteristics included racial or ethnic
background-some races necessarily receiving more points than
others-but also included geography, and special talents, among
others.3oo On the Harvard approach, Powell said:
In such an admissions program, race or ethnic background may
be deemed a "plus" in a particular applicant's file, yet it does
not insulate the individual from comparison with all other
candidates for the available seats . . . . This kind of program
treats each applicant as an individual in the admissions
process. The applicant who loses out on the last available seat
to another candidate receiving a "plus" on the basis of ethnic
background will not have been foreclosed from all consideration
for that seat simply because he was not the right color or had
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

See supra text accompanying notes 120-58.
See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315, 317-19.
See id. at 298; see supra text accompanying notes 237-40.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314 (emphasis added).
See id. at 298; see supra text accompanying notes 237-40.
See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317-19.
See id. at 317-18, 323-24.
See id.
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the wrong surname. It would mean only that his combined
qualifications, which may have included similar nonobjective
factors, did not outweigh those of the other applicant. His
qualifications would have been weighed fairly and competitively,
and he would have no basis to complain of unequal treatment
under the Fourteenth Amendment.301
Note that Powell's approval of the Harvard approach is
predicated not on a determination that Harvard was pursuing
purposes untainted by racism, but on a determination that Harvard
treated white applicants "fairly." Consider, now, two points that
clearly illustrate how Powell's concern with "fair" effects undermined
enforcing the prohibition of purposes rooted in racist values or
stereotypes. First, the fact that Harvard considers factors other than
race in constructing a "diverse" student body does not explain why
Harvard does consider race at all. Indeed, Harvard could consider
race in a way that violates the prohibition of purposes rooted in racist
values or stereotypes. Powell cited a statement in Harvard's
description of its program:
A farm boy from Idaho can bring something to Harvard College
that a Bostonian cannot offer. Similarly, a black student can
usually bring something that a white person cannot offer.302

301. Id. at 317-19 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Apart perhaps from special
bills, all legislation classifies, and all classifications treat people as members of groups.
Selecting applicants on the basis of grade point averages and MCAT or LSAT scores
treats them as members of groups defined in terms of grades and test scores. Given a
substantive constitutional principle prohibiting purposes rooted in racist values or
stereotypes, the issue really is not whether a selection policy treats applicants as
individuals or as members of groups. Rather, the issue, properly framed, is whether
the policy uses race in a way that places value on race per se, or that engages in racial
stereotyping by making unexamined and unsupported assumptions that race
correlates with fact.
302. Id. at 323. In Grutter, Justice O'Connor implicitly connected the concept of
"individualized consideration" to the prohibition of racial stereotyping:
That a race-conscious admissions program does not operate as a quota does
not, by itself, satisfy the requirement of individualized consideration. When
using race as a "plus" factor in university admissions, a university's
admissions program must remain flexible enough to ensure that each
applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes an
applicant's race or ethnicity the defining feature of his or her
application .... Here, the Law School engages in a highly individualized,
holistic review of each applicant's file, giving serious consideration to all the
ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse environment.
Grutter, 539 U.S. 336-37. Although O'Connor characterizes her notion of
"individualized consideration" as an application of Justice Powell's, it is altogether
different. Because he referred approvingly to Harvard's statement vaguely
differentiating black and white students, one can conclude that Powell was not
concerned with how and why race was considered, but only with whether race was
considered along with other sources of diversity. The Michigan law school policy, as
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What, exactly, is the "something" that a black student can
usually bring that a white person cannot? Is Harvard acting based on
a racial stereotype? Had he taken seriously the presumption that
racial classifications were adopted because of purposes rooted in
racist values or stereotypes, Powell should have presumed that
Harvard's use of racial classifications were rooted in stereotype, and
should have cited Harvard's admissions policy not as a paradigm to
be copied by public universities, but as beset with pitfalls to be
avoided.303
Why, then, does Powell laud the Harvard program as a model for
public institutions? Why would Powell not require a public school to
make findings of fact, identifying the traits that it believes correlate
with race, traits that it wishes to bring to its student body, toward
gaining the educational benefits of "genuine" (including racial)
diversity, as he requires findings of fact identifying past illegal
discrimination when the state relies on a remedial purpose?304 Why
was Powell so insistent on the formalities of "strict scrutiny" in his
great debate with Brennan, yet so lax in its application to the facts
and circumstances of the Harvard plan?
There is a second indication that Powell, beguiled by his
"fairness" concerns, was distracted from the established concept of
"strict scrutiny." Powell suggested (quite shockingly) that the
Harvard program (if adopted by a public university) should be
presumed permissible:
It has been suggested that an admissions program which
considers race only as one factor is simply a subtle and more
sophisticated, but no less effective, means of according racial
preference than the Davis program. A facial intent to
discriminate, however, is evident in petitioner's preference
program and not denied in this case. No such facial infirmity
exists in an admissions program where race or ethnic
background is simply one element, to be weighed fairly against
other elements, in the selection process . ... And a court would
not assume that a university, professing to employ a facially
nondiscriminatory admissions policy, would operate it as a

characterized by O'Connor, does not use race in a way that assumes a correlation
between race and unspecified fact. Rather, it seems to consider the particular role that
the applicant's race has played in her life, and in forming her perceptions and values.
Unlike Powell's notion of "individualized consideration," this part of O'Connor's
Grutter opinion is tailored to overcoming a presumption that race was considered in
violation of a prohibition of purposes rooted in racist values or stereotypes.
303. The point is not that Harvard would necessarily have been unable to respond
persuasively to these suspicion-crystallizing questions, but that under "strict scrutiny"
tailored to enforcing the substantive prohibition of purposes rooted in racism, Harvard
(if a public institution) would have had the burden to do so.
304. See supra text accompanying notes 256-73.
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cover for the functional equivalent of a quota system. In short,
good faith would be presumed in the absence of a showing to the
contrary in the manner permitted by our cases.305
Somehow, Powell views the Harvard program as not facially
discriminatory-as not employing racial classifications-and,
therefore, as not warranting "strict scrutiny."306 But, of course, the
Harvard program does use racial classifications in determining which
races get what kind of "pluses." The fact that Harvard might give
pluses based on factors other than race does not negate the fact that
it does give pluses based on race, just as a private club's exclusion of
members based on gender and religion would not negate the fact that
the club discriminates based on race as well. How striking it is, after
being so insistent that the formalities of "strict scrutiny" should be
applied to all racial classifications, that Powell would suggest that a
program like Harvard's ought to be insulated by a presumption of
good faith.307 Apparently distracted by a visceral sense of its
"fairness," he fails to see the racial classifications that the program
does contain, and fails to be suspicious of the racist values or
stereotypes on which those classifications probably were
predicated.3os

305. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318-19 (emphasis added).
306. See id. at 321-24.
307. See id. at 318-19.
308. This analysis of Powell's opinion suggests that an effort to "taxon" or categorize
extant doctrine in terms of substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules
might yield only limited benefits. Consider Professor Berman's consideration of
whether "strict scrutiny" should be understood, in his terms, as an operative
proposition or a decision rule. See Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, supra note
12, at 80 n.253. After laying out propositions from recent cases (which built upon and
perpetuated the failings of Powell's Bakke opinion), and after recognizing that
impermissible motivation can be a basis for invalidating a racial classification,
Berman concludes:
[S]trict scrutiny seems to rest on both evidentiary and justificatory
rationales. Some demand for heightened justification is part of the operative
proposition; narrow tailoring is supplied by the decision rule. Perhaps, then,
the doctrine is best understood as follows. The operative proposition of equal
protection prohibits states from treating people differently unless the public
good pursued outweighs the harm to disadvantaged persons. The decision
rule directs that, because racial classifications generally produce substantial
harm, and because fully ad hoc balancing is cumbersome and unpredictable,
courts should presume that the good does not outweigh the harm unless the
good is "compelling." Furthermore, because our unfortunate history shows
that states are especially likely to be pursuing illegitimate ends when
employing racial classifications, the decision rule also directs courts to
presume that the (putatively compelling) interest claimed by the state is not
the real interest pursued unless the classification is narrowly tailored to
advance that (putatively compelling) interest.
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***
To summarize Powell's application of "strict scrutiny" to the facts
of Bakke's case: Concerns about the effects on "innocents" generated
restrictions on the discretion of a policymaker unwarranted for
enforcing the prohibition of purposes rooted in racist values or
stereotypes. Concerns about the effects on "innocents" also distracted
Powell's attention from aspects of the "model" Harvard program that,
if adopted by a public university, could well have violated the firmly
established substantive constitutional principle prohibiting purposes
rooted in racism. Thus, Powell's failure to distinguish explicitly
between substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules,
to attend to the enforcement of each substantive constitutional
principle separately, and to do so through adjudicative rules
specifically tailored to each, tainted the manner in which he
examined the facts of Bakke's case. As a result, he presented an
analysis that promised not only to invalidate policies that were not
adopted for prohibited purposes rooted in racial prejudice, but also to
uphold policies that were adopted for prohibited purposes-and
thereby to undermine the adjudicative function.309

Id. (emphasis added). In my view, this characterization of "strict scrutiny" tries too
much to account for extant doctrine, and too little to critique current doctrine, in
relation to the distinction between substantive constitutional principles (or operative
propositions) and adjudicative (or decision) rules. This account of "strict scrutiny'' fails
to reveal that the Court (beginning with Justice Powell) has been concerned with
substantive concerns going beyond impermissible purpose-including the "fairness" of
harming "innocents," and concerns about promoting racism. Instead, Berman
identifies a normatively vague operative proposition: states may not "treatO people
differently unless the public good pursued outweighs the harm to disadvantaged
persons." Id. Having failed to tease out the distinct normative bases for distinct
"operative propositions"--e.g., the prohibited purposes principle and the "unfair"
effects principle-Berman's account of extant doctrine cobbles together a single
"decision rule" that actually makes reference to two these two disparate substantive
concerns-"pursuing illegitimate ends" and producing (an unspecified type of)
"substantial harm." In my view, Berman's particular taxonomic account of extant
"strict scrutiny'' is capable neither of effectively adjudicating whether any of the
disparate substantive concerns have been violated, nor "duly instructing'' political
actors about the boundaries of their discretion. The insight that constitutional
doctrine, like doctrine in other areas of law, must be structured in terms of substantive
constitutional principles and adjudicative rules, has a power that is more productively
directed toward the critique of existing doctrine (that has not been framed with careful
attention to the distinction), and the creation of new doctrine. To focus too much on the
taxonomy of existing doctrine places too much credence on judicial thought processes
that, at best, have been inchoate and implicit, and limits the clarifying potential of the
underlying premise of the taxonomic agenda: analytical clarity comes from making
explicit that which has been only implicit.
309. Cass Sunstein characterizes Powell's opinion as "narrow," in leaving many
questions open, Sunstein, supra note 17, at 46-47, but not "shallow, because it offered
a number of relatively abstract judgments about the legitimate grounds for affirmative
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action programs." Id. at 4 7 n.209. For Sunstein, whether a decision is "narrow" or
"wide" depends on the extent to which it purports to reach facts beyond those of the
case decided. Id. at 15-17. Whether a decision is "shallow" or "deep" depends on the
extent to which it purports to be deduced from foundational first principles. Id. at 2021. It is difficult to understand how Powell's decision can be understood as "narrow,"
as he sweepingly deems a purpose of achieving racial diversity as not "compelling;" a
purpose of remedying the effects of past legal discrimination as not "compelling;" a
racial classification adopted for remedial purposes unsupported by contemporaneous
findings of fact identifying past illegal racial discrimination as impermissible; and so
on. Indeed, Powell's opinion was the foundation for Adarand, and Richmond u. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). Furthermore, Powell's opinion can be understood as
"deep" rather than "shallow" not simply because it suggested abstract judgments about
legitimate grounds for affirmative action programs, but also because it suggested
abstract principles with respect to which such programs would be deemed invalid-for
having excessively unfair effects, and for excessively promoting racial prejudice. See
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318-19.
Toward minimalism, Sunstein urges case-by-case analysis rather than rules. See
Sunstein, supra note 17, at 90-92. He conceives of a rule-based disposition of
affirmative action policies in terms of a "court opinion outlawing affirmative action."
Id. at 91. But one might question whether case-by-case disposition is necessarily, or
even more probably, minimalist than would be rules-based disposition. It all depends
on the rule. The inherited meaning of "strict scrutiny" applied a substantive
constitutional principle prohibiting purposes rooted in racism. This rule is concerned
only with legislative purpose, not the effects of the policy, its "fairness," its duration, or
any other matter that a court might identify as relevant in the less disciplined
common law manner for evaluating the facts of each case. See supra note 98.
Furthermore, the rule prohibiting racist purposes does require a careful examination
of each case's facts-but only so far as those facts are relevant for rebutting a
presumption of impermissible purpose. Perhaps Sunstein has a notion of
constitutional mandates that is denser than mine--that "correctly" interpreting
constitutional text involves intricately evaluating and balancing a broad range of facts
and policies. My notion of constitutionality is skeletal. See supra note 117.
Constitutional provisions establish relatively discrete boundaries on governmental
discretion, leaving most values and factual judgments permissible bases for the
exercise of governmental discretion. Constitutional policy-as made by the People
when acting as framers and ratifiers, and as properly interpreted by judges-does not
replicate the full range of considerations relevant for making ordinary policies in
legislative politics. Rather, it defines boundaries within which ordinary policy ought to
be made. This is a minimalist concept of constitutional meaning, and implies a
minimalist approach to judicial review. But it is minimalist in the sense of identifying
minimalist substantive constitutional principles. In my view, disposing of affirmative
action cases as all racial classifications had been evaluated before Bakke, i.e.,
according to a rule prohibiting racist purposes, is far more "minimalist" than was
Powell's opinion, and far more minimalist than "case-by-case" dispositions building on
the Powell opinion have been. See generally Chang, Judicial Conservatism, supra note
121.
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Failing Explicitly to Derive and Define New
Substantive Constitutional Principles Undermines
the Political Function for Enforcing Previously
Established Substantive Constitutional Principles

Justice Powell's three requirements for governmental entities
seeking to use racial classifications for remedial purposes sent
problematic messages that begged to be heeded by conscientious
policymakers.aw Policymakers were not told that they may use racial
classifications if their purposes are not rooted in racist values or
stereotypes. Rather, they were told that if they seek to use racial
classifications for remedial purposes, they must be politically
accountable, and they may only seek to redress the effects of past
discrimination that was illegal. Policymakers who conscientiously
heeded these constraints were discouraged from enacting policies
that would have been perfectly permissible-that they should have
felt constitutionally free to enact-under the well-established
substantive constitutional principle prohibiting laws with racial
classifications adopted because of purposes rooted in racism.
President Clinton sought to "mend it, not end it," but the definition of
"mending'' was obscured by the failings of Powell's analysis and by
subsequent decisions that built on Powell's foundation.an
This point does not presuppose that the only legitimate
definition of unconstitutional racial discrimination is that which
violates the prohibition of purposes rooted in racism. It does not
presuppose that Powell's
additional,
implicit substantive
constitutional principles-the prohibition of racial classifications
having excessively "unfair" effects on "innocents," and the prohibition
of classifications that excessively promote racism-are necessarily
erroneous.a12 It does suppose, however, that each substantive
constitutional principle should be derived and defined on its own
terms-that one or another putative substantive constitutional
principle might be erroneous. It also supposes that a doctrinal hash
of disparate substantive concerns and functionally distinct
adjudicative considerations cannot begin to provide policymakers

310. For discussion of those three requirements, see supra text accompanying notes
256-77.
311. In 1995, President Clinton sought to defend affirmative action against political
and legal attacks. "Despite the strong sentiments in Clinton's speech, the 96-page
review it introduced concludes that a number of minority set-asides will have to be
revised or eliminated to comply with [a] recent Supreme Court ruling .... [S]ays a top
Clinton aide, alluding to the impact of the Supreme Court decision, 'there's a day of
reckoning coming."' See James Carney, Mend It, Don't End It, TIME, July 31, 1995, at
35.
312. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298-300; see also supra text accompanying notes 233-41.
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with "due instruction" as to the constitutional norms by which they
should feel their discretion constrained.
c.

Failing Explicitly to Derive and Define New
Substantive Constitutional Principles (and
Correlative Adjudicative Rules) Undermines the
Adjudicative Function for Enforcing Those New
Principles

In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,313 Justice Powell
authored a plurality opinion in which the reason for a finding of
unconstitutionality was Bakke's implicit substantive constitutional
principle prohibiting racial classifications that inflict excessively
unfair effects on "innocents."311 Wygant involved a challenge to a
local school board policy, established through a collective bargaining
agreement with the teachers' union, that displaced a pure seniority
principle of "last hired, first fired" with one providing for racially
proportionate layoffs.315
After noting that the Court would apply "strict scrutiny" even
though "the challenged [racial] classification operates against a
group that historically has not been subject to governmental
discrimination,"316 Powell determined that because of the ''burden
that [the] preferential layoffs scheme imposes on innocent parties,"
"the layoff provision was not a legally appropriate means of achieving
even a compelling purpose"311 He continued:

While hiring goals impose a diffuse burden, often foreclosing
only one of several opportunities, layoffs impose the entire
burden of achieving racial equality on particular individuals,
often resulting in serious disruption of their lives. That burden
is too intrusive. We therefore hold that, as a means of
accomplishing purposes that otherwise may be legitimate, the
Board's layoff plan is not sufficiently narrowly tailored. Other
less intrusive means of accomplishing similar purposes-such
as the adoption of hiring goals-are available. For these
reasons, the Board's selection of layoffs as the means to

313. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
314. Id. at 280-84.
315. Id. at 270. The provision stated, "In the event that it becomes necessary to
reduce the number of teachers through layoff from employment by the Board, teachers
with most seniority in the district shall be retained, except that at no time will there
be a greater percentage of minority personnel laid off than the current percentage of
minority personnel employed at the time of the layoff." Id.
316. Id. at 273.
317. Id. at 278 (emphasis added).
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accomplish even a valid purpose cannot satisfy the demands of
the Equal Protection Clause.318
Note the import of this passage: Even if the Court were to
determine that racial classifications had not been employed in
pursuit of purposes rooted in racist values or stereotypes-even if the
state were to meet its burden of establishing that it employed racial
classifications for
constitutionally legitimate purposes-the
classification could be struck down based on a judicial determination
that it inflicted excessively unfair effects on "innocents." Powell's
Wygant opinion makes undeniable that which was implicit in Bakke:
the creation of a new substantive constitutional principle, beyond the
proscription of purposes rooted in racism, prohibiting racial
classifications deemed to have excessively unfair effects.319
Powell failed to address the full range of issues relevant for
deriving and defining this putative substantive constitutional
principle. First, he did nothing to derive the constitutional pedigree
of this principle-nothing to indicate whether, in his view, a concern
with the "fairness" of racially disproportionate effects was an
originalist interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, whether he
was employing a particular methodology other than originalism, why
his chosen methodology was appropriate, or why his chosen
methodology generates the concern with unfair effects. With all of
these questions unaddressed and unanswered, the legitimacy of
enforcing a judicial definition of "unfairness" is seriously
questionable as "legislating from the bench."320
Second, Powell failed to define the concept of "fairness" that he
purported to enforce. Why is the injury from losing a job more
significant than that from having one's job application rejected? More
significantly, why is it unconstitutionally unfair for a white job
holder to lose a job because of race-specific layoff policies that were
adopted because of permissible purposes (untainted by racist values
or stereotypes), but not unconstitutionally unfair for a black job
318. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 283-84 (emphasis added).
319. See Chang, Judicial Conservatism, supra note 121, at 821-23.
320. See BORK, supra note 78 at 15-16 (noting that self-proclaimed judicial
conservatives profess abhorrence for "legislating from the bench"); see also United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J .. , concurring); Lopez, 514 U.S.
at 601 (Thomas, J., concurring); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522-27 (1965)
(Black, J., dissenting). The aversion to "legislating from the bench" is, however
selective. Compare Justice Thomas' concern with enforcing the original understanding
of the Commerce Clause in Lopez and Morrison with his concern for enforcing his
personal beliefs about racial discrimination. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("I believe that there is a moral and constitutional equivalence between
laws designed to subjugate a race and those that distribute benefits on the basis of
race in order to foster some current notion of equality.") (citation omitted); see also
Chang, Judicial Conservatism, supra note 121, at 800-17; infra note 466.
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holder to suffer the same loss-the loss of a job-because of a
(permissibly motivated) last hired, first fired principle? Although it is
true, as Powell suggests, that "layoffs impose the entire burden of
achieving racial equality on particular individuals, often resulting in
serious disruption of their lives,"321 seniority-based layoffs of more
recently hired black employees must seriously disrupt their lives as
well.a22
A legislature that chooses to displace traditional seniority
policies toward mitigating the effects of past racial discrimination
has made its own judgment about fairness. What is the judiciallydetermined, constitutionally mandated concept of "fairness"? Why
should that definition of "fairness" supersede the legislature's
different view? Without clear answers to these questions, and apart
from issues of legitimacy, a judge seeking to enforce the "excessively
unfair effects" principle will haphazardly identify issues of
constitutionally significant fact and, therefore, haphazardly fulfill the
adjudicative function of judicial review.
Furthermore, if laws containing racial classifications are to be
measured against a separate substantive constitutional principle
prohibiting excessively unfair effects on "innocents," the Court must
derive and define adjudicative rules tailored to enforcing this new
norm. Should laws with racial classifications be presumed to violate
this principle? Do remedial racial classifications probably have
excessively unfair effects on whites? Is it worse wrongly to uphold a
classification that is excessively unfair than wrongly to invalidate
one that is not excessively unfair? Powell posed none of these
questions. He addressed and answered none of these questions-and
none could have been answered because the substantive definition of
unconstitutional unfairness was neither explicitly defined, nor
derived.
Thus, with the substantive constitutional principle prohibiting
"unfair" effects ill-defined, Justice Powell's Wygant opinion risked
erroneously identifying issues of constitutionally significant fact.
With the appropriate adjudicative rule unaddressed, his opinion
risked erroneously resolving issues of constitutionally significant
fact. The foregoing discussion focused on one of Powell's new
substantive constitutional principles, but is applicable to any
circumstance in which a Justice measures the permissibility of
challenged policies against putative substantive constitutional
principles that are neither explicitly derived nor defined, nor
tethered to adjudicative rules explicitly tailored for their
enforcement.

321.
322.

Wygant, 476 U.S. at 283.
See Chang, Judicial Conservatism, supra note 121, at 794-99.
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Failing Explicitly to Derive and Define New
Substantive Constitutional Principles Undermines
the Political Function for Enforcing Those New
Principles

The creation of constitutional doctrine that fails explicitly to
derive and define substantive constitutional principles undermines
the political function of judicial review by precluding the "due
instruction" of political representatives as to the norms by which
they should feel their discretion constrained. All of the previously
discussed ways in which the political function could be undermined323
are applicable to Justice Powell's opinions in Bakke and Wygant and
their newly-established implicit substantive constitutional principle
prohibiting (permissibly motivated) racial classifications having
excessively unfair effects on "innocents." First, failing to define the
elements of "unfairness" fails to instruct political actors about the
boundaries by which discretion is circumscribed.324 Second, failing to
derive the excessively unfair effects principle through an identified
interpretive methodology is a lost opportunity to reveal it as
interpretive error, and increases the likelihood that conscientious
legislators will be wrongly inhibited from enacting remedial uses of
racial classifications.325 Third, and alternatively, failing to derive the
excessively unfair effects principle through an identified interpretive
methodology is a lost opportunity to reveal it as proper
interpretation, and thereby to reduce the likelihood that less than
conscientious legislators would feel constrained to limit their policy
pursuits within such boundaries
judicial supremacy
notwithstanding .326

D.

The Nature of Federal Legislative Power: Marshall in
McCulloch versus Marshall in Gibbons

Explicitly differentiating the derivation and definition of
substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules can
323. See supra text accompanying notes 183-84.
324. Policymakers were left unguided about a range of issues. What
constitutionally-mandated notion of "fairness" underlies the proposition that it is
worse to lose a job than never to receive it? What constitutionally-mandated notion of
"fairness" supports the view that it is worse for a white worker with more seniority to
lose a job than for a black worker with less seniority (because of the effects of past
racial discrimination) to lose a job? See Chang, Judicial Conservatism, supra note 121,
at 794-99.
325. Cf supra text accompanying note 311 for an example of a politician who
conscientiously sought to limit policy choices within judicially-declared constitutional
mandates.
326. Cf supra text accompanying notes 167-87 for an example of a politician less
than conscientious about responsibilities in relation to judicial supremacy.
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enhance the enforcement of constitutional provisions well beyond the
Equal Protection Clause. Consider the enumerated powers of
Congress. Consider, in particular, Justice Marshall's foundational
efforts to interpret the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause
in McCulloch v. Maryland, and the Commerce Clause in Gibbons v.
Ogden.327
1.

McCulloch and Foundational Ambiguity
a.

Failing Explicitly to Derive and Define Substantive
Constitutional Principles Undermines the
Adjudicative Function
.

Definitional Ambiguity and Identifying Issues of Constitutionally
Significant Fact. In McCulloch v. Maryland,328 Marshall resolved
arguments concerning the definition of Congress' legislative
discretion under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Challenging the
permissibility of legislation creating a national bank, Maryland
argued, first, that the power to create a bank was not expressly
enumerated and, second, that any implied powers provided by the
Necessary and Proper Clause should be interpreted narrowly.329
Indeed, Maryland argued that "necessary" should be construed to
mean "absolutely necessary,"330 defined "as limiting the right to pass
laws for the execution of the granted powers, to such as are
indispensable, and without which the power would be nugatory."331
The federal government conceded that the power to create a bank
was not expressly enumerated, but contended that the implied
powers delegated through the Necessary and Proper Clause should
be interpreted broadly enough to include the discretion to create a
bank,332
Marshall presented his own, much broader interpretation. In
Marshall's view, Congress could choose any means of regulation it
wished, so long as the ends it sought to pursue were authorized
under some enumerated power other than the Necessary and Proper
Clause.333 He said:
[W]e think the sound construction of the constitution must
allow to the national legislature that discretion, with respect to
the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.

22 U.S. 1 (1824).
17 U.S. 316 (1819).
See id. at 412.
Id. at 414-15.
Id. at 413.
Id. at 413-15.
Id. at 418-19.
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execution, which will enable that body to perform the high
duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the
people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but
consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional. 334
Later in his opinion, Marshall articulated much the same idea:
[W]here the law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to
effect any of the objects entrusted to the government, to
undertake here to inquire into the degree of its necessity, would
be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department,
and to tread on legislative ground. This court disclaims all
pretensions to such a power.335
These statements express three essential concepts. First, a law
might be affirmatively prohibited-unconstitutional not on
federalism grounds, but for transgressing affirmative prohibitions,
such as those established in the Bill of Rights. Second, the Necessary
and Proper Clause itself imposes no limits on Congress' discretion.
The choice of means-and any determination about the degree of a
law's necessity-are political questions, not subject to judicial
oversight. Third, and very significant, these statements imply that
the boundaries on congressional discretion under the expressly
enumerated powers (other than the Necessary and Proper Clause)
are to be defined in terms of "ends" or "objects"-purposes-that
Congress is constitutionally authorized to pursue. Thus, implicitly,
Congress' discretion under the Commerce Clause is properly defined
in terms of the limited purposes Congress may pursue. So with the
power to tax, to pay the debts, and all of the other enumerated
powers. "Let the end be legitimate," where a law is "really calculated
to effect any of the objects entrusted to the government," then
Congress' choice of means-so long as not affirmatively prohibitedis a matter of political discretion.336
There are ambiguities in at least the first iteration of principles
defining Congress' discretion under the Necessary and Proper Clause
334. McCulloch, 17 U.S at 421 (emphasis added).
335. Id. at 423. Elsewhere, Marshall articulated the same idea but in negative
terms:
Should congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures prohibited
by the constitution; or should Congress, under the pretext of executing its
powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the
government; it would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case
requiring such a decision come before it, to say that such an act was not the
law of the land.
Id. (emphasis added).
336. Id. at 421, 423 (emphasis added).
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with potentially significant consequences for identifying issues of
relevant fact and fulfilling the adjudicative function.337 Yet,
Marshall's analysis became more fundamentally problematic as he
moved toward his ultimate conclusion that the statute creating the
national bank was not unconstitutional. Having declared that an act
would be impermissible if Congress "under the pretext of executing
its powers, pass[ed] laws for the accomplishment of objects not
entrusted to the government,"338 Marshall's ensuing analysis was
definitionally deficient in two ways.
First, though he suggested that the bank is helpful "in the
prosecution of [the government's] fiscal operations," and "the
administration of our finances," he did not identify the particular
enumerated power(s) under which, in his view, Congress acted to
create the national bank.339 Second, he did not define the purposes
for which Congress may legislate under those particular (unspecified)
enumerated powers.340 Given these unaddressed issues, it was simply

337. Marshall suggests that the means chosen must in some way be "appropriate."
Does he intend this as a judicially-defined element that must be satisfied, apart from
whether Congress acted for a legitimate end? In other words, must the Court make its
own determination of whether the means selected are "appropriate," or is the question
simply whether Congress selected the means in pursuit of a legitimate end? His other
two statements would seem to eschew an independent judicial determination of
"appropriateness," but the ambiguity created by his reference to a requirement of
"appropriate" means in the first statement creates a risk of wrongly identifying issues
of fact in adjudicating federalism challenges to congressional acts. In that first
iteration, Marshall also suggests that the means chosen must be "plainly adapted" to a
legitimate end. See id. at 421. Does he mean to establish judicial standards as to the
efficacy of a chosen means to achieve a legitimate end-and, therefore, to establish
requirements in addition to the legislature's good faith? If so, Marshall is
contemplating a requirement that goes well beyond determining the content and
legitimacy of Congress' purpose. He may be contemplating the possibility that an act of
Congress could be deemed impermissible even if adopted for a legitimate end if, in the
Court's view, the act is not a sufficiently effective means for achieving that end. For
evaluation of such a substantive proposition, see infra note 429. Alternatively, is
requiring that the challenged statute be "plainly adapted" to a legitimate end meant to
establish an adjudicative rule for ascertaining legislative purpose-i.e., a presumption
that Congress acted for a constitutionally unauthorized purpose? Such a notion, ifthat
is what Marshall had in mind, would have been very different from Thayer's
deferential "rule of administration." See supra text accompanying notes 52· 77. If so, as
discussed below, there was no analysis of any kind deriving an (implicit) adjudicative
rule presuming that acts of Congress are unconstitutional for not having been adopted
in pursuit of legitimate ends.
338. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 423.
339. Id. at 422.
340. In other words, now assuming that Congress claims to have acted under the
commerce power to create the bank, what ends, objects, or purposes is Congress
authorized to pursue under the Commerce Clause? Marshall might have defined a
substantive constitutional principle that Congress' discretion under the Commerce
Clause is limited to purposes of promoting interstate commerce-i.e., if (and only if)
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impossible to determine whether Congress acted for permissible
purposes in having created the national bank. By thus failing to
define the applicable substantive constitutional principle for
identifying issues of constitutionally significant fact, Marshall
hamstringed his analysis of the bank's permissibility, and thereby
undermined the adjudicative function.
Deriuational Ambiguity and Adjudicative Legitimacy. Marshall
spent considerable effort discussing his interpretive goal for defining
"necessary," and the interpretive methodology to be employed in
reaching that goal. He said, "[t]his word, then, like others, is used in
various senses; and, in its construction, the subject, the context, [and]
the intention of the person using them, are all to be taken into
view."341 Thus, he endeavored to identify the intent of the
sovereign-the People who chose the word "necessary." "The
government proceeds directly from the people; is 'ordained and
established' in the name of the people."342
Turning to interpretive methods, Marshall suggested various
approaches for identifying the intent of the sovereign People. He
compared the text of the Constitution with that of the Articles of
Confederation as a basis from which to infer the intent of those who
framed and ratified the Necessary and Proper Clause.343 He further

Congress enacted legislation with the purpose of promoting interstate commerce, then
its means of regulation are permissible. Alternatively, he might have determined that
the framers and ratifiers had a more limited view of congressional discretion under the
Commerce Clause, authorizing only legislation adopted for purposes of eliminating
protectionist trade barriers. These different substantive definitions of congressional
power under the Commerce Clause identify different issues of relevant fact that would
have to be resolved in determining the permissibility of the national bank. Judicial
scrutiny of the circumstances under which the bank was rechartered should look very
different, depending on which (if either) of these two ways of defining authorized
purposes under the Commerce Clause Marshall might have adopted. For further
discussion of these purpose-centered definitions of congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause, see infra note 433 and accompanying text.
341. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 415.
342. Id. at 403. This interpretive goal also was implicit in Marbury u. Madison,
where Marshall declared: "That the people have an original right to establish ... such
principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis,
on which the whole American fabric has been erected." 5 U.S. at 176. From this
foundational norm, Marshall's interpretive approach was comprised of a goalidentifying the intent of the framers and ratifiers-and of methodological propositions
as to how that goal is to be fulfilled. One should note that Marshall's rationale for
originalism is not quite applicable for guiding Justices once "the People" who created
the Constitution have passed from the scene. See infra text accompanying notes 468·
72.
343. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 406. In particular, Marshall noted that the Articles
of Confederation declared that the national government possessed only such powers as
were "expressly" delegated, while the Constitution's Tenth Amendment omitted the
word "expressly" in declaring that those powers not delegated to the national
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asserted that the People could not have intended to create a national
government without providing "ample means" for the execution of its
enumerated substantive powers. "The power being given, it is the
interest of the nation to facilitate its execution. It can never be their
interest, and cannot be presumed to have been their intention, to clog
and embarrass its execution, by withholding the most appropriate
means."344
However supportable these propositions about the People's
intent might have been, Marshall's analysis thus far was relevant
only for rejecting Maryland's very narrow interpretation of
"necessary." Beyond this, however, he gave no attention to derivingjustifying-the critical proposition that the People intended to define
Congress' expressly enumerated powers in terms of limited,
authorized purposes.345 This is significant because there were other
ways in which the framers and ratifiers might have chosen to define
the national government's legislative powers. Rather than define
Congress' powers in terms of authorized purposes, they might have
preferred to define such powers in terms of requisite effects.
Alternatively they might have chosen to define such powers in terms
of permitted subjects of regulation-thus rendering Marshall's
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause incorrect.346
Failure to derive-to justify-the proposition that Congress'
expressly enumerated powers are defined in terms of authorized
purposes undermined Marshall's conclusion that the national bank
was not unconstitutional. A substantive constitutional principle
defining Congress' powers in terms of authorized purposes requires
finding very different facts relevant to a challenged statute than
would a principle defining Congress' discretion in terms of requisite
effects, or authorized subjects. Furthermore, correctly finding facts
under an identified principle promises incorrect results if the
principle applied was itself unwarranted. Failing to derive-to
justify-the conceptualization of congressional power in terms of
authorized purposes threatened the legitimacy of any conclusions
reached about the national bank, and about any other congressional

government are reserved to the states. See id. Of course, omitting the word "expressly"
in the Constitution merely confirms that the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution
intended to vest the national government with some measure of implied powers-a
point that Maryland did not contest. The interpretive disagreement between Maryland
and the federal government concerned not whether Congress was vested with implied
powers, but the scope of those implied powers.
344. Id. at 408.
345. Id. at 421-23 (emphasis added). Indeed, he gave little attention to deriving his
own interpretation of the necessary and proper clause as imposing no limits on
Congress' choice of regulatory means. Id.
346. See infra text accompanying notes 356-62, 366- 72.
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statute subsequently challenged, and thereby undermined the
adjudicative function.

***
All of these failings in defining the principles for identifying
issues of constitutionally significant fact about the national bankfailing to specify the enumerated power under which Congress acted,
to define the purposes Congress may pursue under that power, to
derive the proposition that Congress' powers were created in terms of
authorized purposes, and to derive the particular purposes Congress
was authorized to pursue--would have been less likely had Marshall
endeavored to define constitutional doctrine explicitly in terms of
substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules.
Substantive constitutional principles are rules stating limits on
governmental discretion derived from and evoking values deemed to
underlie constitutional text. Their function is to identify issues of
constitutionally significant fact. They must, therefore, be defined
with careful attention to the elements identified, and to the kinds of
fact addressed by each element. Furthermore, to frame a substantive
constitutional principle requires its derivation-by identifying the
values deemed to underlie relevant text, explaining how and why
those values were so deemed, and explaining how the substantive
constitutional principle, as particularly defined, is indeed derived
from and expresses those identified underlying constitutional norms.
b.

Failing Explicitly to Derive and Define Adjudicative
Rules Undermines the Adjudicative Function

Beyond the foregoing shortcomings in deriving and defining the
substantive constitutional principles relevant for adjudicating the
bank's permissibility, Marshall failed to derive and define
adjudicative rules with respect to which issues of constitutionally
significant fact were to be resolved. Now assuming that McCulloch's
(inadequately
derived
and
defined)
implicit
substantive
constitutional principles provide the yardstick for identifying the
issues of constitutionally significant fact, should congressional acts,
when challenged, be presumed to have been enacted for
constitutionally authorized purposes (and, therefore, presumed
permissible) or be presumed to have been enacted for constitutionally
unauthorized purposes (and, therefore, presumed impermissible)?
What evidence should be relevant from which to infer Congress'
legislative objectives? What inferences from what evidence should be
permissible? What, if any, inferences from what evidence should be
mandatory? Because Marshall did not begin to address these issues,
reliably determining whether the national bank was adopted because
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of authorized purposes under some enumerated power was gravely
undermined.347
c.

Failing Explicitly to Derive and Define Substantive
Constitutional Principles and Adjudicative Rules
Undermines the Political Function

It should be evident that McCulloch's ambiguities in defining
substantive constitutional principles would impede not only the
Court's performance of the adjudicative function, but also the "due
instruction" of political actors. The McCulloch opinion informed
Congress that its statutes were to be judged by the purposes for
which they were enacted,348 but gave no indication of the purposes for
which Congress was authorized to act under any enumerated power.
Further discussion of the political function will be deferred until
analysis of Gibbons and its progeny,349 for the doctrines developed in
these cases involved worse than the ambiguity that results from
doctrine that is unclear. These cases undermined both the
adjudicative and the political functions with implicit substantive
constitutional principles that were at war with each other.

347. Indeed, it was impossible to determine whether the Bank should be presumed
permissible or impermissible without having first identified the power(s) under which
Congress acted, and without having defined (and derived) the particular purposes
(ends or objects) that Congress was authorized to pursue under such power(s). As
previously suggested, one cannot effectively analyze the burden of persuasionwhether pursuant to a probabilistic analysis or a normative analysis-without a
clearly defined substantive constitutional principle. See supra text accompanying notes
142-57, 237-40, 313-23. If one were to pursue a probabilistic rationale for allocating
the adjudicative presumption, determining whether a given category of statute
probably does, or does not, violate the applicable substantive constitutional principle
requires focusing with particularity on the elements of the substantive constitutional
principle at issue. Thus, for example, determining whether Congress probably enacted
the Bank legislation for a constitutionally authorized purpose requires defining those
purposes that are authorized. If one were to pursue a normative rationale for
allocating the adjudicative presumption, one also would have to identify the content of
the constitutional norms limiting (and authorizing) congressional discretion in order to
determine whether an erroneous invalidation would be worse than an erroneous
failure to invalidate the challenged Bank legislation. Thus, the failure to derive and
define substantive constitutional principles undermined the adjudicative function not
only through the absence of clear rules for effectively identifying issues of relevant
fact, but also by having precluded the derivation and definition of adjudicative rules
for effectively resolving issues of relevant fact.
348. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421-24.
349. See infra text accompanying notes at 350-82.
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Building on McCulloch's Substantive Ambiguity:
Gibbons' Schizophrenia and its Bipolar Progeny

Gibbons v. Ogden350 involved a dispute over the operation of
steam vessels in the Hudson River from the shores of New Jersey to
those of New York. New York had granted a monopoly to Ogden to
operate vessels in its waters.351 Congress had granted a license to
Gibbons to operate vessels between New Jersey and New York,
including within New York's waters.352 If Gibbons' license was a valid
exercise of federal power, it would preempt Ogden's monopoly based
on New York law. Ogden argued that Congress lacked discretion
under the Commerce Clause to grant a license to operate a vessel
within New York's territorial waters, because navigation within a
state's territorial waters does not qualify as "commerce among the
several states."353
Referring to the Commerce Clause, Marshall asked, "What is
this power?"
This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in
itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges
no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution.
These are expressed in plain terms, and do not affect the
questions which arise in this case, or which have been discussed
at the bar. If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of
Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to
those objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations,
and among the several States, is vested in Congress as
absolutely as it would be in a single government, having in its
constitution the same restrictions on the exercise of the power
as are found in the constitution of the United States. The
wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the
people, and the influence which their constituents possess at
elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as that, for
example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they
have relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are the
restraints on which the people must often rely solely, in all
representative governments.354
Note that these elements defining the extent, and the limits, of
Congress' delegated powers are much the same as those Marshall
developed in McCulloch.355 First, he suggests that the Constitution
350. 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
351. Id. at 7.
352. See id.
353. Id. at 186·87.
354. Id. at 196-97.
355. See supra text accompanying notes 334-40. Toward defining Congress'
discretion under the Commerce Clause in Gibbons, Marshall addressed interpretive
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imposes affirmative limits on Congress' discretion, apart from the
boundaries of delegated powers. As in McCulloch, these affirmative
limits, such as those imposed by the first eight amendments, did "not
affect the questions" presented in Gibbons. Second, he suggests that
Congress' legislative powers are "limited to specified objects"-that
Congress is authorized to legislate in the pursuit of particular ends,
objects, or purposes. Third, as he did in McCulloch, he suggests that
Congress' regulatory discretion is plenary, so long as it acts in
pursuit of authorized purposes.
Yet, the ambiguities left in McCulloch were repeated in Gibbons.
Most significantly, what purpose(s) may Congress pursue under the
Commerce Clause? Marshall never touched this issue.356
Compounding these ambiguities, earlier portions of Marshall's
Gibbons opinion implied an entirely different framework for defining
the scope of the commerce power. Indeed, Marshall began his
analysis of Congress' discretion under the Commerce Clause by
considering whether ship navigation falls within the subject of
commerce.
The subject to be regulated is commerce; and our constitution
being, as was aptly said at the bar, one of enumeration, and not
of definition, to ascertain the extent of the power, it becomes
necessary to settle the meaning of the word .... If commerce
does not include navigation, the government of the Union has no
direct power over that subject, and can make no law prescribing
what shall constitute American vessels, or requiring that they
shall be navigated by American seamen. All America
understands, and has uniformly understood, the word
"commerce," to comprehend navigation. The convention must
have used the word in that sense, because all have understood
it in that sense; and the attempt to restrict it comes too late.357

goals and methods as he had with respect to the necessary and proper clause in
McCulloch. As in McCulloch, Marshall suggests the goal of identifying the intent of
"the enlightened patriots who framed our constitution, and the people who adopted
it ...." Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 188. Furthermore, he again suggests a premise with
respect to which he seeks to infer the intent of these framers and ratifiers-that they
used words in the Constitution "in their natural sense." Id.
356. Secondary ambiguities include the following questions: To determine whether
Congress acted for legitimate ends, does it matter if one member voted for illegitimate
ends; or if most members did not vote for legitimate ends; or if the act would not have
been enacted but for the consideration of legitimate ends? These are ambiguities about
identifying those issues of relevant fact that should be resolved in the adjudicative
process. For a discussion of willful ambiguity, see supra text accompanying notes 11619.
357.

Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 189-90 (emphasis added).
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Marshall pursues a similar subject-centered inquiry into whether the
navigation of vessels within a state's waters is encompassed by
"commerce among the several states."
The subject to which the power is next applied, is to commerce
"among the several States" ... It is not intended to say that
these words comprehend that commerce, which is completely
internal . . . and which does not extend to or affect other
States.358
There is a fundamental inconsistency between this part of
Marshall's opinion, concerned with defining "commerce" and "among
the several states" as subjects of regulation,359 and the later part of
his opinion, discussed above, concerned with defining the power "to
regulate."360 Each of these two different approaches would require
identifying very different issues of fact in determining whether
particular acts of Congress are permissible. The latter approach is
concerned with facts indicative of legislative purpose; the former is
concerned with facts indicative of the nature of the things regulated.
Both approaches cannot be correct. If, indeed, as Marshall had
suggested in McCulloch, and in the latter part of Gibbons defining
the power "to regulate," Congress may choose any means of
regulation in pursuit of an authorized end,361 the inquiry into
whether "navigation" qualifies as commerce would be irrelevant.
Marshall's assertion, above, that "[if] commerce does not include
navigation, the government of the Union has no direct power over
that subject" would be wrong.362
This schizophrenia in Marshall's substantive conceptualization
of federal legislative power in Gibbons-which emanated at least in
part from his failure to attend to the explicit derivation and

358. Id. at 194 (emphasis added).
359. Id.
360. Id. at 196-97.
361. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421, 423; Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196-97.
362. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 190 (emphasis added). It is somewhat unclear what
Marshall means by "direct" power over navigation. One might interpret the statement
as distinguishing between power derived from the Commerce Clause itself as "direct"
power, in contrast with power derived from the necessary and proper clause in
conjunction with the Commerce Clause as other than "direct." Yet, such an
interpretation of Marshall's meaning is not plausible, because Marshall follows this
point about "direct" power with the unqualified assertion that if "commerce" does not
include navigation, Congress could "make no law" regulating vessels or seamen. Id.
This unqualified proposition that Congress could make no such law had to have
accounted for whatever discretion Congress has under the necessary and proper
clause. This confirms that in this portion of Gibbons, Marshall's view of Congress'
discretion under the Commerce Clause is the product of an approach very different
from that developed in McCulloch and in the later, purpose-centered portion of
Gibbons.
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definition of both substantive constitutional principles and
adjudicative rules in McCulloch363-had significant consequences in
the decades to come. Consider Champion v. Ames364 (The Lottery
Case) and Hammer v. Dagenhart365 (The Child Labor Case).
Champion involved a challenge to a congressional act that
criminalized the interstate shipment of lottery tickets.366 Champion
argued that the act was unconstitutional because "the carrying of
lottery tickets from one state to another ... does not constitute ...
commerce among the states."367 The government argued "that the
carrying of lottery tickets from one state to another is commerce
which Congress may regulate."368 Note that both parties made
arguments that eschewed the McCulloch and latter-Gibbons
concept369 of federal legislative power defined in terms of authorized
purposes. Instead, both parties made arguments that employed the
earlier Gibbons conceptualization of congressional power in terms of
whether Congress regulated an authorized subject.
Justice Fuller, in dissent, did rely on the McCulloch and the
latter Gibbons perspective.
[A]n act prohibiting the carriage of lottery matter would be
necessary and proper to the execution of a power to suppress
lotteries; but that power belongs to the states and not to
Congress. To hold that Congress has general police power
would be to hold that it may accomplish objects not entrusted to
the General Government, and to defeat the operation of the
[Tenth] Amendment .... 370
Fuller seems concerned about Congress' objects or purposes, and
seems to suppose that the commerce power does not vest Congress
with a "general police power" to pursue moralistic purposes.
In response for the majority, Justice Harlan suggested that so
long as Congress regulated the subject of interstate commerce, it
could pursue any purpose.
We have said that the carrying from State to State of lottery
tickets constitutes interstate commerce, and that the regulation
of such commerce is within the power of Congress under the
Constitution .... If a state, when considering legislation for the
suppression of lotteries within its own limits, may properly take
into view the evils that inhere in the raising of money, in that
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.

See supra text accompanying notes 329-47.
188 U.S. 321 (1903).
247 U.S. 251 (1918).
See generally Champion, 188 U.S. 321.
Id. at 344.
Id. at 345.
See supra text accompanying notes 350-56.
Champion, 188 U.S. at 365 (Fuller, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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mode, why may not Congress, invested with the power to
regulate commerce among the several States, provide that such
commerce shall not be polluted by the carrying of lottery tickets
from one State to another? In this connection it must not be
forgotten that the power of Congress to regulate commerce
among the States is plenary, is complete in itself, and is subject
to no limitations except such as may be found in the
Constitution. 371
Note that in the last sentence above, Harlan paraphrases the portion
of Marshall's Gibbons opinion that defined Congress' powers in terms
of unlimited discretion to choose means in pursuit of limited,
authorized ends. Highly significant, however, was Harlan's omission
of Gibbons' limiting principle: Congress' discretion, "though limited to
specified objects, is plenary as to those objects."372
In Hammer, the Court considered a challenge to a congressional
act that prohibited the interstate shipment of goods produced by
children of less than a minimum age who worked for less than a
minimum wage or for more than maximum hours.373 In a formal
sense, the subject of regulation in Hammer was just as much
interstate commerce per se as was the regulated subject in
Champion-interstate shipment was prohibited by the law
challenged in each case. In Hammer, however, the subject of
regulation was not dispositive.
The thing intended to be accomplished by this statute is the
denial of the facilities of interstate commerce to those
manufacturers in the States who employ children within the
prohibited ages. The act in its effect does not regulate
transportation among the States, but aims to standardize the
ages at which children may be employed in mining and
manufacturing within the States .... There is no power vested
in Congress to require the States to exercise their police power
so as to prevent possible unfair competition .... The grant of
power to Congress over the subject of interstate commerce was
to enable it to regulate such commerce, and not to give it
371. Id. at 355-56 (majority opinion).
372. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 197 (emphasis added). There is, of course, a certain
ambiguity in this statement from Gibbons. "Objects," in the sense of the purposes
Congress is authorized to pursue under its enumerated powers, are not specified in the
Constitution, but would have to be identified through some interpretive inference. Yet,
it also is true that the subjects Congress may regulate are not specified in the sense
suggested in the earlier part of Gibbons-that because, in Marshall's view, "commerce"
includes the unspecified category of "navigation," Congress may regulate the licensing
of steam vessels. Furthermore, the subjects Congress may regulate also are not
specified in the sense suggested by Marshall's definition of Congress' discretion in
McCulloch and in the latter part of Gibbons. Rather, from that perspective, Congress
could regulate any subject, so long as it pursued authorized objects.
373. See Hammer, 247 U.S. at 268 n.1.
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authority to control the States in their exercise of the police
power over local trade and manufacture.374
Though reference to the effect of the act makes Justice Day's
conceptualization of Commerce Clause discretion ambiguous, the
broader thrust of these passages suggests a concern with the
impermissibility of Congress' purpose-that Congress "aim[ed] to
standardize" the age at which children could be employed; that
Congress sought "to require the States to exercise their police power
so as to prevent possible unfair competition;" that Congress sought
"to control the states in their exercise of the police power ...."375 In
Hammer, it did not matter that the subject regulated was interstate
shipment-what mattered was Congress' purpose. In Champion, it
did not matter that Congress was aiming at the moral evils of selling
and buying lottery tickets-what mattered was that the subject
regulated was interstate shipment. Thus, Hammer and Champion
enforced diametrically opposed (implicit) substantive constitutional
principles defining congressional discretion under the Commerce
Clause.376
374. Id. at 271-74 (emphasis added).
375. Id. at 272-74. Although the Hammer Court determined that Congress "aim[ed]
to standardize" child labor policy through the Child Labor Act, it failed to define the
substantive standard against which that purpose was measured-it failed to define
the substantive constitutional principles identifying those particular purposes that
Congress may pursue under the Commerce Clause. More than this, the Hammer Court
gave no indication of the adjudicative rules with respect to which it made the factual
determination that the Child Labor Act was enacted for illegitimate purposes. Did the
government bear the burden to show that Congress acted for constitutionally
authorized purposes, or did the challenger bear the burden to show the opposite? Why?
What evidence of legislative intent was relevant? What inferences from what evidence
were permissible, or mandatory, and why?
376. Justice Day feebly tried to distinguish the facts of Hammer from those of
Champion, and thereby denied the fundamental inconsistency of the implicit
substantive constitutional principles applied in each case. Day suggested, first, that
unlike lottery tickets, the goods produced by children are intrinsically harmless.
Hammer, 247 U.S.at 272. Yet, a lottery ticket is simply a piece of paper which, one
would suppose, is no more intrinsically harmful than is a shirt stitched together by a
child. It is, of course, the use of a lottery ticket-its sale or purchase-that arguably is
harmful, as it is the manufacture of the shirt by children that involves social harm. In
both circumstances, it is human activity in relation to intrinsically harmless products
that provides the focus of legislative concern.
Day's second basis for purportedly distinguishing the statute upheld in Champion
from that invalidated in Hammer somewhat contradicts the first, and is no more
tenable. Day suggested that for lottery tickets, "the use of interstate transportation
was necessary to the accomplishment of harmful results . . . . [A]lthough the power
over interstate transportation was to regulate, that could only be accomplished by
prohibiting the use of the facilities of interstate commerce to effect the evil intended.
This element is wanting [in regulating the interstate shipment of goods produced by
children]." Id. at 271. Of course, if the interstate shipment of lottery tickets was
necessary to effect the evil posed by lottery tickets, it follows that it is their sale or
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***
Causes of Doctrinal Incoherence. McCulloch's ambiguity begat
Gibbons' internal inconsistency; Gibbons' internal inconsistency
begat the contradictory (implicit) substantive constitutional
principles applied in Champion and Hammer. To have expressly
derived and defined substantive constitutional principles in
McCulloch would have required Marshall to designate as substantive
constitutional principles the propositions that legislation enacted "for
the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government" is
unconstitutional; and that legislation is permissible if "really
calculated to effect any of the objects entrusted to the government,"
regardless of the means of regulation.377
To have justified the purpose-centered approach as a substantive
constitutional principle would have required addressing a range of
questions. Why did the sovereign People choose to define the power
"to regulate Commerce ... among the several states," or "to establish
an uniform Rule of naturalization,"378 in terms of authorized
purposes? What values, what competing values, underlay the
People's creation of these limited powers and their definition of these
powers in terms of authorized purposes? What other ways for
defining the boundaries of these expressly enumerated powers might
they have chosen?379 What values could underlie these alternative
modes of defining national legislative power, and why are such
values not plausibly those from which the sovereign People created
Congress' legislative powers? And if, indeed, the sovereign People did
choose to define the enumerated powers in terms of authorized
purposes, what particular purposes did they authorize Congress to
pursue when using the power under which the Bank was created,
and why?

purchase that is harmful, rather than anything intrinsic in the pieces of paper. Beyond
this, however much this point undermines Day's first basis for distinguishing the
cases, it fails to establish a second basis for distinguishing lottery tickets from goods
produced by children. As the use of interstate transportation was necessary to achieve
harmful results with lottery tickets, so the interstate shipment of goods produced by
children was necessary to reach an out-of-state demand for the goods, which increased
the occasion for employing more children. Thus, if the child labor statute could be
understood as "aiming at" local production, so the lottery statute could be understood
as "aiming at" local purchase.
377. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 423.
378. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
379. Why not have chosen to define the powers in terms of required regulatory
effects, rather than legislative purposes? Why not have chosen to define the power in
terms of authorized subjects, rather than authorized objects? See supra text
accompanying notes 356- 72.
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To have addressed the normative roots and implications of a
putative substantive constitutional principle would have required
acknowledging definitional ambiguity, and either clarifying what was
ambiguous, or explaining why the ambiguity is retained as a matter
of judicial choice. Furthermore, to have explicitly derived and defined
adjudicative rules in McCulloch would have required closer attention
to defining the substantive conception of federal legislative power
that Marshall had constructed. Determining whether a challenged
statute should be presumed permissible or impermissible, from
either a probabilistic or a normative perspective, requires identifying
with particularity the elements of the substantive constitutional
principle with respect to which probabilities or normative hierarchies
are to be determined.380
Had there been in Gibbons an explicit focus on the discrete
functions of substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative
rules, and the explicit derivation and definition of each, Marshall
would have been more likely to recognize, and ultimately to avoid
articulating, the two inconsistent substantive conceptualizations of
Congress' discretion. He more likely could have considered whether it
makes more sense to conclude that the sovereign People chose to
frame congressional discretion in terms of subjects it may regulate,
or in terms of objects it may pursue, or in some other terms entirely.
Thus, he would have been more likely to acknowledge (or to avoid
framing) doctrine suggesting simultaneously that Congress'
discretion is limited in terms of the subjects it may regulate and that
Congress has unbounded discretion to choose the means of
regulation-the subjects of regulation-so long as it has pursued an
authorized end. How could it be that Congress lacks power to
regulate a subject that does not qualify as "commerce" (as Marshall
suggested that navigation could not be regulated unless it qualifies
as "commerce") if, indeed, Congress has plenary discretion to choose
the means of regulation when acting in pursuit of authorized ends?
Had this all occurred in Gibbons, the divergent approaches of
Champion and Hammer would not each have had a plausible
precedential pedigree. Justice Harlan less likely could have so
selectively used Marshall's Gibbons language in Champion, because
Marshall more likely would have clearly derived and defined doctrine
in Gibbons that was concerned either with authorized subjects of
regulation, or authorized objects of regulation, but not both.381
380. One cannot conduct an effective analysis about how to allocate the burden of
persuasion-whether with respect to a probabilistic analysis or a normative analysiswithout a clearly defined substantive constitutional principle. See supra text
accompanying notes 142-57, 237-40, 313-23, 347.
381. Not only did Harlan fail to acknowledge that his definition of congressional
power was inconsistent with McCulloch, and with at least that portion of Gibbons
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Champion might well have been decided very differently, based on
the principle (on which Fuller relied in dissent) that Congress acts
impermissibly when it pursues purposes not constitutionally
authorized.
Consequences of Doctrinal Incoherence for the Adjudicative and
Political Functions. A court might happen to reach the same result in
a case whether by flipping a coin or by the careful derivation,
definition, and application of legal principle to relevant facts. Though
the result in Gibbons might not have been different had Marshall
fully pursued the implications of McCulloch's proposition that
Congress may regulate any subject so long as it acts for authorized
objects,3s2 the incoherence of the Gibbons opinion undermined the
adjudicative function in Champion and Hammer. Champion's
doctrine applied to Hammer's facts should have upheld the
challenged regulation, as the dissent argued. Hammer's principle, if
applied by the majority in Champion, should have invalidated that
regulation. The availability of contradictory doctrine, both of which
cannot be correct, must undermine the adjudicative function, much
in the way that deciding constitutional cases by flipping a coin would.
Furthermore, just as ambiguous-or worse, contradictoryconstitutional doctrine must undermine the adjudicative function by
failing to guide courts effectively, such flawed doctrine must
undermine the political function of judicial review in failing to guide
legislators effectively. Legislators only could have been confused by
judicial opinions suggesting in one case (Champion) that Congress
may pursue any purpose, so long as the subject regulated is
interstate commerce, and suggesting in another case (Hammer) that
Congress may not regulate under the Commerce Clause if its purpose
is not authorized, even if the subject regulated is interstate
commerce. Such incoherent doctrine cannot "duly instruct')··legislators as to the boundaries of their discretion. Embracing the
proposition that constitutional doctrine must be structured as is legal
doctrine in other areas-explicitly comprised of substantive rules and
adjudicative rules, explicitly recognizing the nature and functions of
each kind of rule, and explicitly deriving and defining each kind of
rule-can reduce the risks of ambiguous, inconsistent, and
misleading legal doctrine, unfit to perform the adjudicative and
political functions that judicial review exists to serve.

concerned with defining "to regulate" in the Commerce Clause; he also failed even to
address the range of issues relevant to deriving substantive constitutional principles.
For discussion of issues relevant for deriving substantive constitutional principles, see
infra text accompanying notes 466-77.
382. For discussion of McCulloch's purpose-centered definition of Congress'
discretion, see supra text accompanying notes 334-46.
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The New Deal Revolution in Commerce Clause Doctrine and
the Modern Reaction: Explicitly Deriving and Defining
Substantive Constitutional Principles and Adjudicative
Rules Could Enhance Doctrinal Clarity and Legitimacy

Champion and Hammer adjudicated challenges to congressional
acts that regulated the interstate shipment of goods and, therefore,
that could be seen as regulating interstate commerce itself. In the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Court developed
complex and contradictory doctrines for determining the
permissibility of federal statutes regulating subjects that did not
qualify as interstate commerce per se--either because not commerce
or not interstate. The Court determined that if the subject regulated
is not itself interstate commerce, then Congress could regulate only if
the thing regulated "directly" affects interstate commerce.383 By the
time of challenges to early New Deal legislation, the Court defined
"direct effects" as those caused "proximately" by the thing regulated,
without "an efficient intervening agency or condition."384 It
emphasized that the magnitude of the effect on interstate commerce
caused by the subject Congress regulates was irrelevant to the issue
of whether that subject "directly'' affects interstate commerce.385
So much could be said about this pre-New Deal line of cases,
informed by the distinction between substantive constitutional
principles and adjudicative rules. Rather than spend more time with
these cases, however, it would be equally revealing, and more
relevant to evaluating contemporary constitutional doctrine, to look
closely at the case in which the Court departed from the doctrinal
focus on "direct" versus "indirect" effects, and to examine how the
Court's failure in that case to distinguish between substantive
constitutional principles and adjudicative rules undermined the
adjudicative and political functions of judicial review.

383. See, e.g., Carter, 298 U.S. at 304. Noting that the regulation of wages and
hours "primarily falls upon production and not upon commerce," and that "the
production of every commodity intended for interstate sale and transportation has
some effect on interstate commerce," the Court turned to "the final and decisive
inquiry," i.e., "whether here that effect is direct." Id. at 307.
384. Id. This was an apparent importation into constitutional law from prevailing
tort notions of proximate cause. See, e.g., In re Polemis, (1921] 3 L.J.K.B. 560 (Eng.
EWCA (Crim)) (finding defendant in negligence action liable only for those harms
"directly" caused by his negligence, where "direct" entails the absence of causal events
intervening between defendant's negligence and plaintiffs injury).
385. Carter, 298 U.S. at 308 ("[T]he extent of the effect bears no logical relation to
its character. The distinction between a direct and indirect effect turns, not upon the
magnitude of either the cause or the effect, but entirely upon the manner in which the
effect has been brought about.").
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NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel as Counterpoint

In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel,386 the Court considered a
challenge to the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. The Act
prohibited employers from retaliating against employees for
engaging in union organizing activities. Pursuant to the Act, the
National Labor Relations Board found that the Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corporation had impermissibly fired employees. The Board
ordered the company to reinstate the employees, and to pay their
back wages.387 In challenging this order, the company relied on
arguments that were irrefutable under the most recently decided
cases38B--that the subject regulated was not interstate commerce per
se; that firing employees could have only an indirect effect on
interstate commerce; and that the exercise of federal power was,
therefore, unconstitutional.389 The government attempted to rely on
the less recently decided "stream of commerce" line of cases.390
The Analysis the Court did Pursue. The Court determined that
neither line of precedent was controlling, and moved-more
implicitly than explicitly-toward a new definition of congressional
power under the Commerce Clause.
We do not find it necessary to determine whether these features
of defendant's business dispose of the asserted analogy to the
"stream of commerce" cases ... The congressional authority to
protect interstate commerce from burdens and obstructions is
not limited to transactions which can be deemed to be an
essential part of a "flow" of interstate or foreign commerce ....
The fundamental principle is that the power to regulate
commerce is the power to enact "all appropriate legislation" for
its "protection or advancement;" to adopt measures "to promote
its growth and insure its safety;" "to foster, protect, control, and
restrain." That power is plenary and may be exerted to protect
interstate commerce "no matter what the source of the dangers
which threaten it." Although activities may be intrastate in
character when separately considered, if they have such a close
and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their
386.
387.
388.

301 U.S. 1 (1937).

Id. at 22.
See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. u. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Carter
u. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
389. See Jones, 301 U.S. at 34. Firing employees for union organizing activity could
affect interstate commerce only through a chain of causation involving several
intervening agencies-including the decision to strike by fellow employees; the
resulting cessation of producing goods; the resulting cessation of shipping goods; and
the resulting reduction of goods purchased in other states. Thus, firing employees for
engaging in union activities could affect interstate commerce only indirectly under
Carter. See supra text accompanying notes 383·85.
390. See Jones, 301 U.S. at 34-36.
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control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce
from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the
power to exercise that control .... The question is necessarily
one of degree.391
Here, the Court suggests that under the Commerce Clause,
Congress has the power "to protect interstate commerce from
burdens and obstructions."392 Justice Hughes elaborates by declaring
"the fundamental principle" defining Congress' power, and
articulates that "fundamental principle" in terms that imply a
reversion to the purpose-centered definition of congressional power
born in McCulloch, distracted in Gibbons, and implicitly-if
temporarily-recaptured in Hammer.393 Congress has the power to
enact all appropriate legislation regarding interstate commerce "for
its protection or advancement."394 Thereafter, Hughes describes the
power in terms of infinitive verbs: Congress may adopt measures "to
promote its growth and ensure its safety .... "395 Further implying an
approach consistent with that in McCulloch, the Court declared that
the power it had just sketched-the power to legislate for the
protection or advancement of interstate commerce-is plenary, and
may be exercised regardless of the source of the dangers that
Congress seeks to address. In other words, but still only implicitly,
Congress may pursue any means of regulation-may regulate any
subject-so long as its purpose is to protect or to promote interstate
commerce.
Yet, this "fundamental principle" is not the only principle
implied by Justice Hughes' opinion. In addition, Hughes seems to
view as significant the effects of the regulated activities on interstate
commerce, but to examine such effects in a way that departed from
Carter's focus on causal chains. Hughes declared that "it is the effect
upon commerce, not the source of the injury, which is the
criterion."396 Though this statement leaves ambiguities as to what
aspects of "the effect" the Court deemed significant, the ambiguities
were mitigated when the Court examined the facts of the case-the
"effects of the unfair labor practices."397 "In view of respondent's farflung activities, it is idle to say that the effect upon interstate
commerce would be indirect or remote. It is obvious that it would be

391. Id. at 36-37 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
392. Id. at 36.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 37 (quoting The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 564 (1870)).
395. Id. (quoting County of Mobil v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 696-97 (1880)).
396. Jones, 301 U.S. at 37 (quoting Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1,
51 (1912)).
397. Id. at 41.
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immediate and might be catastrophic."398 Here is implied, at least, a
concern with the magnitude of effects on interstate commerceimplying a principle that if the subject regulated could have a
substantial (or catastrophic) effect on interstate commerce, then
Congress may regulate that subject under Commerce Clause.399
It should be obvious that Jones' two principles each make very
different issues of fact constitutionally dispositive. Under the firstthe "fundamental principle" concerned with the purposes for enacting
the challenged legislation-the Court would need to make
determinations as to Congress' beliefs about the facts of the world,
and Congress' purposes in responding to those beliefs. Under the
second, concerned with the effects of the subject regulated on
interstate commerce, the Court would need to make determinations
as to its beliefs about the facts of the world-the Court's judgments
about the effects of the regulated activity on interstate commerce.
Thus, these two different principles in Jones would provide very
different bases for adjudicating challenges to congressional
legislation.
Which is a more plausibly "correct" interpretation of the
Commerce Clause? Hughes made even less effort to derive as
"correct" either the purpose-centered fundamental principle, or the
new magnitude-oriented effects principle, than he did to define either
principle with precision.400 Thus, the Jones opinion left nearly as
much ambiguity as to the substantive constitutional principles
defining Congress' Commerce Clause discretion as did Marshall's
opinion in Gibbons.401
Elements of an Analysis the Court Should Have Pursued. A
substantive constitutional principle states limits on governmental
discretion derived from and evoking values deemed to underlie

398. Id.
399. The foregoing explication of Hughes' two principles glosses over the kinds of
ambiguity, explored above in other doctrinal contexts, resulting from failing to
structure constitutional doctrine explicitly in terms of substantive constitutional
principles and adjudicative rules. Though "the fundamental principle" was framed
implicitly as concerned with legislative purpose, it might have been understood to be
concerned with the effect of legislation. These two different meanings would hinge on
the difference between defining Congress' power as that of enacting legislation to
promote interstate commerce, versus enacting legislation that promotes interstate
commerce. So understood, the fundamental principle would have an interesting
relationship to the second principle-which was concerned with the degree of the effect
of the regulated activity on interstate commerce. For an examination of how the
purpose-oriented "fundamental principle" relates to this second principle, see infra
text accompanying notes 409-11.
400. Rather, the principles were asserted simply as if they were ordained by past
decisions. See Jones, 301 U.S. at 36-37.
401. See supra text accompanying notes 350-62.
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constitutional text.402 Had he explicitly sought to define Congress'
discretion in such terms, Hughes would have been more likely to
consider whether a purpose-centered definition of congressional
authority is, indeed, rooted in values underlying the Commerce
Clause.403 When form is explicitly connected to content and context,
doctrinal meaning must be more carefully defined. Further
development of an analysis the Court might have pursued toward
deriving-legitimizing-the substantive constitutional principles
from which twentieth century Commerce Clause doctrine is
comprised will be deferred until the discussion of United States v.
Darby, 404 in the next section. 405
Beyond this, Hughes neglected entirely the derivation and
definition of the foundational adjudicative rule allocating the burden
of persuasion. Should laws like the NLRA have been presumed
impermissible, or presumed permissible? Why? Let us briefly
consider how the analysis ought to have proceeded.
As previously suggested, one might allocate the burden of
persuasion from a probabilistic perspective or a normative
perspective.406 Whichever perspective one chooses, deriving and
defining the adjudicative presumption requires clearly identifying
the applicable substantive constitutional principle with respect to
which probabilities or normative hierarchies are to be determined.401
Assume, for the sake of discussion, a substantive constitutional
principle declaring that if (and only if) Congress pursues a purpose of
protecting or promoting interstate commerce, then it has plenary
discretion to choose the means of regulation, and has acted
402. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
403. Does the specific proposition that Congress may pursue any regulatory means
(not otherwise prohibited) so long as its purpose is to promote or protect interstate
commerce emanate from and evoke values underlying the Commerce Clause? How and
why? If Congress does regulate a subject that qualifies as interstate commerce per se,
is its discretion still restricted to pursue only the authorized purpose of promoting
interstate commerce? Why? Alternatively, does defining Congress' discretion in terms
of the effects of the regulated activity on interstate commerce emanate from and evoke
values underlying the Commerce Clause? If so, should a court second-guess a
legislative determination that disparate bargaining power between employers and
employees depresses the price of labor, which undermines demand, which undermines
production, which undermines interstate commerce? Should Congress have the right
to pursue its view of social and economic facts relevant to the creation of economic
policy, or should courts have priority to substitute their views of the facts of the world?
Does judicial review only of Congress' bona fides, or of the correctness of Congress'
judgment as well, better reflect the constitutional allocation of institutional
responsibilities between Court and Congress?
404. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
405. See infra text accompanying notes 426-35.
406. See supra text accompanying notes 142-57.
407. See supra text accompanying notes 142-57, 237-40, 313-23, 347.
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permissibly. How could Justice Hughes have framed an analysis of
whether Congress should be presumed to have enacted the National
Labor Relations Act for such permissible purposes?
From a probabilistic perspective, deriving and defining the
adjudicative presumption depends on identifying categorical
circumstances about the statute in question that suggest a
probability of constitutionality, or unconstitutionality. For example,
if one can identify a category of statute that includes the National
Labor Relations Act, within which a majority would seem to have
been enacted to protect or promote interstate commerce, then there is
a basis to presume that the Act is permissible, and to place the
burden on the challenger to prove that it is among the impermissible
minority within that category.4os
From a normative perspective, deriving and defining an
appropriate adjudicative presumption would depend first, on
identifying what (of constitutional magnitude) would be lost if the
Court were to uphold an unconstitutional act, or invalidate a
permissible act; and second, on determining which constitutional loss
is more significant, and more to be avoided.409 In Jones, the
erroneous invalidation of the NLRA would undermine the
constitutional norm that the national electorate's representatives
have the right to make policy within the boundaries of their
constitutionally delegated authority-in particular, the right to make
policy to protect and promote interstate commerce. The erroneous
failure to invalidate the NLRA would intrude on the constitutional
norm that the national government is a limited government of
enumerated powers, and is limited toward protecting the states'
discretion to govern themselves without unauthorized federal
interference.
Finally, constructing doctrine that explicitly differentiates the
derivation and definition of substantive constitutional principles and
adjudicative rules could have facilitated additional clarifying
refinements in Jones. Recognizing the two kinds of rule would have
supported exploring whether there was some relationship between
the "fundamental principle,'' apparently concerned with whether
Congress acted with a purpose "to protect or to promote" interstate
commerce, and that other principle, apparently concerned with the
408. Conversely, if one can identify a category of statute that includes the National
Labor Relations Act, within which most would seem not to have been enacted to
protect or promote interstate commerce, then there is a basis to presume that the Act
is impermissible and to place the burden on the government to prove that it is among
the permissible minority within that category. For foundational discussion on the
probabilistic approach for allocating the burden of persuasion in constitutional
adjudication, see supra text accompanying notes 152-57.
409. See supra text accompanying notes 142-51.
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magnitude of the effect of the regulated activity on interstate
commerce. Is the effect principle inconsistent with the purpose
principle? If so, which is the "correct" substantive constitutional
principle, and which should be abandoned?
Alternatively, the two principles might have been understood as
synergistically related. The effects principle could have been
understood as an adjudicative rule developed to help enforce the
substantive constitutional principle authorizing Congress to act with
a purpose of protecting or promoting interstate commerce. The
stronger the basis from which Congress could have concluded that
the regulated activity-that is, the discriminatory firing of employees
for engaging in union activities-substantially (and negatively)
affects interstate commerce, the stronger the basis from which a
court could infer that Congress' purpose for enacting the NLRA was
indeed to protect or to promote interstate commerce. Depending on
whether the foundational adjudicative rule were to establish that
laws like the NLRA are presumptively permissible, or presumptively
unconstitutional, the supplementary adjudicative rule establishing
the relevance of plausible effects could provide the basis for a
permissible inference, or perhaps a mandatory inference, that
Congress acted for a constitutionally authorized purpose.
Framing issues for deriving and defining adjudicative rules is
necessary, but obviously not sufficient, for framing the rules
themselves. Complex questions, difficult to resolve, are presented
whether one pursues a probabilistic or normative framework for
deriving and defining an adjudicative presumption. There will be
much more to say about allocating adjudicative presumptions for
legislation challenged under the Commerce Clause, when discussion
turns to United States u. Lopez.410 For now, it is sufficient to reiterate
the basic proposition: Structuring constitutional doctrine by explicitly
differentiating substantive constitutional principles (and the
considerations relevant to their derivation and definition) and
adjudicative rules (and the considerations relevant to their
derivation and definition) can enhance doctrinal clarity. Though
Justices might seek to create doctrinal ambiguity for a range of
reasons, candor and clarity may well be chosen objectives, and for
good reasons-for example, better fulfilling both the adjudicative and
political functions.411
Of course, the Jones Court did not explicitly differentiate
substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules. Perhaps
it sought ambiguity by design. Perhaps it created ambiguity through

410. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). See infra text accompanying notes 446-53.
411. See supra text accompanying notes 39-115. On reasons for doctrinal ambiguity,
see supra Part III.A.
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inadvertence. Whatever the case, ambiguity there was, and the ink
on the pages was barely dry when in Darby, the Court moved,
implicitly but unmistakably, to a new substantive conception of
congressional discretion under the Commerce Clause.
2.

United States v. Darby as Counterpoint

United States v. Darby involved a challenge to two provisions of
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 412-§l5(a)(l), which prohibited
the interstate shipment of goods, if those goods had been produced by
workers employed for more than maximum hours or for less than a
minimum wage; and §15(a)(2), which prohibited the employment of
workers for more than maximum hours or for less than a minimum
wage, if those workers produced goods to be shipped in interstate
commerce.413 Note that §15(a)(l) was structurally identical to the
child labor provisions invalidated in Hammer.414
The Analysis Justice Stone Did Pursue. Recall the implicit
substantive constitutional principle from Jones: Congress' discretion
under the Commerce Clause is defined in terms of authorized
purposes, and that if Congress acted for the purpose of promoting
interstate commerce, then the means of regulation are
constitutionally irrelevant.415 In Darby's consideration of §15(a)(l),
this principle was turned on its head, when Justice Stone declared:
The motive and purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce
are matters for the legislative judgment upon the exercise of
which the Constitution places no restriction and over which the
courts are given no control. "The judicial cannot prescribe to the
legislative departments of the government limitations upon the
exercise of its acknowledged power." Whatever their motive and
purpose, regulations of commerce which do not infringe some
constitutional prohibition are within the plenary power
conferred on Congress by the Commerce Clause. Subject only to
that limitation, presently to be considered, we conclude that the
prohibition of the shipment interstate of goods produced under
the forbidden substandard labor conditions is within the
constitutional authority of Congress.416
In this passage, Justice Stone and the Court reverted to the principle
embraced in Champion: Congress may act for any purpose, so long as
the subject regulated is interstate commerce per se.417
412. Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et. seq.
(2004)).
413. See Darby, 312 U.S. at 108-10.
414. See supra text accompanying notes 373-76.
415. See Jones, 301 U.S. at 33-34.
416. Darby, 312 U.S. at 115 (citations omitted).
417. See Champion, 188 U.S. at 355-56.
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Indeed, rather than positing a congressional purpose to promote
interstate commerce through § 15(a)(l), the Court supposed Congress
to have been concerned with the "fairness" of labor conditions and the
"fairness" of competition between producers in states that mandated
"fair" employment conditions, and producers in states that did not.418
Given these concerns, Congress might well have believed that its
enactment actually would harm the efficiency of production, lessen
the availability of inexpensive goods, hinder the growth of the
national economy, and limit the flow of interstate commerce-yet
despite such beliefs, might well have chosen to sacrifice economic
productivity toward enhanciiig social "fairness." If so, §15(a)(l) would
not have been permissible under Jones' implicit substantive
constitutional principle limiting Congress' Commerce Clause
discretion to the pursuit of authorized purposes-in particular, the
purpose of promoting the flow of interstate commerce.
In upholding §15(a)(2), Justice Stone said:
The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined
to the regulation of commerce among the states. It extends to
those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce
or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make
regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a
legitimate end, the exercise of the granted power of Congress to
regulate interstate commerce.419
This statement implies two principles with respect to which
regulations of subjects other than interstate commerce per se may be
validated: First, Congress may regulate those intrastate activities
that so affect interstate commerce as to validate their regulation in
pursuit of "a legitimate end;" second, Congress may regulate those
intrastate activities that so affect Congress' regulation of interstate
commerce as to validate their regulation in pursuit of "a legitimate
end."
At first glance, these rules seem to connect one principle
concerned with the legitimacy of legislative purpose and another
principle concerned with the effects of the regulated activity-a
connection that begged to be identified in Jones. Upon closer
examination, however, one concludes that Justice Stone's approach,
unlike the approach implicit in McCulloch, Hammer, and Jones, does
not contemplate a limited set of permissible purposes rooted in the
Commerce Clause itself.
418. Justice Stone posited that "the evils aimed at by the Act are the spread of
substandard labor conditions through the . . . facilities of interstate commerce ....
The Act is thus directed at the suppression of ... competition in interstate commerce
which it has in effect condemned as 'unfair' . .. ."Darby, 312 U.S. at 122 (emphasis
added).
419. Id. at l18.
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Recall that under Stone's analysis of §15(a)(l), Congress may
regulate interstate commerce per se for any motive or purpose.420 In
analyzing §15(a)(2), Stone declares that Congress may regulate
intrastate activities "which so affect ... the exercise of the power of
Congress over [interstate commerce] as to make regulation of them
appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end .... "421 The
ongoing production of goods under substandard labor conditions
affects Congress' prohibition of shipping such goods in interstate
commerce-that is, such production affects the exercise of Congress'
power over interstate commerce.422 Furthermore, when Congress
prohibits the interstate shipment of goods produced under
substandard labor conditions, Congress may act for any purpose
(including for non-economic moral purposes)--any end is legitimate.
Thus, ancillary to prohibiting the interstate shipment of goods
produced under substandard labor conditions (the exercise of
Congress' power over interstate commerce), Congress is
constitutionally unconstrained in the purposes for which it may
regulate the intrastate conditions of production themselves. This is
quite unlike the fair implications of Jones, which seemed to define
Congress' discretion as restricted with respect to the purposes it may
pursue, but unrestricted as to the means it may choose for pursuing
those constitutionally authorized purposes.
The proposition that under the Commerce Clause, Congress may
pursue any purpose in regulating activity that is not itself interstate
commerce was confirmed by Stone's analysis of why §15(a)(2) was
permissible even unconnected to §15(a)(l). Stone said:
We think also that §15(a)(2), now under consideration, is
sustainable independently of §15(a)(l), which prohibits
shipment or transportation of the proscribed goods. As we have
said the evils aimed at by the Act are the spread of substandard
labor conditions through the use of the facilities of interstate
commerce for competition by the goods so produced with those
produced under the prescribed or better labor conditions; and
the consequent dislocation of the commerce itself caused by the
impairment or destruction of local businesses by competition
made effective through interstate commerce. The Act is thus
directed at the suppression of a method or kind of competition
in interstate commerce which it has in effect condemned as
"unfair" . . . .423

420.
421.
422.
place.
423.

Id. at 115.
Id. at 118.
Such goods cannot be shipped interstate if they are not produced in the first
Darby, 312 U.S. at 122.
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According to Stone, the effect on interstate commerce contemplated
by Congress involved the spread of "substandard" labor conditions.424
As discussed above, this effect was conceptualized in moral terms,
not in the economic terms of reduced productivity, reduced demand,
or a reduced flow of interstate commerce.425 Stone does not posit a
congressional concern that the regulated activities would cause
harmful economic effects on interstate commerce; rather, he posits a
congressional concern that interstate commerce would cause harmful
effects on local morality-that the dynamics of interstate competition
would pressure local businesses to employ workers under
"substandard" conditions. Thus, in upholding §15(a)(2) on a basis
independent of § 15(a)(l), Stone implies that Congress may regulate
activity that is not itself interstate commerce if that activity has a
substantial effect "on" interstate commerce, even when Congress has
conceptualized, evaluated, and targeted that effect in terms not of
interstate economic curtailment, but of local moral debasement
through the mechanisms of interstate commerce.
Elements of an Analysis Justice Stone Should Have Pursued. A
substantive constitutional principle states limits on governmental
discretion derived from and evoking values deemed to underlie
constitutional text.426 If Justice Stone had framed Darby's analysis
explicitly in terms of substantive constitutional principles, he would
have had to confront the following questions: What values could
explain the particular benefits to be gained by empowering Congress
to legislate for any purpose, so long as the subject regulated is
interstate commerce, or in some way substantially affects interstate
commerce? How do such benefits justify the concomitant sacrifice of
otherwise retained state legislative autonomy? More fundamentally,
whose values count-those of the framers and ratifiers, or those of
some sovereign People otherwise defined? Recognizing, now, that the
Darby (Champion) approach is very different from that of Jones
(McCulloch), which better expresses values underlying the commerce
power for defining the extent-and the limits-of Congress'
discretion ?427
Consider the relative merits of the substantive constitutional
principle implicit in Jones and that implicit in Darby. Jones implied

424. Id. at 123.
425. See supra note 418 and accompanying text.
426. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
427. Without delving too far into what it might entail, Professor Berman refers to
considerations for evaluating a putative substantive constitutional (operative)
principle as the "test of fidelity." See Berman, Guillen and Gullibility, supra note 12,
at 1528-29. For a summary of my views about the criteria with respect to which
substantive constitutional principles ought to be derived and defined, see infra text
accompanying notes 467-78.
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that under the Commerce Clause, Congress may regulate any subject
for the purpose of promoting interstate commerce. Empowering
Congress in this way promises certain unambiguous benefits to the
people of all the states, at least over the long term. We live in a
material world42B--money and possessions are good; more money and
possessions are better. If Congress enacts legislation-e.g.,
mandating minimum wages, or prohibiting the discriminatory firing
of employees-with a purpose of promoting interstate commerce,
promoting productivity, and creating wealth, the anticipated
material benefits could compensate for any intrusions on state
discretion to pursue competing policies.429
All of this helps to explain why people-the sovereign People of
the states in 1787-might have chosen to define congressional power
in terms of authorized purposes, and in particular to define the
commerce power in terms of the authorized purpose to promote
interstate commerce. All of this could have been said, and should
have been, in Jones-indeed, in Gibbons-toward explicitly deriving,
defining, and legitimizing their implicit substantive constitutional
principles. What could be said, however, to explain why the sovereign
People of the states might have chosen to define the commerce power
in Darby's terms, authorizing Congress to pursue any purpose, so
long as the subject regulated is interstate commerce, or has some
kind of substantial effect on interstate commerce?
Justice Stone's view of the purposes underlying the Fair Labor
Standards Act, discussed above, imply perhaps the strongest
rationale for Darby's Commerce Clause doctrines.
[T]he evils aimed at by the Act are the spread of substandard
labor conditions through the use of the facilities of interstate
See MADONNA, MATERIAL GIRL (Sire/Warner Bros. 1984).
Of course, Congress might not be correct in predicting the economic
consequences of its policies. This possibility of predictive error raises the question of
whether the substantive constitutional principles defining Congress' discretion under
the Commerce Clause might better be defined in terms of required effects-for
example, under the Commerce Clause, Congress might be deemed permitted to
regulate only if its enactment actually will have the effect of promoting interstate
commerce. But such an approach for defining the substantive boundaries of
congressional discretion would require a judicial determination as to the effects to be
anticipated from the regulation in question. It contemplates the priority of a court's
prediction, superseding the legislature's, about the way the world works-about
matters of societal fact relevant to policymaking. This seems deeply at odds with
conventional notions about legislative prerogatives in a democracy. In part because a
court might err as well, it is ordinarily a matter for legislative judgment to predict and
to evaluate the effects of laws contemplated or enacted-for example, whether a policy
of mutually assured destruction would deter a Soviet first strike; or whether lowering
marginal tax rates would increase tax revenues; or whether reforming welfare would
encourage its beneficiaries to seek employment; or even whether imposing the death
penalty deters crime.
428.
429.
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commerce for competition by the goods so produced with those
produced under the prescribed or better conditions; and the
consequent dislocation of the commerce itself caused by the
impairment or destruction of local businesses by competition
made effective through interstate commerce. The Act is thus
directed at the suppression of a method or kind of competition
which it has in effect condemned as "unfair" .... 430
Thus, according to Justice Stone, Congress determined that without
national standards governing minimum wages and maximum hours,
interstate market forces would spread pressures to pay "unfair"
wages. Indeed, without national mandates governing decent
employment conditions, firms in states that favored such standards
would face "unfair competition" from firms in states that rejected
such standards.431 Stone anticipates two possible effects of leaving
low-paying firms and states unconstrained by national standards:
Either states otherwise inclined to impose mm1mum wage
requirements would forgo such policies toward enabling their firms
to remain competitive in the relevant market; or such states will
persist in imposing minimum wage policies, rendering their firms
less competitive and vulnerable to being forced out of business. Thus,
as he apparently viewed Congress' intent in enacting Darby's
minimum wage requirements, Stone contemplates that national
standards enacted under the Commerce Clause can be designed to
prevent "higher morality" states from facing "unfair" economic
pressure from "lower morality" states to lower their moral standards
and forgo their preferred policies.
Might the sovereign People have sought to empower Congress to
prevent what it views as creeping interstate moral debasement
through such effects of "unfair" interstate economic competition?
Perhaps. Yet, the consequences of this "unfair" economic
competition-the "dislocation" of less efficient firms by more
productive firms-was among those economic benefits that the
framers and ratifiers apparently anticipated from freely flowing
commerce among the states, as fostered by laws enacted by
Congress.432 If a product could be produced better and cheaper by a
firm in Georgia than one in Mississippi, the Georgia firm should have
430. Darby, 312 U.S. at 122 (emphasis added).
431. Id.
432. One should emphasize that Congress could, of course, favor wage and hour
legislation because of a belief that such a policy would stimulate demand, and thereby
promote interstate commerce, as was the view of congressional policy in Carter and
Schechter. Where minimum wage legislation is justified on "fairness" grounds,
however, one might seek minimally decent standards of employment even while
believing that such standards could retard interstate commerce, or without
considering the effects of such standards on the volume and vigor of interstate
commerce.
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free access to the Mississippi market. The Mississippi firm might fail,
but its economic energies could be channeled toward the production
of goods for which it is better suited.433
Indeed, as suggested by the rationale for Jones' "fundamental
principle," one can understand why people would sacrifice state
discretion to pursue their own moral objectives if they anticipate
gaining wealth, at least in the long-run. Far less plausible is the view
implicit in Darby-that the people of the states chose to sacrifice
state discretion to pursue local moral judgments for the sake of
establishing national moral judgments with no anticipated
corresponding gain in wealth. What the Darby principle promises, at
best, would be the opportunity for states to trade occasions when, as
part of a congressional majority, they can impose their morality (say,
about minimum wage laws) on states that disagree, for occasions
when, as part of a congressional minority, they have moral precepts
imposed on them (say, about child labor). Voters might view trading
opportunities for national governance on moral questions as
desirable, but they hardly would anticipate an unambiguous
benefit-such as the long term wealth production promised by
conceptualizing the commerce power as does the McCulloch-Jones
approach.
Yet, even if it were more plausible that Jones, rather than
Darby, expresses the original intent for the Commerce Clause, it
would not necessarily follow that Jones, rather than Darby, is
"correct." Should substantive constitutional principles defining
Congress' discretion under the Commerce Clause be defined in terms
of the original understanding? If so, why? If not, why not? And if not,
then through what alternative interpretive methodology? How does

433. In the Federalist No. 11, Alexander Hamilton declared: "Under a vigorous
national government, the natural strength and resources of the country, directed to a
common interest, would baffle all the combinations of European jealousy to restrain
our growth." THE FEDERALIST No. 11, at 87. Although he was discussing the benefits of
union in relation to Europe-both competition among states for European markets,
and competition between domestic and European industry-Hamilton here
contemplates a Commerce Clause authorizing vigorous national policy directed toward
economic growth. See id. Elsewhere in this Federalist Paper, Hamilton extols the
virtues of union in relation to establishing a navy, as different ingredients in building
a navy are best provided by different states and regions. Id. at 89. The point is related
to the benefits to be derived from a national market of producers and consumers,
where production proceeds by those firms and in those areas where the highest quality
can be achieved with least cost. This is a perspective that hardly supports the Darby
notion that Congress was to be empowered to impose national moral standards on
conditions of production, even at the cost of economic productivity. Again, of course,
Congress could well choose to enact the kinds of policy challenged in Darby for
purposes of promoting economic development and the flow of interstate commerce. See
supra note 432.
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that alternative interpretive methodology lead to Darby's
principles?434
To have framed constitutional doctrine explicitly in terms of
deriving and defining substantive constitutional principles and
adjudicative rules could have made addressing these questions far
more likely. Explicitly framing constitutional doctrine in terms of
substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules
inherently requires not only defining each kind of rule for
adjudicating a constitutional controversy, but also deriuingjustifying-a rule as a substantive constitutional principle or as an
adjudicative rule. To have done so might have inhibited Justice
Stone's reversion to, and expansion of, Champion's license for
Congress to pursue any purpose under the Commerce Clause.435 And
even apart from whether Justice Stone still would have moved from
Jones' purpose-centered definition of congressional power, he could
have enhanced the definitional clarity and interpretive legitimacy of
whatever rules he ultimately chose to apply in Darby, had he
endeavored explicitly to derive and define them as substantive
constitutional principles for identifying issues of significant fact, and
concomitant adjudicative rules for resolving those issues of fact.

3.

United States u. Lopez as Counterpoint

In United States u. Lopez, defendant was convicted of violating
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which defined as a crime
"knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows,
or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone."436 Lopez argued
that Congress had acted beyond its discretion under the Commerce
Clause in having criminalized such gun possession. This is regarded
as a case in which a majority of the Court sought to reinvigorate
federalism-based limits on national legislative power.437 Lopez
reveals the limitations of a judicial effort to "fix" inherited doctrine,
without structuring the fix explicitly in terms of substantive
constitutional principles and adjudicative rules.
The Analysis Rehnquist Did Pursue. Justice Rehnquist, for the
majority, began by canvassing established Commerce Clause
doctrine, stating that Congress may regulate, first, use of the
channels of interstate commerce; second, the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce;

434. See infra text accompanying notes 467-78.
435. See Darby, 312 U.S. at 113-17.
436. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
437. See, e.g., NORMAN REDLICH, JOHN ATTANASIO, & JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN,
UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 143 (2005) (characterizing Lopez as "another
turning point" in the Court's Commerce Clause doctrine).
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and third, activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.438
Analyzing the Act under the third doctrinal category, Rehnquist
implicitly addressed issues relevant to the foundational adjudicative
rule-that is, whether Congress or the challenger bore the burden of
persuasion with respect to the "affecting commerce" principle.439 He
noted the undisputed fact that Congress had failed to make formal
findings identifying the effects on interstate commerce caused by gun
possession in a school zone. Rehnquist said:
Congress normally is not required to make formal findings as to
the substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate
commerce. But to the extent that congressional findings would
enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity
in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even
though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye,
they are lacking here. 440
This passage suggests that the Court was subjecting this Act to a
burden of validation that was not applicable to other putative
exercises of the commerce power. Unlike for other challenged
legislation, Congress' failure to make such formal findings in the
Guns-Free School Zones Act counted against its permissibility.
Indeed, in dissent, Justice Breyer charged that this facet of
Rehnquist's opinion departed from precedent.
Courts must give Congress a degree of leeway in determining
the existence of a significant factual connection between the
regulated activity and interstate commerce-both because the
Constitution delegates the commerce power directly to Congress
and because the determination requires an empirical judgment
of a kind that a legislature is more likely than a court to make
with accuracy. The traditional words "rational basis" capture
this leeway .... Thus, the specific question before us, as the
Court recognizes, is not whether the "regulated activity
438. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59. Rehnquist cited Darby for the "use of channels"
principle, though he referred to the situation addressed by Darby in the second
category's concern with "things in interstate commerce." Id. He recognized that under
established doctrine, Congress may regulate use of the channels of interstate
commerce even to address perceived moral problems, as Darby made clear. Id. It is
notable that Rehnquist did not mention Jones' "fundamental principle," which seemed
to harken back to the McCulloch framework for defining Congress' Commerce Clause
power as involving unlimited discretion to choose the means of regulation, so long as
the ends are constitutionally authorized. See supra text accompanying notes 329-47.
Rehnquist thus implicitly confirmed that Darby and its progeny superseded Jones,
even as his Lopez opinion might be interpreted as an implicit and tentative effort to
reinvigorate the notion that Congress may act only for economic purposes, at least
when regulating matter that is not itself interstate commerce. See infra text
accompanying notes 447-54.
439. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-65.
440. Id. at 562-63 (citations omitted).
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sufficiently affected interstate commerce," but, rather, whether
Congress could have had "a rational basis" for so concluding.441
Rehnquist gave two reasons for rejecting this "rational basis"
deference in enforcing the "substantial effects" principle against the
Lopez statute-reasons that putatively distinguished that statute
from all those to which the Court had accorded deference since Jones.
First, the regulated activity-gun possession in a school zone-is not
"economic activity."442 Second, deferring to Congress' assertions of
"inference after inference" about the effects on interstate commerce of
this "non-economic activity"<>would "convert congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort
retained by the States."443 How do these two propositions support
adjudicative rules less deferential to congressional discretion in
Lopez than in Jones or Darby?
As Rehnquist presented his analysis, this retreat from deference
seems little more than the late twentieth century equivalent to
earlier crudely articulated fears of congressional aggrandizementwhether Maryland's position in McCulloch, Calhoun's path to
nullification, or the Knight-Schechter-Carter era refrain that if
Congress can do "this," then little would be left for state regulation.444
Such outcome-reactive paths to nondeferential adjudicative rules
hardly provide the focused analysis that can enhance the
adjudicative and political functions of judicial review.

441. Id. at 616-17.
442. Id. at 567.
443. Id. Rehnquist also noted that the Lopez statute "contains no jurisdictional
element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm
possession in question affects interstate commerce." Id. at 561. However, the absence
of a statutory requirement that a particular litigant's regulated activity must be
determined to have a substantial effect on (or some other connection with) interstate
commerce does not distinguish the Lopez statute from, say, the quota on a farmer's
winter wheat production upheld in Wickard u. Filburn, and, therefore, does not
explain why the Court applied a presumption of impermissibility in Lopez and a
presumption of permissibility in Wickard. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128-29 (upholding
regulation because "Congress may properly have considered that wheat consumed on
the farm where grown, if wholly outside the scheme of regulation, would have a
substantial effect in defeating and obstructing its purpose to stimulate trade therein at
increased prices").
444. In 1895, the Court said: "[I]f the national power extends to all contracts and
combinations in manufacture, agriculture, mining, and other productive industries,
whose ultimate result may affect external commerce, comparatively little of business
operations and affairs would be left for the state control." United States v. E.C. Knight
Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16 (1895). In 1935, the Court said: "If the commerce clause were
construed to reach all enterprises and transactions which ... have an indirect effect
upon interstate commerce, the federal authority would embrace practically all the
activities of the people and the authority of the State over its domestic concerns would
exist only by sufferance of the federal government." Schechter, 295 U.S. at 546.
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Why should it matter whether Congress regulates economic
activity or non-economic activity? How would lesser deference to
regulations of non-economic activity prevent transforming the
commerce power into a general police power? If the subject regulated
should matter, why not draw a distinction, as the Court once did,
between regulating interstate commerce itself, and regulating
intrastate economic activities-whether commerce, manufacturing,
or mining?445 Why, and how, is the nature of the regulated subject
significant for deference, or not, in determining whether that
regulated subject substantially affects i~terstate commerce?
An Analysis Rehnquist Should Have Pursued. To develop a
rationale for such lesser deference to regulations of non-economic
activity in enforcing the "substantial effects" rule, one must consider
the rationale for the "substantial effects" rule itself. As suggested in
the discussion of Jones, one might understand a requirement that a
regulated activity must substantially affect interstate commerce as
an adjudicative rule for enforcing a substantive constitutional
principle authorizing congressional action under the Commerce
Clause if (and only if) Congress' purpose was to promote the flow of
interstate commerce.446 The adjudicative rule would permit an
inference of such a permissible purpose if there was a basis for
Congress to believe that the regulated activity had a substantial,
adverse effect on the flow of interstate commerce. Assuming such
functions for the purpose principle (substantive), and the effects
principle (adjudicative), how might one frame the basic adjudicative
rule-that is, the adjudicative presumption? Should the government
bear the burden of proving a permissible purpose-and of proving a
basis on which Congress could have concluded that the regulated
activity adversely affected the volume or flow of interstate
commerce--or should the challenger have the burden of persuasion
on these issues?

445. Such is a question posed by Justice Thomas. See 'Lopez, 514 U.S. at 587
(Thomas, J., concurring).
446. Recall our earlier consideration of the "effects" principle in Jones. See supra
text accompanying notes 409-11. We questioned whether this rule was, and should be,
viewed (implicitly) as a substantive definition of Congress' Commerce Clause
discretion, or as an adjudicative rule defining permissible inferences about dispositive
congressional intent from ancillary facts. Under the former view, the Court would be
called upon to make its own independent judgment as to whether the regulated
activity substantially affects interstate commerce. Under the latter view, the Court
would be called upon to determine whether there was a basis for Congress to believe
that the regulated activity substantially affected interstate commerce, thereby
providing a plausible basis for concluding that Congress' purpose was to promote or
protect interstate commerce. See supra note 429.
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As previously suggested, one might pursue a normative or a
probabilistic analysis for allocating the burden of persuasion.447 Yet,
we have seen little promise from the normative approach.448 Would it
be worse wrongly to determine that Congress did pursue the
legitimate purpose of protecting or promoting the flow of interstate
commerce, or wrongly to determine that Congress did not pursue
such a constitutionally permissible purpose? Does the constitutional
significance of either error depend on whether Congress regulated
economic activity or non-economic activity? It is difficult to posit
how.449
In determining whether Congress pursued a purpose of
promoting interstate commerce, might one develop a probabilistic
rationale for according less deference to regulations of non-economic
activity than to regulations of economic activity? Is there a basis for
distinguishing the likelihood that Congress enacted legislation in
pursuit of such an authorized purpose? Does the distinction between
regulating economic activity and regulating non-economic activity
provide such a categorical basis. for allocating different
probabilistically-rooted adjudicative presumptions?
Perhaps. Economic activities-such as gathering raw materials,
manufacturing products for marketing, transporting products for
marketing, advertising products in pursuit of sales, buying and
selling products in the market, hiring or firing employees, paying
wages to employees-may be more likely to have potential effects on
the volume and flow of interstate commerce than would noneconomic activities such as static possession. If this is so, then it
seems more likely that Congress could be concerned about a
substantial effect on interstate commerce if such economic activities
447. See supra text accompanying notes 142-57.
448. See supra text accompanying notes 145-51.
449. Either error would intrude on a fundamental constitutional value. Erroneously
invalidating a congressional act would intrude on the constitutional value of politically
accountable lawmaking-that Congress is vested with discretion to legislate within
constitutional bounds. Erroneously upholding a congressional act would intrude upon
the constitutional value of federalism-that states retain discretion to legislate
according to the preferences of their people in those areas where Congress has not
permissibly enacted preemptive uniform national policy. Determining which value is of
greater constitutional significance-essential for determining which mistake is more
to be avoided from the normative perspective-is more demanding than "merely"
deriving and defining those substantive constitutional principles. See supra text
accompanying notes 142-51. Identifying substantive constitutional principles and
determining their relative weight require choosing the interpretive methodology a
Justice will employ (whether originalism or something else); justifying that
methodology as the appropriate basis with respect to which to define substantive
constitutional principles; and applying that interpretive methodology toward
identifying the content and comparative weight of relevant competing substantive
constitutional principles. See infra text accompanying notes 467-78.
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were left unregulated than if non-economic activities were left
unregulated and, therefore, more likely that Congress would choose
to regulate economic activities for the purpose of promoting
interstate commerce than to pursue such a purpose in regulating
non-economic activities.450 In other words, congressional regulation of
economic activity suggests a probability that Congress acted for
purposes of promoting interstate commerce451 that is not suggested
by the regulation of non-economic activity. Thus, regulations of noneconomic activities may indeed warrant less judicial deference on the
issue of whether they were enacted for the permissible purpose of
promoting interstate commerce-and less deference on the issue of
whether Congress believed that such activities have a substantial
economic effect on interstate commerce.452 Whether or not these
propositions are correct, one could not have begun to analyze the
matter at issue-i.e., whether, and why, regulations of non-economic
activity should be accorded less judicial deference than regulations of
economic activity-without having explicitly distinguished between
substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules, their
respective functions, and the different considerations relevant for
their respective derivation and definition.453
450. In Carter, Schechter, Jones, Wickard, Darby, and Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), Congress had regulated economic activities.
Though Congress might not have enacted each of those regulations for purposes of
promoting interstate commerce, one reasonably might suppose that it acted for such
purposes in enacting most of those regulations.
451. Even if the "substantial effects" principle is viewed not as an adjudicative rule
for enforcing a substantive principle defined in terms of authorized purposes, but as a
substantive principle itself, a similar probabilistic rationale also could justify drawing
a categorical distinction between regulating economic activity versus non-economic
activity. If one posited that economic activity more likely has a (relevant) substantial
effect on interstate commerce than does non-economic activity, there would be a
probabilistically-rooted basis for according more deference to a statute regulating the
former than to one regulating the latter.
452. Justice Rehnquist has indicated not that findings of fact are required for
upholding a regulation of non-economic activity under the Commerce Clause, but that
such findings would be helpful to support a judicial determination of permissibility.
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63 (citations omitted). If the Court were to make the
factfinding requirement a condition of permissibility, it would present the kinds of
issue regarding conclusive presumptions addressed above in relation to Justice
Powell's opinion in Bakke, and Professor Berman's analysis of Miranda's exclusionary
rule. See supra note 262.
453. For a similar analysis of Lopez in relation to a putative substantive
constitutional principle defining Congress' Commerce Clause discretion as limited to
the pursuit of commercial purposes, see Berman, Guillen and Gullibility, supra note
12, at 1523-27. It bears repeating that even when analysts do explicitly differentiate
substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules, they may well disagree
about the content and definition of each kind of rule in particular constitutional
contexts. Professor Roosevelt, for example, characterizes the substantive constitutional
principle established in McCulloch as authorizing Congress to regulate "if the
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Enhancing Doctrinal Clarity and Legitimacy Can
Promote the Adjudicative Function

From McCulloch and Gibbons, to Champion and Hammer, to
Jones and Darby, to Lopez today, the Court has struggled to craft a
paradigm with respect to which Congress' discretion under its
enumerated powers is to be defined, and has consistently failed to
derive-to justify-one paradigm or another as a proper
interpretation of our constitutional law. Through this struggle, it
created incompatible conceptions. If the part of Gibbons defining "to
regulate" was correct, than the part defining "commerce among the
several states" was wrong. If Hammer was correctly decided, then
Champion was wrong. If Jones' doctrine was correct, then Darby's
was wrong.
It matters whether Congress' discretion is defined as limited to
the pursuit of constitutionally authorized purposes, or as unlimited
with respect to purposes so long as the subject regulated either is
itself interstate commerce, or has some substantial effect on
interstate commerce. Whatever substantive definition is chosen, it
matters whether that principle is applied with deference, or with an
intrusive adjudicative rule. Reliably framing constitutional rules
tailored to fulfilling the two essential and discrete adjudicative
functions of identifying issues of relevant fact, and resolving those
factual issues, requires structuring constitutional doctrine explicitly
in terms of substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative
rules.

legislative intent is in fact to regulate interstate commerce." Roosevelt, supra note 20,
at 1674. Though apparently viewing McCulloch as concerned with legislative purpose,
this characterization of congressional power begs the question of whether Congress
must intend to regulate interstate commerce only for particular purposes-e.g., only to
promote trade and economic productivity. See supra text accompanying notes 419-35.
The statutes challenged in Champion and Hammer each involved a congressional
intent to regulate interstate commerce, but as a means of achieving ends other than
promoting interstate commerce-and the Court had a very different view in each case
of whether such motives were constitutionally significant. See supra text
accompanying notes 364-76. Better specifying the content of substantive constitutional
principles (or operative propositions) must depend on better exploring the implications
of how such substantive principles ought to be derived and defined-in my view, as a
function of explicitly identified values deemed to underlie constitutional text. Whether
one embraces my characterization of the applicable substantive constitutional
principle, or Roosevelt's, or something else altogether, the basic point remains as to
the analytical virtues of explicitly differentiating the derivation and definition of
substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules. As Professor Roosevelt
stated in critiquing the Lopez Court's posture of nondeference as not adequately
justified: "The failure to distinguish between decision rules and operative propositions
has . . . led the Court to reject its Commerce Clause decision rules for patently
inadequate reasons." Roosevelt, supra note 20, at 1699.
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Enhancing Doctrinal Clarity and Legitimacy Can
Promote the Political Function

The Civil Rights Act of 1964454 prohibits racial discrimination in
places such as restaurants, theaters, hotels, and amusement parks.
Two Supreme Court decisions influenced congressional deliberations
about whether the legislation should be enacted under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment or the Commerce Clause. In the
consolidated case United States v. Stanley455 (Civil Rights Cases), the
Court invalidated the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which criminalized
racial discrimination by private individuals in providing "the
accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public
conveyances on land or water, theatres, and other places of public
amusement ...."456 Congress enacted this landmark legislation
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Bradley, for
the Court, determined that Section 5 does not empower Congress to
regulate private conduct, but only to constrain state action that
subverts "the fundamental rights specified in the amendment."457
Proponents of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were concerned that if
Congress proceeded under the Fourteenth Amendment, their bill
would suffer the same fate as did the 1875 Act. Yet, because Darby
had determined that Congress may legislate for moral ends so long
as the subject regulated had some substantial effect on interstate
commerce, the bill's proponents had reason to expect that it would be
deemed permissible if enacted under the Commerce Clause. Some
still favored relying on Section 5, however, arguing that combating
racial discrimination is a moral matter, that connecting the issue to
commerce obfuscates those moral issues, and that Congress'
objectives far better fit the values underlying the Fourteenth
Amendment than those underlying the commerce power. Typical
were the positions of Senator Pastore of Rhode Island, and Senator
Cooper of Kentucky. Pastore said:
I believe in this bill, because I believe in the dignity of man, not
because it impedes our commerce. I don't think any man has
the right to say to another man, ''You can't eat in my restaurant
because you have a dark skin." ... And that is the reason I
want to vote for this law.458

454. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) (2000).
455. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
456. Id. at 9 (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335, § 2).
457. Id. at 11.
458. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CASES AND MATERIALS 202
(10th ed. 1980).
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Cooper went a bit further, suggesting that relying on the Commerce
Clause requires limiting the reach of the bill's prohibitions in ways
that are unwarranted and that otherwise might not be necessary.
I do not suppose that anyone would seriously contend that ...
Congress . . . suddenly determined, after all these years, that
segregation is a burden on interstate commerce. We are
considering the legislation because we believe . . . that all
citizens have an equal right to . . . the equal use of
accommodations held out to the public . . . . [I]t is a right of
citizenship and a constitutional right under the 14th
amendment. It has nothing to do with whether ...
discrimination against individuals places a burden on
commerce. It does not depend upon the commerce clause, and
cannot be limited by that clause .... 459
Those who favored relying on the commerce power argued that

Darby provided a safe foundation for the bill, while the Civil Rights
Cases rendered Section 5 shaky at best. Robert Kennedy, the
Attorney General, pressed the point in his congressional testimony:
We base this on the commerce clause which I think makes it
clearly constitutional .... I think there is argument about the
14th amendment basis-going back to the 1883 Supreme Court
decision, and the fact that this is not state action-therefore
Congress would not have the right under the 14th amendment
to pass any legislation dealing with it .... [W]e are not going
beyond any principle of the use of the commerce clause that has
not already been clearly ... ruled on by the courts. We are not
stretching the commerce clause. 460
These statements illustrate the political function of judicial
review. Political actors accounted for not only the Court's decisions,
but also its reasoning. Yet, while congressional debate was
influenced by Darby and the Civil Rights Cases, the doctrine of
neither case had been effectively legitimized as "correct." The Civil
Rights Cases did derive interpretation of Section 5 power on textual
and originalist grounds, but so much had changed since 1883 that
the Court's interpretive rationale warranted at least reexamination,
if not rejection. In Darby, as suggested above, the Court had made no
effort toward justifying its implicit substantive constitutional
principles as "originalist," or as a correct expression of any other

459. Id. at 201.
460. Id. at 199. Burke Marshall, Assistant Attorney General of the Civil Rights
Division, echoed Kennedy. "I think it would be a mistake to rely solely on the 14th
amendment. This bill ... relies on the 14th amendment, and also on the Commerce
Clause. I think it is plainly constitutional. I think if it relied solely on the 14th
amendment, it might not be held constitutional. I think it would be a disservice to pass
a bill that was later thrown out by the Supreme Court." Id. at 202.
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identified and justified interpretive methodology.461 But Darby's
then-recent vintage offered a path of less resistance, even for
members of Congress who sensed a discontinuity in pursuing
primarily moral objectives through a power that seemed concerned
primarily with economic development.
Consider how different congressional deliberation about the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 might have been had the Court clarified Jones'
"fundamental
principle"
through
explicitly
differentiating
substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules, rather
than abandoning that "fundamental principle" in Darby.462 Suppose,
for example, the Court had defined a substantive constitutional
principle declaring that Congress may act under the Commerce
Clause whenever (but only if) its purpose is to promote or protect the
development of interstate commerce. Suppose, as well, that the Court
had defined adjudicative rules declaring that when Congre(:ls
regulates economic activities, it will be presumed to have acted for
those authorized purposes; and, further, that when there is a basis
from which Congress plausibly could have determined that the
regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce, there is
a basis for concluding that Congress acted to promote interstate
commerce.
In a context of such judicial declarations, it would not have been
plausible to argue that pursuing moral purposes under the
Commerce Clause is permissible. 463 The positions of Senators Cooper
and Monroney would have had constitutional force beyond
persuasiveness on grounds of mere policy. Despite that, proponents
such as the Attorney General could have emphasized the deferential
adjudicative rules (implicit in Jones but which we have
hypothetically posited were made explicit). They could have
pretextually emphasized economic objectives, while deemphasizing
moral motives. Members of Congress would have more understood
that they could choose to respect a clearly derived and defined
substantive constitutional principle limiting Congress to purposes of
promoting interstate commerce; or choose to violate that principle by
acting pretextually, anticipating that the bill could have been upheld
pursuant to deferential adjudicative rules. "Duly instructed,"
members of Congress could have chosen policy more responsibly.

461. See supra text accompanying notes 426-27.
462. See supra text accompanying notes 428-35.
463. Even with Darby's departure from Jones' "fundamental principle" that
implicitly defined Congress' Commerce Clause power in terms of limited permitted
purposes-purposes of promoting or protecting interstate commerce-members of
Congress were uncomfortable about using the commerce power for moral purposes. See
supra text accompanying notes 459-60.

2006]

STRUCTURING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE

927

Furthermore, had the Court clarified and legitimized Jones,
rather than departing from it in Darby, the Civil Rights Cases, eight
decades old by 1964, might have seemed the less daunting obstacle.
Legislative creativity could have been devoted to developing new
arguments about the nature and definition of state action. For
example, private discrimination in the provision of services could
have been connected to state action by recognizing that such private
discrimination depended significantly on state enforcement of
trespass laws. Building on McCulloch's definition of congressional
power in terms of unlimited discretion to choose the means of
regulation toward achieving a constitutionally authorized end,
prohibiting private discrimination could have been viewed as a
chosen means toward the constitutionally authorized end of
preventing state law enforcement from discriminating because of the
racism of the private service providers.464 Alternatively, as suggested
by Akhil Amar, prohibiting private racial discrimination could have
been viewed as a means of securing equal citizenship to blacks,
mandated pursuant to Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.465
Or, building on Bolling, Brown, and Loving, proponents could have
developed arguments that the definition of congressional power

464. Cf. Shelley, 334 U.S. 1. In Palmore v. Sidoti, a father challenged his former
wife's custody of their daughter because the mother, a white woman, had married a
black man. The state court determined that "the best interests of the child" would be
threatened by the taunts the child would face about her black step-father. 466 U.S. at
431. Justice Burger, for the Court, invalidated the custody decision because the
custody decree accommodated the anticipated racist response of private actors. Id. at
433-34.
There is a risk that a child living with a stepparent of a different race may be
subject to a variety of ... stresses not present if the child were living with
parents of the same racial ... origin. The question, however, is whether the
reality of private biases ... are permissible considerations for removal of an
infant child from the custody of its natural mother .... The Constitution
cannot control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them. Private
biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or
indirectly, give them effect.
Id. (emphasis added). Burger's opinion is significant in suggesting that even if the
purpose of a government official is not itself rooted in racist values or stereotypes-as
the family court judge seemed to be concerned with sparing the child from taunts she
would bear from one custody arrangement but not from the other-a governmental
purpose to accommodate private racism is impermissible. This notion would be readily
applicable to a state's even-handed enforcement of trespass laws, where the owner of
private commercial property discriminated because of race in determining which
customers to permit where. If state action accommodating anticipated private racism
can be viewed as a violation of equal protection in Palmore, then state action
accommodating actual private racism (a race-motivated call to enforce trespass laws)
could be so understood as well. See supra note 92.
465. See Amar, supra note 17, at 105-07.
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under Section 5 should be derived by interpretive methodologies
other than originalism.
Even had the Court decided Darby as it did, but in a way that
explicitly sought to derive its substantive constitutional principle as
"correct" interpretation, the political function of judicial review also
could have been enhanced. Members of Congress might have felt less
concerned about enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for moral
purposes had the Court persuasively explained the permissibility of
pursuing such purposes as derived from and expressing values
deemed to underlie the Commerce Clause. Alternatively, if the
Court's explicit derivation of Darby's substantive principles had been
unpersuasive, conscientious members of Congress could have better
understood why using the Commerce Clause for moral purposes
should indeed be viewed as constitutionally problematic-and should
be avoided-despite having been deemed permissible by the Court.
In short, the better instructed political actors are about the
derivation and definition of the substantive constitutional principles
by which they should view their discretion constrained, the better
able they will be to make informed decisions about what policies
should be understood as constitutionally problematic and why, what
precedents should be viewed as binding and how, and what areas of
substantive constitutional doctrine appropriately might be
questioned. Judicial opinions that frame substantive constitutional
principles by explicitly identifying the values deemed to underlie
constitutional text,· and the interpretive methodology with respect to
which such values were identified, would better enable legislators
and other political actors to account for such values when deciding
which policies to pursue, and which to eschew.

IV. TOWARD FULFILLING THE ADJUDICATIVE AND POLITICAL
FUNCTIONS: A TEMPLATE FOR STRUCTURING CONSTITUTIONAL
DOCTRINE

The foregoing has suggested that constitutional doctrine should
be structured in a way that explicitly differentiates substantive
constitutional principles and adjudicative rules. This section suggests
a template of issues that judges should address in deriving and
defining each kind of rule.
Explicitly Deriving and Defining Substantive Constitutional
Principles. First, a judge must identify the interpretive methodology
with respect to which she will endeavor to derive and define relevant
values and to frame applicable substantive constitutional principles.
Second, whether the judge identifies originalism, conventional
morality,
Dworkian
principle,
representation-reinforcement,
republican aspiration, or something else, she must justify her choice
of methodology. Justification is all the more important when the
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judge employs one interpretive method for resolving some issues of
constitutional meaning, and another interpretive method for
resolving other issues of constitutional meaning. Identifying
interpretive method, and justifying such a choice, is essential for
addressing every question of substantive constitutional meaning, to
prevent Justices from claiming to pursue a consistent approach, even
as they cherry-pick contexts in which to abide by their protestations,
and those in which freely to depart.466
Though well beyond the scope of this Article, it might be helpful
briefly to address some ways in which a judge might endeavor to
justify her choice of interpretive methodology. Justice Marshall's
opinion in Marbury v. Madison467 is foundationally instructive. In
interpreting and enforcing the Constitution's mandates, Marshall
recognized the need to identify the sovereign-the authority whose
values ought to have been enforced. Marshall identified "the people"
who created the Constitution as the sovereign. He declared:
That the people have an original right to establish, for their
future government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall
most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis on which the
whole American fabric has been erected.468

466. Justice Thomas insists on originalism for interpreting the Commerce Clause.
See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627 ("Until this Court replaces its existing Commerce
Clause jurisprudence with a standard more consistent with the original
understanding, we will continue to see Congress appropriating state police powers
under the guise of regulating commerce."). Yet, he also insists on a decidedly
nonoriginalist interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause-that all laws containing
racial classifications are prohibited. See supra note 320. Consider, as well, Justice
Blackmun's different methodologies for interpreting the words "liberty'' and "person"
in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 129-68.
Blackmun employed a methodology akin to a Dworkinian pursuit of coherent principle
for interpreting the word "liberty'' as including the right to choose to terminate
pregnancy. See id. at 153 ("This right of privacy ... founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty ... is broad enough to encompass a woman's
decision whether ... to terminate her pregnancy."). Blackmun employed originalism
for interpreting the word "person" in that very same clause as not including a human
fetus. Id. at 157-58 ("The Constitution does not define 'person' in so many words ....
'Person' is used in other places in the Constitution .... [I]n nearly all these instances,
the use of the word is such that it has application only post-natally .... All this,
together with our observation ... that throughout the major portion of the 19th
century prevailing legal abortion practices were far freer than they are today,
persuades us that the word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not
include the unborn.").
467. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). What follows in the text above anticipates analysis to be
presented in my work-in-progress, tentatively entitled "Reconceptualizing
Originalism."
468. Id. at 176. As previously discussed, Marshall predicated his opinion in
McCulloch on this foundational norm of sovereignty as well. See supra note 342 and
accompanying text.
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Having identified the governing sovereign, everything else fell
into place for evaluating and choosing interpretive methodologies. If,
indeed, the People who created the Constitution in 1787 are the
sovereign, if they have the right to their preferred constitutional
values, then Marshall is their servant, and his interpretive goal
should be to identify the constitutional choices they made.469 For
Marshall, fulfilling this interpretive goal warranted an interpretive
methodology known today as "originalism," and involved analyzing
all reliably relevant evidence indicating the intent of the framers and
ratifiers-from constitutional language, to records of debates, to
other aspects of the political context in which the text was framed
and ratified.470
Of course, for judges deciding cases a century or two after the
ratification of constitutional text, the justification of interpretive
method could not be as direct as was Marshall's. In 2006, who is the
sovereign whose values ought to be vindicated? Is it the People, long
since dead, who created the text in question, or the People today, who
not only are governed by the Court's interpretations, but who have
the uncontested right to create their own constitutional provisions
and to select Supreme Court Justices? How one answers these
foundational questions must have far reaching implications for
articulating an interpretive goal, and justifying an interpretive
methodology for achieving that goal.m
Third, having identified and justified an interpretive
methodology, the judge should, through applying that methodology,
identify values that underlie the relevant constitutional text. Toward
this end, it is critical to recognize that there are inevitably competing
values underlying the meaning of all constitutional provisions-as
the original understanding of unconstitutional racial discrimination
accommodated an aspiration for racial equality with continuing
racist notions;472 and the original understanding of liberties specially
protected against state intrusion by the Due Process Clause
accommodated an aspiration for individual liberty with ordinary
469. This, or some variation on the idea, would be the implicit interpretive goal.
One variation would seek to identify not only the constitutional choices actually made
by the sovereign People, but also the choices they would have made, had they thought
about an issue not actually contemplated. Justice Jackson suggested such a notion
when he said, "Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned had
they foreseen modern conditions, must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic
as the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh." Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
470. See BORK, supra note 78, at 165 (discussing "abundant sources" for inferring
the original understanding of particular constitutional provisions).
4 71. For more on possible interpretive methodologies, see supra text accompanying
notes 136-38.
472. See Chang, Constitutional Intent, supra note 41, at 833-38.
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concerns for social order through law;473 and the original
understanding
of
Congress'
limited
enumerated
powers
accommodated the pursuit of benefits anticipated through
authorizing the creation of national policy with a continuing desire
for state autonomy.474
Identifying such competing values underlying constitutional text
is necessary for providing a foundation from which applicable
substantive constitutional principles can be meticulously derived and
defined, and for identifying the normative framework within which
judges and political actors should understand the meaning of such
principles. Identifying the normative framework within which
substantive constitutional principles ought to be understood is
essential for transforming otherwise abstract and formulaic doctrine
into normatively evocative declarations. Framing substantive
constitutional principles as normatively evocative declarations is
critical toward fulfilling Madison's and Hamilton's vision of a valuebased constitutionalism capable of securing "the permanent and
aggregate interests of the community'' against the short-sighted
impulses of majority faction.475
Fourth, having identified the competing values underlying
constitutional text, the judge should carefully frame the elements of
a substantive constitutional principle in a way that is derived from,
expresses, and serves the implications of those values. Of course, the
crystallization of mature doctrine will take time.476 But once doctrine
has matured, the Court should explain the connection between each
element of the substantive constitutional principle and the identified
competing underlying values. The Court should endeavor to address

473. Id. at 811-14.
474. Unless a policy is constructed from competing public values, there is no need
for a constitutional mandate to force a greater commitment to one side of those
competing values than Congress can be trusted to respect. It is the competition of
values, and an anticipated congressional inclination to favor one side of that
competition, that provides a rationale for constitutional mandates forcing a greater
commitment (than Congress can be trusted to respect) to the other side of that
competition. See Chang, Critique, supra note 37, at 293-95; see also supra text
accompanying notes 39-51.
475. Having defined "faction" as "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a
majority or minority of the whole, who are united by some common impulse of passion,
or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and
aggregate interests of the community," THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78, Madison defines
"the great object to which our inquiries are directed" as "secur[ing] the public good and
private rights against the danger of ... a [majority] faction." Id. at 80.
4 76. See supra text accompanying notes 117-18.
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any ambiguities in each element's meaning, and either resolve those
ambiguities, or explain why they remain.477
Explicitly Deriving and Defining Adjudicative Rules. As
suggested throughout this Article, different considerations must
underlie the derivation and definition of substantive constitutional
principles and adjudicative rules. Framing adjudicative rules must
be guided by the goal of best avoiding error in resolving those issues
of fact made relevant by the elements of the applicable substantive
constitutional principle, and in applying those elements to the facts
found.
First, toward deriving and defining an adjudicative rule for
enforcing the applicable substantive constitutional principle, that
substantive principle must be clearly identified.478 This, of course,
will have been achieved if the foregoing parts of this "template" have
been followed.
Second, the judge must identify (and justify) the analytical
method through which she will derive and define the foundational
adjudicative
rule--the
presumption
of
permissibility
or
impermissibility. Is the adjudicative presumption to be determined
through a normative analysis, identifying the constitutional costs
that would be incurred through an erroneous invalidation of the
challenged act (and the erroneous intrusion on the foundational norm
477. Close attention to substantive constitutional principles as derived from and
evoking values deemed to underlie relevant text is necessary not only for framing new
doctrine, but also for an effective critical taxonomy of existing doctrine. One might
quibble, for example, which Professor Roosevelt's analysis of the Court's doctrine for
adjudicating equal protection challenges to laws that discriminate because of gender.
Roosevelt focuses on the shift from Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130 (1872) (in which the
Court upholds a state bar against the practice of law by women), to Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (in which the Court's plurality applies "strict
scrutiny'' to gender classifications), as a shift in "decision rules" that had "lost their fit
with the underlying operative proposition-discrimination against women had shifted
from natural to invidious." See Roosevelt, supra note 20, at 1688. Roosevelt is correct,
in my view, in suggesting that there had been a shift in the implicit substantive
constitutional principle. But what warrants emphasis in this context is less that
Frontiero was part of a reform of adjudicative (decision) rules to fit changed
substantive constitutional (operative) principles but, rather, the change in substantive
constitutional principle itself. What was the new substantive definition of
unconstitutional gender discrimination? I would suggest that the Court was moving
toward a substantive constitutional principle prohibiting purposes rooted in gender
role-typing or stereotyping-a destination rather clearly reached in Mississippi
University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). If this is, indeed, the definition of
the applicable substantive constitutional principle, through what interpretive
methodology is it derived? These questions concerning the derivation and definition of
substantive constitutional principles must be raised and addressed as prior to, and
more fundamental than, the derivation, definition, and "fit" of adjudicative (decision)
rules for their enforcement.
478. See supra text accompanying notes 234-40.
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of electorally accountable discretion within constitutional
boundaries), or an erroneous failure to invalidate (and the erroneous
intrusion on the particular substantive constitutional values at
issue)?479 Or is the adjudicative presumption to be determined
through a probabilistic analysis, identifying a category of
governmental act, including the one in question, suggesting a
probability of permissibility, or impermissibility, with respect to the
substantive constitutional principle at issue?480 Or, is the
presumption to be determined through some combination of the
normative and probabilistic approaches?
Third, whatever analytical method is identified (and justified)
for deriving and defining the adjudicative presumption, the judge
must apply that method to the particular doctrinal context presented
and, of course, actually frame the adjudicative presumption.
Fourth, the judge might frame supplemental adjudicative rules
tailored to resolving the issues of fact made relevant by the
applicable substantive constitutional principle. Such supplemental
adjudicative rules could be derived from the relationships among the
substantive constitutional principle, the foundational adjudicative
presumption, and the rationale for that adjudicative presumption.
They could include rules identifying categories of evidence relevant
to establishing essential elements of the substantive constitutional
principle,481 or rules identifying ancillary facts from which
permissible or mandatory inferences of dispositive fact ought to be
drawn.482

479. See supra text accompanying notes 142-51.
480. See supra text accompanying notes 152-57, 198-207, 446-53.
481. In Arlington Heights, for example, Justice Powell identified several categories
of evidence that a challenger could employ to meet its burden to show that a facially
neutral law was motivated at least in part by an impermissible racially discriminatory
purpose. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-67.
482. One might understand the substantial (economic) effects principle from Jones,
for example, as an adjudicative rule establishing a basis from which a court may, or
must, draw an inference of congressional purpose to promote the volume or flow of
interstate commerce. See supra text accompanying notes 409-11. One might
understand the requirement of factfinding in Powell's Bakke opinion as an
adjudicative rule establishing a basis from which a court must draw an inference of
purposes rooted in racial stereotypes. See supra text accompanying notes 258-62. One
. might understand Justice Rehnquist's preference for congressional findings of fact in
Lopez as an adjudicative rule establishing a basis from which a court must draw an
inference of purposes other than one to promote the volume or flow of interstate
commerce. See supra text accompanying notes 447-54.
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CONCLUSION: TOWARD CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE CLEARLY
ROOTED IN, AND EXPRESSNE OF, LEGITIMIZED PUBLIC VALUES

Like doctrine in other areas of law, constitutional doctrine
should be comprised of two explicitly differentiated kinds of legal
rule. Substantive constitutional principles should be framed for
determining which facts have what legal significance-for identifying
issues of legally relevant fact. Adjudicative rules, most
fundamentally rules allocating the burden of persuasion, should be
framed for resolving those issues of fact, and for applying the
substantive law to the facts found. Substantive constitutional
principles should be derived from and evoke values deemed to
underlie particular provisions of constitutional text. Adjudicative
rules should be derived from concerns for minimizing the costs of
making erroneous findings of fact, and of reaching erroneous
conclusions about a challenged policy's constitutionality, under
applicable substantive standards.
Unlike doctrine in other areas of law, constitutional doctrine has
not been framed in a structure that explicitly differentiates the
derivation and definition of substantive principles and adjudicative
rules. Rather, the Supreme Court has created formulaic doctrine,483
in context after constitutional context, that fails to serve relevant
underlying values, fails to identify and define necessary elements,
and conflates considerations relevant to defining what must be
proved and those relevant to defining how that proof is to be made.
Failing explicitly to differentiate the derivation and definition of
substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules results in
ambiguities that undermine the adjudicative function of judicial
review. Ambiguity in defining substantive constitutional principles
risks adjudicating issues of fact that ought to be irrelevant, and
neglecting issues of fact that ought to be dispositive. Failing
explicitly to derive and define adjudicative rules risks erroneously
allocating the burden of persuasion. Ill-framed substantive rules for
identifying issues of significant fact, and ill-framed adjudicative rules
for resolving those issues of fact, can only increase the risks of both
upholding government action that "in fact" is unconstitutional and
striking down government action that "in fact" is not
unconstitutional.

483. See, e.g., Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165,
202-03 (1985); Amar, supra note 17, at 27 (suggesting that to focus on synthesizing
constitutional doctrine rather than on ascertaining the Constitution's meaning is "to
miss the point of many constitutional rights and structures-to spend too much time
pondering arid formulas and not enough time recalling the world the Constitution
rejected and imagining the world it promised").
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Furthermore, failing explicitly to differentiate the derivation and
definition of substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative
rules results in ambiguities that undermine the political function of
judicial review. When political actors are not effectively informed
about the elements of their conduct that render government action
unconstitutional, they could be both undeterred from enacting an
impermissible law and deterred from enacting a permissible law.
Either way, an essential objective of constitutionalism-the exercise
of political will within constitutional boundaries-is thwarted.
In our democracy, legal rules are created and enforced to serve
public values-values that ought to be publicly identified, contested,
and selected. No less than for contract law, or tort law, or criminal
law-and perhaps more so-constitutional law foundationally ought
to be about preferred public values. There is no other reason for a
body of superior law that governs inferior law, or for a practice in
which judges appointed "during good behavior" exercise a power that
is designed to supersede the decisions of officials accountable to the
People.
Our processes of constitutional democracy establish the
framework within which disagreements about governing public
values are to be resolved. The familiar counter-majoritarian difficulty
of judicial review underscores the importance of ensuring, to the
extent possible, that constitutional cases are properly decided, and
that public officials are duly instructed about the boundaries of
political discretion, according to rightly framed substantive
constitutional commandments. Hamilton's rationale for judicial
review was predicated on the faith that federal judges have the
capacity and inclination to exercise judgment, not will, and thereby
effectively to identify the Constitution's meaning and enforce its
mandates.484
Eternal debates about whether Dred Scott was "correctly"
decided--or Plessy, Brown, Loving, or Roe-are premised on the
notion that there is such a thing as deciding a constitutional
controversy "correctly;" that there is such a thing as Hamiltonian
interpretive "judgment;" and-a critical point-that criteria for
decisional correctness are different from questions of political
desirability. The political function of judicial review contemplates
that political actors will abide by the fair implications of decided
cases-e.g., feeling constitutionally free, if so inclined, to create
separate but equal facilities for blacks and whites after Plessy, and
feeling constitutionally constrained from maintaining racially
segregated public schools after Brown; feeling constitutionally free, if
so inclined, to criminalize sexual conduct between people of the same
484.

See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
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gender after Bowers u. Hardwick,485 and feeling constrained from
doing so after Lawrence u. Texas.486
Thus, it matters greatly that the Court's voice, as oracle of
constitutional meaning, explicitly defines substantive principles,
explicitly predicated on identified values, explicitly derived through
an identified and plausibly legitimate interpretive methodology. If
not, the justification for a judicial opinion intervening in politically
accountable decisionmaking, or refraining from intervening, is no
more compelling than would be intervention decided through the flip
of a coin. Doctrine that does not explicitly differentiate the derivation
and definition of substantive constitutional principles and
adjudicative rules intertwines discrete functions, risks the unreliable
adjudication of constitutional controversies, and leaves unfulfilled
the promise of a judicial participation in our democratic
constitutionalism that legitimately clarifies foundational values and
appropriately enriches public debate.
Through constitutionalism, the American people pursue a better
version of our laws and our politics--one that seeks "the permanent
and aggregate interests of the community" more than we otherwise
would.487 Through constitutionalism, the American people attend to
certain values---constitutionally selected values-more than we
otherwise would.488 If judicial review is to serve its adjudicative and
political functions, if judicial review is to help the People and our
representatives toward better self-governance, then judges must
pursue a better version of constitutional doctrine.489 Practical or
merely ideal, embraced or debated, the proposition that
constitutional doctrine-like doctrine in other areas of law--ought to
be framed in terms that explicitly differentiate the derivation and
definition of substantive principles and adjudicative rules, could
reform the ways in which the legally-trained and lay alike think
about constitutional law. Less formalistic, less formulaic, less
technically foreign, and more derived from and expressive of clear
and legitimized public values, doctrine comprised of explicitly derived
and defined substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative

485.
486.
487.
488.

478 U.S. 186 (1986).
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 83.
See Chang, Constitutional Intent, supra note 37, at 774-84; Chang, Critique,
supra note 37, at 293-95.
489. Richard Fallon, who Amar views as more concerned with the doctrine than
with the document, Amar, supra note 17, at 27, and who urges a "theory of the secondbest" when Justices cannot agree as to what constitutes "fidelity" to the Constitution,
Fallon, supra note 17, at 117, nevertheless recognizes that the foundational reason for
judicial review is the "successful specification and implementation of constitutional
values ... ."Id. at 142.
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rules could be the basis for better judicial decisions in adjudicating
cases, and better political debate about the constitutional
implications of legislative options. If this does not describe the best
that judicial review can do, it at least may describe a step in the right
direction.

***

